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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the level, determinants and consequences of the Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) governance disclosure in Islamic Banks (IBs) 
that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards. The aims of this thesis are as follows: first, to measure 
the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure; second, to identify the determinants of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure; and finally, to examine the impact of AAOIFI governance disclosure on 
bank performance.  
The study uses the manual content analysis approach to measure the level of disclosure for 126 
bank-year observations. The study constructed an AAOIFI governance index which includes 56 
items based on AAOIFI governance, 2010. To examine the determinants and impact on the 
performance of AAOIFI governance disclosure, for a sample of IBs, the study used ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression analysis.  
The analysis showed that the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure is very low (about 33%) in the 
sample of IBs. Using CG mechanisms as potential determinants of AAOIFI governance, this 
research found a significant positive relationship between AAOIFI governance and audit 
committee size (ACs). However, it showed an insignificant relationship among AAOIFI governance 
disclosure and other variables (board size, board meeting, CEO, board independence and audit 
committee meeting (ACM)). With regard to the consequences of AAOIFI governance disclosure, 
the study investigated the influence of AAOIFI governance disclosure on bank performance. The 
study used two measurements of bank performance, return on asset (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE), and the analysis showed an insignificant relationship among AAOIFI governance disclosure 
and bank performance. 
The study highlighted the implications of AAOIFI governance disclosure for users of annual reports 
in IBs. One of these implications is that the regulatory council and policymakers might identify the 
minimum level of AAOIFI governance that every bank should disclose in an annual report. 
Furthermore, the AAOIFI organisation should be cooperative and work closely with the central 
banks in the countries that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards, to encourage IFIs in these 
countries to comply with CG standards.  
 
Keywords: AAOIFI Governance, content analysis, disclosure level, Islamic Banks, Bank 
Performance 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
The Islamic banking industry has expanded dramatically universally. According to Ernst and 
Young (2015), the global Islamic assets held by conventional banks reached over US $1.8 
trillion in 2013. In fact, since there has been more attention in financial institutions on the 
progression and development of Islamic banking, the corporate governance (CG) of Islamic 
banks (IBs) has become more developed and seems to be more of a challenge (Grassa, 2016). 
In addition, CG has a greater level of importance in financial institutions and has become a 
fundamental role in reducing the owner-management conflicts, since banks have begun to 
mobilise public saving, depend on public trust and have more diverse stakeholders (Darmadi, 
2011). It is important to consider the concept of CG in relation to Islamic banking in order to 
maintain this accomplishment and to further ensure the success of Islamic banking (Sulaiman 
et al., 2015). So, IFIs must be guided to achieve their objectives in line with Sharia principles 
(Zain et al., 2015). 
Bandsuch et al. (2008: 101) define CG in the following way: “Corporate governance (CG) refers 
to the variety of principles and practices that direct the core processes and relationships of 
business. More specifically, CG reflects the formalised values and procedures implemented by 
the business’s recognised authority (e.g., owners, directors, and managers) in its various 
operations and interactions with stakeholders”. 
 From the Islamic perspective, CG is a system that ensures accountability and responsibility 
regarding Islamic principles and fairness to all stakeholders (Matoussi and Grassa, 2012).  
According to Hasan (2011:30), the concept of Sharia governance is “peculiarly exclusive and 
unique to Islamic system financial management”. Sharia governance has a unique character in 
the Islamic system of financial management. The concept of good CG includes three crucial 
issues, namely transparency, disclosure and accountability, to ensure the protection of all 
stakeholders, including minority shareholders (Paino et al., 2011). Disclosure is the primary 
focus of the accountability function of IBs to its stakeholders (Ismail, 2015). According to the 
AAOIFI (2010), the annual reports of IBs should disclose all fundamental information to notify 
society about their operation. Thus, IBs should disclose as much information as possible in a 
succinct, truthful and comprehensive way to their stakeholders (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). 
Societies also might drive IBs to improve their transparency and show a higher level of 
support to their stakeholders with regard to improving their ethical behaviour (Al-Qadi, 2012). 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is a limited amount of research that has 
explored the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure among IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI 
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standards. However, previous studies have not examined the factors that affect levels of 
AAOIFI governance disclosure for IBs that have mandatorily adopted AAOIFI standards. A 
number of CG studies examined the determinants of CG disclosure level, such as (Samaha et 
al., 2015; Farook et al., 2011; Bhatti and Bhatti, 2009; Albassam, 2014; Abdullah, 2013). In 
addition, limited studies have explored AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs, based on AAOIFI 
2010 governance standards. For example, Abdullah (2013) is limited to AAOIFI governance 
standards No. 6 only, while other studies focus on standards No. 7 or No. 1 only (Ismail, 2015; 
Harun, 2016). Other studies focus on specific countries only such as, Al-Baluchi (2006) who 
study just Bahrain, Sudan, Qatar and Jordan, whereas Harun (2016) focuses on the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). Thus, this study examined AAOIFI governance disclosure for IBs 
that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards based on a comprehensive disclosure index 
developed using AAOIFI governance version 2010. The researcher focuses on IBs that have 
mandatorily adopted AAOIFI standards, because it is expected that these banks will meet 
most of the AAOIFI standards requirements, especially the banks that operate in Bahrain. 
Bahrain has a strong regulatory authority and a fairly strong accounting profession to ensure 
compliance. Also, IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards will disclose at least the bare 
minimum amount of information required by the AAOIFI, as it is expected by the stakeholders 
(AI-Abdullatif, 2007). Consequently, all IBs should prepare their annual reports based on 
AAOIFI standards. Therefore, this study seeks to examine if IBs disclose AAOIFI governance in 
their annual reports, with the expectation that IBs should cover all of the AAOIFI governance 
standards, because investors in these banks want to ensure that their funds are used 
efficiently (invested based on Islamic Sharia principles). 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: 1.2 Research Motivation, 1.3 Research Aim 
and Objectives, 1.4 Research Questions, 1.5 Potential Contributions of the Study, 1.6 
Summaries of Empirical Findings and 1.7 Structure of the Thesis.  
 
1.2 Research Motivation 
Compliance with Sharia in Islamic institutions is the primary objective of CG reporting from an 
Islamic point of view (Baydoun and Willett, 2000). As a result, one of the objectives of CG is 
that IBs have a responsibility to disclose all crucial information to their stakeholders about 
their operations (Maali et al., 2006).  
Although IBs must comply with the fundamental principle of Islam in their operations and 
financial transactions, Arifin et al. (2005) argued that there is lack of generally accepted 
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governing, supervisory guidelines and best practice, that can be adapted to the specific 
challenges of IBs.  
The AAOIFI pronouncement is designed to serve IBs in different countries, and some countries 
(such as Bahrain, Qatar and Sudan) have mandatorily adopted AAOIFI standards. But, at 
present, the AAOIFI has no power to enforce its standards. Therefore, the first motivation for 
this study is to look at the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs that mandatorily adopt 
AAOIFI standards. The researcher expects a high level of AAOIFI governance disclosure from 
IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards. This is because these standards have 
comprehensive guidance for IFIs and that Islamic accountability is the main motivation for 
dealing with IBs, constituting a main competitive advantage for IFIs. In addition, one of the 
key objectives of accounting and reporting, from an Islamic perspective, is to ensure that the 
business is accountable and adheres to Islamic rules (Sharia) (Maali et al., 2006). Therefore, 
IBs should disclose more information in their annual reports to ensure that they have attained 
the level of Sharia compliance, required by all stakeholders.  
The second motivation for this study arises from the lack of previous research that studies the 
impact of CG on AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs. There are a few studies that focus on 
the concept of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs (Vinnicombe, 2010; Ullah, 2013; El-Halaby 
and Hussainey, 2015; Abdullah, 2013; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). However, these studies have 
not considered all of the AAOIFI governance and have not examined all countries that 
mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards. Therefore, this study attempts to fill this gap in the 
literature by examining the impact of CG mechanisms on AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs.  
In line with the first and second motivations, the third motivation for this study arises from a 
lack of studies that have examined the association between AAOIFI governance and bank 
performance. Consequently, this study seeks to investigate and address this. The importance 
of CG disclosure in IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards is established during this 
study, because these banks should follow these standards as much as possible to 
demonstrate to all stakeholders that they are compliant with Sharia. As far as the researcher 
knows there have only been a few studies that have examined the CG disclosure in IBs, 
namely Abdullah et al. (2015). Who investigated the determinants of voluntary CG disclosure 
in IBs in the Southeast Asian and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) regions; only AAOIFI 
governance No. 6 was studied. 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
The aim of this study is to analytically examine the AAOIFI governance disclosure levels in the 
annual reports of IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards. Moreover, this research 
examines its determinants and effect on performance. To achieve the aim of the research, the 
study has these objectives:  
1. To measure the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs that mandatorily adopt 
AAOIFI standards. 
2. To investigate the influence of CG mechanisms on AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs. 
3. To investigate the influence of AAOIFI governance disclosure on IB’s performance. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
Based on the above research aim and objectives and also the research motivations, there is a 
clear need to undertake further research into the AAOIFI governance disclosure of IBs that 
mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards, because this is lacking in previous studies in AAOIFI 
governance. Therefore, the following research questions have been addressed: 
1. What is the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs? 
To answer this question, a comprehensive unweighted AAOIFI governance disclosure index is 
adopted in this study (Table 4.3). The unweighted approach is used to code and measure the 
level of disclosure of AAOIFI governance in the annual reports. Consequently, a ‘1’ is given for 
each item in the AAOIFI governance disclosure index in the annual report, and a ‘0’ if 
otherwise. Each IB will be given a score based on the total number of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure items in the annual report. An unweighted disclosure index means that all items 
are given equal scores and importance (Shehata, 2014). This was developed by the researcher 
to indicate the extent of AAOIFI governance disclosure in the annual reports of IBs that 
mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards. 
2. To what extent do CG mechanisms affect AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs? 
In answering this second research question, this study focuses on the influence of the CG 
mechanisms on AAOIFI governance disclosure. The CG mechanisms are: board size, 
independent directors, number of board meetings, non-executive directors, audit committee 
size and number of audit committee meetings. The data of CG mechanisms are mostly 
gathered from the annual reports of IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards, but the 
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financial statements are collected from Fitch Connect (www.fitchconnect.com). The OLS 
regression model is used to test the effect of CG mechanisms on AAOIFI governance 
disclosure level. 
 
3. What is the impact of AAOIFI governance disclosure on the IBs’ performance?  
To answer the third research question, the study used bank performance as the dependent 
variable and the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure as an independent variable. The OLS 
regression model was used to test the impact of AAOIFI governance disclosure levels on the 
performance of each bank.  
 
1.5 Potential Contributions of the Research 
The current study is expected to offer some contributions to the governance disclosure 
literature in three primary ways: AAOIFI governance level of disclosure, the impact of CG 
mechanisms on AAOIFI governance disclosure and the impact of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure on the banks’ performance.  
First, this will be achieved through the analysis of prior studies. Many of these studies have 
carried out a limited analysis of AAOIFI governance disclosure only, such as Abdullah (2013), 
who studied one AAOIFI governance standard in her study (No. 6 only); or  other study who 
used a general AAOIFI standards index in specific countries, Al-Baluchi (2006).  
The current study makes a contribution to the existing literature on CG disclosure by 
measuring the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure, and uses a comprehensive index based 
on all of the AAOIFI governance standards from No. 1 to No. 6 (that were issued in 2010). The 
items included in the index are selected very carefully by reading the AAOIFI governance 
standards. The primary approach used in the previous studies is to initially select a group of 
items that represent the disclosure checklist and then employ them to screen the annual 
report. Next, each item is divided into sub-items, based on essential points in each standard 
(see Table 4.3). Furthermore, the sample of IBs in this current study is different from those 
seen in previous studies, such as Platonova et al. (2016) who focused on 24 IBs from the GCC 
region, and Abdullah (2013) who examined a sample of 67 IBs from the Southeast Asian and 
GCC region. 
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In contrast, this study includes all IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards. These include 
ten countries: Bahrain, Syria, Qatar, Sudan, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Oman and 
Mauritius. This study, however, excludes IBs in Lebanon and Tunisia and some banks from 
Sudan, because the researcher did not have access to the annual reports of these banks and, 
despite sending emails to these banks, they did not reply. 
Moreover, there has been a lot of attention on a wide range of research in recent years, 
which has focused on AAOIFI standards, such as El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016), Sarea (2012) 
and Vinnicombe (2010). However, these studies do not focus on AAOIFI governance but study 
AAOIFI accounting standards and CSR. The current study is the first study to focus on all of the 
AAOIFI governance.  
Secondly, the literature on CG provides mixed empirical evidence for variables related to the 
association between CG characteristics and the level of disclosure (Herwiyanti et al., 2015; 
Abdullah et al., 2015; Srairi, 2015). However, there are limited studies that have sought to 
conduct an analysis concerning the effect of CG mechanisms on AAOIFI governance 
disclosure. Therefore, the second contribution of the current study shows the main drivers for 
the disclosure of AAOIFI governance, by considering the impact of bank governance on the 
disclosure level among IBs that adopt AAOIFI standards. Finally, to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, the current study offers the first empirical evidence of the impact of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure in IB performance.  
 
1.6 Summary of Empirical Results  
 The main findings in this study are: 
 The level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs is on average 33% per annual 
report. It seems that the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs that 
mandatorily adopt AAOIFI is very low. It is lower compared with some previous 
studies, such as (Paino et al., 2011; Vinnicombe, 2010; Al-Baluchi, 2006 and El-
Halaby and Hussainey, 2016), which found a higher level of disclosure in IFIs. 
 The only CG factor that affects the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure is ACs, 
which is found to be statistically significant and positive at 1%, which indicates 
that the number of audit committee members affects the level of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure in IBs.  
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 Regarding consequences, the study finds that AAOIFI governance disclosure has 
an insignificant relationship with bank performance, measured by both return on 
asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE).  
 
1.7 Research Implications 
The main implications in this study are:  
With respect to the result of the insignificant effect of AAOIFI governance disclosure on bank 
performance (measured using ROA and ROE ratios) ,this result confirms that IBs focus on being an 
effective corporate citizen and accepting their social responsibility to help develop the 
community, more than on how to make a profit. 
The result of the AAOIFI governance disclosure level demonstrates that the information related to 
AAOIFI governance was limited in the annual reports for the selected IBs. Thus, the regulatory 
council and policymakers might identify the minimum level of AAOIFI governance that every bank 
should disclose in the annual report. Moreover, in the future, policymakers should be more 
effective in supporting IBs to introduce the importance of AAOIFI governance to the staff by 
additional training for internal sharia review members, audit and governance members; this could 
potentially increase the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure. 
It could also be useful for the AAOIFI member to be cooperative and work extra closely with the 
central banks for the countries that adopt AAOIFI standards as mandatory, to ensure IBs in these 
countries are following the AAOIFI standards. 
The result of AAOIFI governance disclosure level shown in this study can be useful to the Sharia 
Supervisor Board (SSB) in the IBs, because the SSB can review and confirm that all of the activities 
are completely compliant with Sharia rules. This means that the SSB could have the authority to 
prohibit and evaluate the banks and guide when necessary, otherwise the SSB should disclose this 
information to the public. To do so, IBs will highlight their AAOIFI governance, and that, in turn, 
will increase their reputation and improve the faith of current clients and, as a consequence, 
engage with new investors and show a high level of trust from the public in IBs. This implication is 
supported by the result of El-Halaby et al. (2018) which suggested that IBs should improve the 
level of disclosure to engage more clients based on their faith and loyalty of following sharia 
compliance. 
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1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured into eight chapters. This chapter focuses on an overview of the study, 
looking at the motivation, research aim and objectives, research questions, potential 
contribution, a summary of empirical findings, and research implications. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the background of IBs, the characteristics of IBs and the AAOIFI (the 
benchmark for IBs). It also looks at the concept of CG and accountability, both in general and 
from an Islamic perspective, and provides a theoretical framework that has been applied in 
this study, such as agency, signalling and stakeholders’ theories.  
Chapter 3 reviews the literature related to the three research objectives: the level of CG 
disclosure in IFIs; the determinants of AAOIFI governance disclosure; and the impact of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure on IB’s performance. The chapter also develops the research 
hypotheses related to the determinants of AAOIFI governance disclosure and its impact on 
performance.  
Chapter 4 explains the methodology and discusses the research philosophy, strategies and 
research approach. The chapter explains and justifies the selection of the sample banks. In 
addition, it discusses the content analysis and discusses the AAOIFI governance disclosure 
index. Furthermore, it presents the assessment of the reliability and validity of the AAOIFI 
governance disclosure using the pilot study. Finally, the research design is outlined. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the results of the empirical findings on the level of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure, its determinants and its impact on IB’s performance, respectively. 
Finally, chapter 8 provides the concluding remarks of the thesis and presents a summary of 
the key findings of the research, critical reflection on the results, and discusses their 
implications. The remainder of the chapter shows the limitations of this research and 
highlights several avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Overview 
The current chapter presents a conceptual and theoretical framework used in this research. This 
chapter comprises of three parts: the first part shows an overview of the basic foundations that 
form the substance of IBs and sources of Sharia law; the second part outlines the concept of CG, 
both in general and from an Islamic viewpoint; moreover, the notion of accountability in Islam 
and the governance and guidelines of IBs (AAOIFI). The third part shows a discussion on the 
theoretical framework of CG through agency, signalling, accountability and stakeholder theories 
and from an Islamic approach identifying the contributions of these theories. 
2.2 Part One: Background on Islamic Banks 
2.2.1 Historical and Development of the Islamic banking  
Islamic banking is a banking or financing activities that comply with Islamic law (Sharia law) (Lateh 
et al., 2009). According to Kettell (2011), Islamic banking is based on Islamic principles that are 
completely different from conventional banking principles.  In 1963, the first IB was instituted in 
Egypt, ‘The Mit Ghamr Savings Bank’. It was set up in a provincial village in the centre of the Nile 
Delta in Egypt and provided credit to small artisans and providers (Haron and Shanmugam, 1997, 
Mayer, 1985). Despite the political circumstances of the time, the bank was successful; however, 
in 1968 the Egyptian government closed the bank because of the changing political situation. 
However, the success of this IB paved the way, in 1971, for the Nasser Social Bank (Ariff and Iqbal, 
2011). Another attempt was made in Malaysia, in 1968, and ‘Lembaga Urusan Tabung Haji’, was 
set up to help Muslim pilgrims save money for their pilgrimages (Abdullah, 2013). 
The progress of the Nasser Social Bank in Egypt affected many Muslim countries to establish 
Islamic banking (Malkawi, 2010). In 1974 the main institutionalisation derived from the 
foundation of the Islamic Development Bank. Therefore, this political endorsement was supplied 
via the organisation of the Islamic association, that was set up to represent the development-
orientated ‘World Bank’ of the Muslim world (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). 
For the past three decades, Islamic economics has been one of the quickest growing industries, 
and today there are more than 250 financial institutions across 45 countries (Magalhaes and Al-
Saad, 2013). Nowadays, IBs are the higher proportion of IFIs, extending locally and internationally 
over both Muslim and Western countries (Sarea and Hanefah, 2013). According to Abdullah et al. 
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(2015), the percentage of assets of IBs around the world compounded with an annual increase 
rate of about 17% from 2009 to 2013. In addition, these assets in six core markets will reach the 
US $1.8 trillion by 2019. "This growth not only relates to assets but also to the products covered, 
this growth has outstripped corresponding developments in a complementary regulatory 
framework, necessitated by the unique characteristics of some Islamic 
contract”(Vinnicombe,2012: 78 ). 
In the modern world, IBs aim to enhance and improve the enforcement of the principles of Islamic 
law to all banking transactions, to make all stakeholders guarantee that all banking transactions 
are consistent with Sharia law (Paino et al., 2011). Countries that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI 
standards are the main leader in the Islamic banking sector. The AAOIFI standards were 
established in Bahrain where has a number of IBs and financial institutions. Moreover, it also 
hosts the General Council for Islamic Banks and Institutions.  
Bahrain and Sudan were the first countries to adopt AAOIFI (1998), followed by Qatar and Jordan 
(2002). So, the current study refers to these countries as the oldest ones that have adopted 
AAOIFI mandatorily. The first IB in Bahrain was set up in 1978, and today there are more than 20 
IFIs in Bahrain. The total assets of IBs in Bahrain reached the US $25.4 billion by the end of 2012 
(Central Bank of Bahrain, 2012). 
Islamic banking in Bahrain has a specific law that is different from the laws of conventional banks 
and, according to ministerial decision No. 6, of 1998, IFIs must mandatorily adopt AAOIFI 
standards (Safieddine, 2009). From 1 January 2011, Bahrain issued a CG code by the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce and the Central Bank of Bahrain. This code was set up not to change 
company law, but to enhance the company law and ensure equal disclosure under that law 
(Central Bank of Bahrain, 2011). 
Like Bahrain, Sudan became the second country to adopt AAOIFI standards in 1998. The first IB in 
Sudan was the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (1977); this was the first step to introduce Sudanese 
Islamic banks. IBs in Sudan was favoured by both the government and the people because most 
Sudanese people were afraid to conduct transactions with conventional banks that ran their 
operations based on interest (Hamdi, 1982). The main aim of the Sudanese IBs is to help and 
encourage society by offering support in various ways, such as supporting the agricultural sector, 
industrial sector and social sector (Mohsin, 2005). However, Sudan has faced some economic 
problems. The Sudanese foreign debt is $24 billion, and the civil war costs $1 million every day; all 
of these factors affect the IBs and Sudanese companies (Hussein, 2001).  
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In Jordan, it is more than two decades since the implementation of IBs. The Jordan Islamic Bank 
was founded in 1978 and was the first IB in Jordan since then the number of IBs in Jordan have 
increased, (Saleh and Zeitun, 2006). The IBs in Jordan plays an important role in society by 
supporting different sectors in the country that require financial assistance. In addition, IBs in 
Jordan help the Jordanian economy by doing things in different ways to achieve their goals, such 
as providing training for their employees and adopting IT to provide good services for their 
customers. Moreover, this is helping to expand products and services of IBs to society.  
Qatar is also an example of a country that has adopted AAOIFI standards mandatorily. It is also 
one of the six greatest Islamic finance economies in the world, the total amount of Islamic assets 
in Qatar is over $81 billion (Tlemsani, 2015). Since 2002, IBs in Qatar have asked the Qatar Central 
Bank to carry out CG reports based on AAOIFI standards (Al-Baluchi, 2006; Safeddine, 2009). 
Karim (1996) claimed that the policies of accounting and disclosure level are different from one 
nation to another, and also from bank to another bank in the same nation, and occasionally from 
one year to another year.      
Farook et al., (2011) state that IBs should follow principles based on Islamic law (Sharia). The 
purpose of these principles should not be the maximisation of profit but should be to support 
society in avoiding riba (interest) and poverty (Besar et al., 2009). The main characteristic of IBs is 
the prohibition of interest in any activity because Islam prohibits Muslims from dealing with 
interest (riba). The Quran and Sunnah are the essential sources of Sharia, and it can be seen that 
the Quran determines the principles that are used as a control for IBs. Therefore, IBs not only 
have to carry out their aim of making a profit, but they also have to comply with  Sharia principles 
(Ismail, 2015). 
2.2.2 The principles of Islamic banking 
The major difference between Islamic and conventional finance is Sharia law, upon which the 
principles of Islamic finance are founded (Munir, 2013). Elasrag (2014) states that Sharia includes 
all sides of the life of a Muslim, besides religion, spirituality and principles, a Muslim reflects upon 
the social, political, cultural, legal, commercial and financial aspects of human existence. Similarly, 
Asyraf and Nurdianawati (2007) state that the holistic vision of Islam is a plenary and organised 
system of life reflected by the concept of Sharia. Sharia defined by Sardar (2003:17) as “a system 
of ethics and values covering all aspects of life (e.g. personal, social, political, economic and 
intellectual) with its unchanging bearings as well as its major means of adjusting to change”. The 
guidance of Sharia is given from the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the prophet Muhammed 
(Peace Be Upon Him). Previous studies have discussed the principles of Islamic finance (Zaher and 
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Kabir Hassan, 2001; Al-Jarhi and Iqbal, 2001; Wilson, 2006; Visser, 2013; Abdullah, 2013; Ghayad, 
2008). In the following subsection, the six rules that govern Islamic investment and IFIs will be 
discussed.  
2.2.2.1 Prohibition of interest rate (riba)  
 
El-Ashker (1987) defines the meaning of riba as the different among the amount borrowed and 
the amount due to be paid back. The ban of riba is mentioned in different places in the Holy 
Quran. For example, “Allah destroys interest and gives increase for charities” (AL-BAQARAH, 
2:276) and “O you who have believed, do not consume usury, doubled and multiplied, but fear 
Allah that you may be successful” (ALI IMRAN, 3:130).  
Based on the literature, riba in Islam is considered as a notable origin of unjustified preference, 
where work transactions operate by employing a riba (interest) founded arrangement (Sarker, 
1999). So, the ban of interest is a solution for building a right economic regulation in removing 
characteristics of exploitation or unjustified enrichment (Björklund and Lundström, 2005). This so-
called Islamic economic system depends upon Sharia. The majority of Islamic academic state that 
the ban of riba in Islam is not just for religious reasons but also in order to a deeper interest for 
the ethical, economic and social welfare of the community ( Abdullah and Chee,2010). Different 
from some communities, where there is a separation between faith and country, and religion is 
considered to be a special issue, in an Islamic community Islam impacts the decision-making of its 
followers in each situation involving work. The effect of Islam on daily life, involving work practice, 
has been well documented in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, which are the major sources of work 
ethics in Islam (Aribi and Gao, 2011). 
Both of these sources consider riba as unfair treatment and exploitation and view it as 
inconsistent with the Islamic concept of fairness (Brian, 2011). According to Asutay (2010b:25), 
the origin of financial dis-optimality and socioeconomic unfairness is interested (riba), which is 
crucial for ensuring a “stable and socially affiant economic environment”. The aim of the 
prohibition of riba from the Islamic banking system is to protect all stakeholders’ interest (Iqbal 
and Molyneux, 2005). This aim is achieved not only by following the Sharia role but also from 
noting the importance of CG in Islamic banking. For example, AAOIFI governance standards state 
that IFIs should treat equity holders fairly and make sure all transactions do not contravene 
Sharia. Shares in profit and losses between creditors and entrepreneurs are accumulated and 
distributed in an equitable method, and this reflects real productivity and social justice (Askari et 
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al., 2010). So, the sharing of profit and risks of loss (PLS) is used in IFIs to replace the interest rate 
as a method of resource distribution and financial intermediation. 
2.2.2.2 The sharing of profit and the risks of loss (PLS) 
 
The Islamic financial system supports the notion of PLS. This notion mentions fairness between 
the parties in regard to the financial transaction. According to Biancone and Maha (2014), lender 
and borrower are allowed to share a profit or ROA. In general, Islamic finance is interested in 
economic balance, fairness and the distribution of equality in society. The regulation of Islamic 
banking that is according to PLS has a further accountable process to lending, in addition to 
creating reasonable and quality operations (Khan and Mould, 2008). This accountability is 
important in IFIs as it helps to save the benefits of its stakeholders. Therefore, it is a challenge for 
IFIs to ensure there is development in all relevant areas of CG (Chapra, 2007). 
The aim of CG, in relation to IFIs, is being accountable by extending the level of disclosure beyond 
a financial focus to ensure and protect all stakeholders. The important issues regarding CG need 
to be coordinated with matters regarding the PLS system. The complicated accountability 
framework in IFIs brings about enquiries from stakeholders, which mean IFIs should follow a good 
Sharia compliance system (Majid et al., 2011). Based on Maqasid Al-sharia, the purpose of Sharia 
in any activity, including financial activity, is to encourage human welfare while providing the 
maximum number of objectives. Al-Ghazali defines Maqasid Al-Sharia, for instance, “Promoting 
the well-being of all mankind, which lies in safeguarding their faith (din), their human self (nafs), 
their intellect (aql), their posterity (nasl) and their wealth (mal)” (Chapra, 2000:118). Therefore, 
the concept of PLS in relation to the Maqasid Al-sharia method is to avoid inequality between all 
parties and to ensure fairness in society, as mentioned by Asutay (2007b), who regards the Islamic 
morals and principles of the individual, and their well-being, to be equal to the interests of 
society, which expands the narrow definition of the ‘Islamic code’. As a result, following the 
Islamic economic, moral system based on Maqasid Al-sharia, and preparing the fundamental 
principles in Islamic banking, leads to equitable distribution and fairness between all stakeholders. 
 
2.2.2.3 Prohibition of uncertainty (gharar) 
 
Gharar refers to uncertain transactions resulting in uncertain results (Warde, 2000). According to 
Abdullah and Chee (2010), gharar can be separated into less important and limitless gharar, 
where the limitless type mostly ends up as a guesstimate. There are some hadith prohibitions on 
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gharar, such as “Ahmad and Ibn-e-Majah narrated on the authority of Abu-said Al-khudriy: 
Muhammed (Peace Be Upon Him) has forbidden the purchase of the unborn animal in its 
mother’s womb, the sale of the milk in the udder without measurement, the purchase of spoils 
of war prior to their distribution, the purchase of charities prior to their receipt, and the 
purchase of the catch of a diver” (Ibn Maja, 35). This can be the reason for not understanding and 
appreciating the basis of the contract such the content not and the worth of the material and 
commitment (Ayub, 2007). 
Furthermore, the ban of gharar from the Quran is as follows: “And do not consume one another’s 
wealth unjustly or send it [in bribery] to the rulers in order that [they might aid] you [to] 
consume a portion of the wealth of the people in sin, while you know [it is unlawful]” (AL-
BAQARAH, 2:188). “O you who have believed, do not consume one another’s wealth unjustly 
but only [in lawful] business by mutual consent. Moreover, do not kill yourselves [or one 
another]. Indeed, Allah is to you ever Merciful” (AN-NISA, 4:29). 
The prohibition of gharar in IFIs means transparency and fairness (Visser, 2013), and this ban is 
consistent with the aim of CG in IFIs, as transparency and fairness are the most important aims in 
CG. Asutay (2010:28) states that “the ban of gharar (uncertainty) comes from the same 
motivation to the main feature of asset-based productive economic activity through embedded 
financing”. 
2.2.2.4 Prohibition of gambling (maysir) 
 
Ayub (2007:62) defined gambling as: “The game of chance one gains at the cost of others: a 
person puts his money or a part of his wealth at stake wherein the amount of money at risk might 
bring huge sums of money or might be lost or damaged”. There is a ban on gambling in Islam 
because it is seen as a kind of unjust enrichment. Moreover, poor people in society have a right to 
the money wasted on gambling, as gambling will increase social damage (Asutay, 2010). This is 
inconsistent with CG in IFIs that aim to achieve fairness between all stakeholders, including 
society and avoid any conflict of interest (AAOIFI, 2010).    
In the Holy Quran, maysir has been mentioned in different parts, such as: “Satan only wants to 
cause between you animosity and hatred through intoxicants and gambling and to avert you 
from the remembrance of Allah and prayer. So will you not desist” [AL-MADAH, 5:91]. “They ask 
you about wine and gambling. Say, in them is a great sin and [yet, some] benefit for people. 
However, their sin is greater than their benefit.” Moreover, they ask you what they should 
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spend. Say, “The excess [beyond needs]. Thus Allah makes clear to you the verses [of 
revelation] that you might give thought.” [AL-BAQARAH, 2:219]. 
2.2.2.5 The payment of zakah  
 
Zakah, which is one of the five pillars of Islam, literally denotes purity. It is derived from the Quran 
and Sunnah (Salah, 2001; Sahee, 2000). Zakah has been mentioned in different parts in the Holy 
Quran, such as: “And establish prayer and give zakah and bow with those who bow [in worship 
and obedience]” [AL-BAQARAH, 2:43]. Moreover, “Your ally is none but Allah and [therefore] His 
Messenger and those who have believed – those who establish prayer and give zakah, and they 
bow [in worship]” [ALMA’IDAH, 5:55]. According to Shahul and Yaya (2005:85), they clarify zakah 
as “a religious obligation and a levy accepted by Islam on a Muslim’s income and wealth to be 
distributed to the defined beneficiaries, such as the poor and indigent”. Based on AAOIFI financial 
accounting standard No. 9 (zakah), IBs are committed to paying zakah. Also, AAOIFI governance 
standard No. 1 states that all IBs have to disclose information about zakah in their annual reports 
and the SSB is also required to disclose information about the banks’ responsibility in relation to 
zakah in their annual report (AAOIFI, 2010). According to Shanmugam and Zahari (2009), Zakah 
from the Maqasad Al-sharia perspective is applied in Islamic economic principles to remove the 
variance among the rich and the needy and to support the disadvantaged members of society. 
Moreover, the zakah is important in society because it contributes to ease poverty in 
communities and progress towards an increase in economic balance (Platonova, 2014). 
2.2.2.6 Legitimate transactions  
 
The Islamic financial system for businesses or individuals does not admit to using anything that 
would be considered to be a transgression of Sharia in their activities. For example, an IB cannot 
finance, support or provide other services to alcohol, gambling or casino activities. According to 
AAOIFI governance standard No. 1, the SSB has to ensure in its report that all activities carried out 
by IBs comply with Sharia (AAOIFI, 2010). Based on Maqasid Al-sharia, Islamic banking has to 
avoid any activities that are deemed noxious and ethically inadmissible to humane welfare and 
the benefits of community. Moreover, IBs should seek to invest their finances using Islamic 
principles, to ensure their activities contribute to support both the well-being of and the interests 
of society (Platonova, 2014). 
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2.3 Part Two: Corporate Governance and Accountability  
2.3.1 General introduction to corporate governance 
Since the global financial crisis of 2007, a large number of researchers have focused on CG, 
particularly regarding financial institutions (Dalwai et al., 2015; Srairi, 2015). The terminology of 
governance in English comes from the Greek word ‘kybernan’, which means to guide, steer or 
govern (Cadbury, 2002). This refers to the association between the governors and the governed, 
such as the association between the government and the public (Salin et al., 2017). The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has given a precise definition 
of CG (2004:11) “Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also 
provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate 
governance should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives 
that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective 
monitoring.” 
This description by the OECD specifically focuses on the transparency of accounting disclosure 
(Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). CG has become an important factor, with the aim of providing better 
and effective safeguards to all stakeholders, and also to make sure that the market has no doubts, 
and research displays a positive relationship among CG and shares price (Hasan et al., 2017b). 
2.3.2 Corporate Governance Based on an Islamic Standpoint 
Based on the fast development of Islamic finance and the growing existence of IFIs, CG has 
received great interest in IFIs and become the most important issue. These institutions are 
significant, especially for Muslims, as they supply services that comply with Sharia principles, e.g. 
interest-free (riba-based) finance, and avoiding transactions which are prohibited by Sharia, such 
as alcohol, drugs and other activities that bring damage to society (Salin et al., 2017). IFIs should 
recognise society’s interest (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2009) while directing businesses to earn a higher 
profit. For example, IFIs should disclose more information which is reliable and relevant, because 
this information assists all stakeholders in making the right decision, depending on the level of 
transparency and disclosure in financial reports (Salin et al., 2017). The rule of governance in Islam 
includes all Muslims’ transactions because the resource is considered to be a trust from Allah 
(God) and an examination of their faith (Saeed, 1996). So, IFIs have to be honest and equitable 
between all stakeholders and shareholders. The definition of Sharia governance is a governance 
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structure that confirms overall actions and business deals via IFIs are free from illegal elements, 
e.g. interest, uncertainty and other characteristics (Bahari and Baharudin, 2016).  
The principles of Sharia make CG in IBs both unique and essential. Meanwhile, the CG of IFIs is a 
structure that permits the guarantee of duty to Islamic principles to ensure fairness to all 
stakeholders. Therefore, Sharia governance has a unique characteristic of the Islamic system of 
financial management. Accountability, transparency and adequate disclosure are three essential 
ingredients in CG. According to Baydoun and Willett (2000), the essential aim of corporate 
reporting from an Islamic viewpoint is that it exceeds other targets to permit Islamic institution to 
present their compliance with Islamic law.  
Chapra and Ahmed (2002) stated that it is not true to assume that Islamic banks do not need to 
institute prudent corporate governance just because the Islamic value system equitably protects 
the rights of stakeholders. Islamic banks, like conventional banks, also deal with situations of loss 
and failure that result from an infraction of CG, such as the Ihlas Finance House in Turkey in 2001, 
and different cases of cheating that led to losses at Dubai IB from 2004 to 2007. So, these 
situations are reminders of the significance of CG for IBs (Ginena, 2014).  
Stakeholders in IBs have singular issues which justify particular CG attention, including compliance 
with Sharia in all activities and ensuring justice to all stakeholders (Ginena, 2014). According to Ali 
(2007), Sharia non-compliance in IBs leads to the withdrawal of deposits and brings about bank 
failure. This is consistent with Chapra and Ahmed’s (2002) study, which found that of those 
customers who deposit in IBs in various counties, 66.8% in Bangladesh, 85.6% in Bahrain, and 
94.6% in Sudan, would move to another bank and withdraw their deposits if their IB was non-
compliant with Sharia. 
There are two sides to the nature of CG in relation to IBs: the first one is that of Sharia, as based 
on Tawhid epistemology methodology, where IFIs follow Sharia in every functional role (Hamid et 
al., 2011). The concept of Islamic CG has wide practical implications, in particular reducing the 
transaction cost in the environment of decision-making and obtaining those targets within the 
limit of Sharia principles (Choudhury and Hoque, 2006). The second side is the specific 
characteristic of Islamic financial and economic standards. From an Islamic viewpoint, Sharia 
governs economics, human life and political attitude. Allah gives Sharia as the manifestation of his 
unlimited grace, the only actual embodiment to implement fairness (Sulaiman et al., 2015). The 
aim of Sharia CG is not just to safeguard the interests of stakeholders, but to accept the obligation 
of humans to Allah and the remnant of society. To understand Sharia CG, it is important to 
appreciate how the Islamic view works. Otherwise, it will be difficult to realise the true rationale 
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behind Sharia CG (Muneeza and Hassan, 2014).  Maali et al. (2006), state that the outcome of this 
target is that IBs own accountability to show all information fundamental to their stakeholders, 
about their process. 
2.3.3 Accounting, auditing and governance standards for Islamic financial institutions 
The Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) is an 
international Islamic organisation that is a not-for-profit corporate body that prepares accounting, 
auditing, governance, ethics and Sharia standards for IFIs and industry (AAOIFI, website). The 
AAOIFI was established in agreement with the Agreement of Association, which was signed by IFIs 
in Algiers on 1st Safar, 1410 H, which corresponds to 26 February 1990. The AAOIFI was then 
registered in the State of Bahrain as an international, autonomous non-profit-making corporate 
body (AAOIFI, website, AAOIFI, 2010) on 11 Ramadan 1411 H, which corresponds to 27 March 
1991. 
Since the establishment of the AAOIFI in 1990, up until 2017, 94 standards have been issued, as 
follows: 54 on Sharia; 26 on accounting; 5 on auditing; 7 on governance; and two on codes of 
ethics. “AAOIFI Shari’ah standards have been made part of the mandatory regulatory 
requirements in jurisdictions such as Bahrain, Oman, Pakistan, Sudan, and Syria. While AAOIFI 
accounting standards have been made part of the mandatory regulatory requirements in 
jurisdictions such as Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Qatar Financial Centre, Sudan, and Syria, 
AAOIFI auditing, governance and ethical standards are not part of the mandatory regulatory 
requirements for Islamic finance. Instead, these standards are used voluntarily by leading IFIs 
across all major Islamic finance jurisdictions” (AAOIFI, website, 2017). Thus, the AAOIFI has 
introduced a greater harmonisation of Islamic financial exercise around the world (AAOIFI, 2015). 
AAOIFI standards aim to provide and improve auditing accounting, and ethical governance 
standards are linking to the actions of IFIs (Sarea and Hanefah, 2013). 
IBs must comply with the code of the country where they are established. Thus, the AAOIFI has to 
convince the central banks and supervisory powers to execute AAOIFI standards in their countries 
(Abuhmaira, 2006). Although Bahrain, Qatar, Lebanon, Jordan, Sudan, Mauritius, Syria, Tunisia 
and Oman have adopted AAOIFI standards as mandatory (Al Qamashoui and Hussainey, 2016), 
the AAOIFI does not have the strength to compel its standards (Karim, 1996).  
2.3.3.1 AAOIFI corporate governance standards 
 
The AAOIFI has provided guidelines on Sharia governance by publishing seven standards for Sharia 
governance. The main aim for the establishment of these standards is to confirm the efficient 
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function of the IFIs’ system and to encourage transparency and to make sure that, for all 
stakeholders, the IFIs comply with Sharia by following good CG (Bahari and Baharudin, 2016). This 
study will focus on six standards (it avoids standard No. 7 because the researcher did not find any 
academic literature to confirm that CSR is a part of the CG rules or codes). Therefore, the 
following text details a short overview of the governance standards for IFIs: 
 Standard No. 1: Sharia Supervisory Board  
The Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) is an independent body entrusted with the function of 
directing, revising and monitoring the actions of IFIs to ensure that they comply with Sharia 
principles (Hamza, 2013). According to the AAOIFI (1999, 2008, 2010, 2015), the SSB requires at 
least three members with knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh almua’malat) to be appointed 
by stakeholders in the SSB’s annual general meeting. The SSB confirmed its decision about all 
financial transactions having to comply with Sharia principles in the report, and stated that all SSB 
members should sign this report (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). 
 Standard No. 2: Sharia Review 
The aim of the Sharia review (SR) is to confirm that all IFIs’ business and transactions achieve the 
requirement of Sharia (Bahari and Baharudin, 2016). The AAOIFI defines SR as “an examination of 
the extent of an IFI’s compliance, in all its activities, with Sharia. This examination includes 
contracts, agreements, policies, products, transactions, memorandum and articles of association, 
financial statements, reports and circulars” (AAOIFI, 2010:14). The SR does not relieve 
management of its responsibility regarding compliance with Sharia. 
 
 Standard No. 3: Internal Sharia Review  
The important subject discussion consistent with the advanced development of IFIs is the internal 
Sharia review (ISR). According to the AAOIFI (2015), the ISR is executed via an independent 
section or is an integral part of the internal audit and control section. The main objective of this 
standard is to supply an independent estimation, with an emphasis on an efficient internal 
monitoring system, and to evaluate the level of Sharia compliance (Bahari and Baharudin, 2016). 
The ISR should have perfect and constant support of the management and the BOD (AAOIFI, 
2015). The ISR provides experts who are knowledgeable in Sharia law and responsible for 
improving their education to maintain their proficiency.  
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 Standard No. 4: Audit and Governance Committee  
The role of the Audit and Governance Committee (AGC) in IFIs is essential because it manages the 
primary objective of an IFI by promoting significant transparency and disclosure in financial 
reports. Also, it enhances the general trust of the IFIs in its enforcement of Sharia law and 
principles (AAOIFI, 2015).  
The accountability of the AGC will include the following (AAOIFI, 2015): 
1. Understanding the business and control environment of IFIs.  
2. Understanding the prime risk items to which the business is exposed. 
3. Controlling the efficiency of the reporting operation carried out by management. 
4. Reviewing resources and skills, the extent of responsibility and overall work programme. 
5. Reviewing the performance of internal control. 
6. Ensuring IFIs comply with central bank inspectors’ requirements. 
7. Ensuring IFIs comply with Sharia rules and principles. 
 
 Standard No. 5: Independence of the Sharia Supervisory Board 
Independence of the SSB is one of the key components of perfect governance in IFIs. According to 
AAOIFI governance (2015, p.44), the objective of this principle is “an attitude of mind which does 
not allow the viewpoints and conclusions of its possessor to become reliant on or subordinate to 
the influences and pressures of conflicting interest. It is achieved through organisational status 
and objectivity”. The SSB is under double the amount of pressure: not only in relation to the 
commercial reasons of IBs but also because it seeks to maintain its reputation that the validated 
products are produced without error (Hamza, 2013). The SSB should avert the possible and 
existing cases that reduces its capacity to make an objective professional decision (AAOIFI, 2015).  
 
 Standard No. 6: Statement on Governance Principles for IFIs 
At present, globally, the governance of firms is an essential issue in world economics for 
governments, because they must ensure that firms’ objectives are set and how to achieve these 
objectives by monitoring performance (Opata and Awino, 2017). The aim of this standard is 
requisite to support the expansion of investigative governance practices within IFIs.  
According to the AAOIFI (2015), this statement on governance principles explains the scope for 
governance in IFIs. 
30  
 
Based on the AAOIFI, the 12 principles of governance include the following (AAOIFI, 2015):  
1. Effective Sharia compliance structure, which means that an IFI should establish an 
efficient way of ensuring sharia compliance. This structure should cover the 
efficiency of the function played via BOD, SSB, administration and auditors, in so far 
as to relate to sharia compliance.  
2. Fair treatment of equity holders. This means that an IFI should provide the equity-
holders with voting rights, adequate opportunity to have a dialogue with the 
institution and to select members of the governing BOD and SSB.   
3. Equitable treatment of fund providers and other significant stakeholders. This 
means that an IFI should ensure equitable and unbiased treatment of fund providers 
and other significant stakeholders and associated investments, as well as in relation 
to the provision of adequate financial and non-financial information to allow them 
to take appropriate decisions regarding their dealing with the institution.    
4. Fit and proper conditions for both the board and management. This means the IFI 
should decide upon a set of criteria to govern the appointment of persons to serve 
on the BOD and SSB, as well as for the appointment of management.  
5. An effective oversight. This means that BOD should play an effective function in 
leadership, direction and monitoring the implementation of its policies, as well as in 
promoting a sound control sharia-compliant culture with the IFI. 
6. Audit and governance committee (AGC). This means an IFI should have an audit and 
governance committee whose role and responsibilities should be to set appropriate 
terms of reference, which should among others matters include the process for 
financial reporting, internal controls, internal audit oversight, external audit 
oversight and sharia compliance. 
7. Risk management. The BOD of an IFI should be actively involved in setting the risk 
appetite and should make sure that there are appropriate policies and systems for 
identification, measurement, analysis, reporting and mitigation of risks. 
8. Avoidance of conflicts of interest. This means an IFI should set appropriate 
governance structure to ensure that members of BOD, members of SSB, 
management and staff, as well as external parties with substantial dealings with it, 
avoid conflicts of interest. 
9. Appropriate compensation in the instance of any policy oversight. This means an IFI 
will set appropriate governance structures in relation to remuneration policies for 
BOD, SSB and management. 
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10.  Public disclosure. This means that an IFI should adopt high standards of reporting 
and satisfy the information need of owners, investment accountholders, regulatory, 
Zakah and other related agencies.  
11.  Code of conduct and ethics. This means an IFI should select policies and steps 
coordinated with sharia, to enhance a code of moral and accountable behaviour via 
members of BOD, members of SSB, management and employees. 
12.  Appropriate enforcement of governance principles and standards. This means an IFI 
should have a mechanism to ensure that the principles and standards on 
governance are adhered to and monitored. 
 
Most previous studies examined AAOIFI accounting and audit standards across the same 
countries (Vinnicombe, 2010; Sarea, 2012; Ullah, 2013; Sakib, 2015); however, there are limited 
studies for AAOIFI CG, such as Abdullah (2013), who studied CG standard No. 6 only. Therefore, as 
far as the researcher knows, the current research is the first to investigate the determinants and 
consequences of AAOIFI governance standards in all IBs that have adopted them as mandatory. 
This research is also the initial research to consider comprehensive AAOIFI standards regarding IBs 
and CG-specific characteristics in the analysis.    
2.3.3.2 Accountability concept from an Islamic perspective 
 
In general, there are several definitions of accountability. Gray et al. (1995: 38) explained 
accountability as “The duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial account) or 
reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible”. Lozano (2005: 21) declares 
“accountability involves much more than simply providing information; it involves building a 
corporate licence to operate through interaction with other social actors…. Accountability is not a 
question of metrics, but vision and accountability is a tool available for firms to show their 
responsibility through corporate reports”. According to Jackson and McLeod (1982), 
accountability clarifies what has been done, what is presently being done and what will be done. 
So, accountability includes the disclosure of more information (Naser et al., 2006).  
All human existence is under a commitment to be thankful to Allah. He gave Islam to humankind 
as a whole religion, as mentioned in the Quran “This day I have perfected for you your religion 
and completed My favor upon you and have approved for you Islam as religion.” (Al-Ma’idah, 3). 
So, as everything belongs to Him, Muslims should know what He wants and follow His order 
(Hassan and Salman, 2017) “Say: 'Surely my Prayer, all my acts of worship, and my living and my 
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dying are for Allah alone, the Lord of the whole universe, He has no associate. Thus have I been 
bidden, and I am the foremost of those who submit themselves (to Allah).” (Al-An’am: 162-163) 
On the day of judgement, Muslims become responsible in front of Allah for all dealings with 
others in relation to business activities (Hassan and Salman, 2017). Accountability in Islam 
indicates that we have obligations towards Allah and then the whole of society, which aims to 
safeguard people’s interests from any potential abuse. As mentioned in the Quran: “So by your 
Lord, We will surely question them all, About what they used to do” (Al-Hijr: 92–92). Moreover, 
“And stop them; indeed, they are to be questioned” (As-saffat: 24).  
Considering accountability, in practice, this should lead to more transparency, which would lead 
to improving stakeholders’ knowledge about IBs activities. It does not only mean accountability 
for financial reporting but, beyond the financial and technical side, also recognising fairness in 
society (Muwazir et al., 2006). Alshehri (2012), argued that accountability is considered to be the 
fundamental basis of the Islamic system. The concept of accountability is, therefore, applied to all 
Muslims’ lives and their relationship with Allah and then with others (Al-Jirari, 1996). The Prophet 
Muhammed (Peace Be Upon Him) stressed that accountability is an essential standard for the 
relationship conducted within the Islamic community, via saying: “All of you are guardians and are 
responsible for your subjects. The ruler is a guardian of his subjects, the man is a guardian of his 
family, the woman is a guardian and is responsible for her husband’s house and his offspring, and 
so all of you are guardians and are responsible for your subjects.” [Sahih al-Bukhari and Muslim]. 
Islamic accountability is the primary stimulus for dealing with IBs, constituting a central 
competitive advantage for IFIs. This indicates that everybody is accountable to Allah for their 
works and this is coming from the supreme meaning of Tawhid (oneness of God) and should be 
the foundation of CG in Islam. 
Sharia is general direction guiding every side of practising Muslims’ daily lives (Vinnicombe, 2010). 
Hence, Sharia acknowledges that what practising Muslims have to undertake in the 
worldly/material transaction must be controlled by religious/Islamic value, namely responsibility, 
morality, equity, accountability and social equity (Maali and Napier, 2010). Grais and Pellegrini 
(2006) assert that the SSB in IBs is responsible for ensuring that business transactions are Sharia-
compliant, by depicting responsibility, efficiency, privacy, independence and disclosure. 
From all the previous discussions in this chapter, particular those which mention the failure and 
financial disgrace of various IFIs and the implications of Sharia non-compliance risk, the 
requirement for a good Sharia CG system is a vital part of the CG of IFIs. The SSB in IBs is 
responsible for ensuring that business deals are Sharia-compliant, by depicting accountability, 
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independence, confidentiality, efficiency and disclosure (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). In addition, 
with the huge growth of the IFIs sector across the globe it is important to provide a good Sharia 
governance system that is compliant with Islamic principles across all of the activities. Therefore, 
the SSB, which is expert in Sharia, especially Fiqh Almuamalat, plays a significant function in IFIs in 
defining the legitimacy of the confirmed products of IBs. 
To protect the credibility of the SSB and to maintain the legitimacy of the products of IBs, it is 
important to provide a good Sharia governance system. According to Wilson (2009), the Sharia 
governance system plays a significant function in enhancing moderation and equity in financial 
deals and, therefore, promoting the general confidence in IBs on the side of compliance with 
Sharia principles. 
The AAOIFI governance standards are established to develop and enhance the Sharia governance 
system in IFIs; five out of seven standards in AAOIFI governance are related to Sharia governance 
in particular. The SSB is an important standard in AAOIFI governance as it functions a significant 
role in agreeing on a fatwa and improving, examining and checking the Sharia standards. 
According to the AAOIFI (2008), the SSB contributes to the importance of Sharia-confirmed tools, 
examining any request they receive, and consulting on all the AAOIFI standards issues of auditing, 
accounting and codes of ethics, to confirm these issues are compliant with Sharia principles. 
The main motivation for the emergence of the AAOIFI governance standards is to provide 
comprehensive guidelines for the SSB, to check and supervise the activities of IFIs, to confirm that 
they are compliant with Sharia principles (AAOIFI, 2010). Moreover, based on AAOIFI governance 
standards No. 1, the SSB must be experts in different subjects, including Sharia scholars, 
accountants, economic experts and lawyers with experience of IFIs. All of these requirements 
enhance the SSB reports that are important in IFIs, especially regarding the compliance with 
Sharia principles. In this respect, the AAOIFI governance has different procedures for the various 
SSB functions, including reviewing, planning and preparing working documents, as well as 
processing and documenting the outcomes and providing a Sharia review report (AAOIFI, 2010). 
AAOIFI governance requires that SSB report should adhere to a specific format, and this report is 
very important to all stakeholders as approval of compliance with Sharia principles in IFIs and to 
find out information about IFIs. Therefore, SSB supports fair disclosure and transparency as the 
crucial concept of CG. 
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2.4 Part Three: Theoretical Framework 
This part seeks to review the theoretical framework of the research. According to Rwegasira 
(2000), and Solomon (2007), it is difficult to depend on one theory in CG because it is related to 
various fields, including economics, management, law, finance and politics. The theory is 
important for research because it is a determinant of which kind of data may be used and 
collected. Therefore, the theoretical framework of this study provides the reader with the link 
between research questions, hypotheses and findings. According to Gray et al. (2009: 13), “the 
lens of theory enables us to evaluate practice and policy against criteria that we deem 
appropriate”. The definition by the Cambridge dictionary Matsumoto (2009), is “a formal 
statement of the rules on which a subject of study is based or of ideas, which are suggested to 
explain a fact or event or more generally, an opinion or explanation.”  
Basically, CG supplies a robust framework that resolves the issues and disagreements between an 
organisation’s stakeholders (Khir et al., 2007). This framework is developed from current CG 
theories. IFIs are required to conform with traditional CG guidelines so that they are able to 
operative a dual banking framework. So, it is fundamental to ensure that these theories are in line 
with Sharia values (Htay and Salman, 2013). Different theories could illustrate the CG disclosure 
phenomena, for instance, agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, signalling 
theory, accountability theory, communication theory and economic theory. 
Nevertheless, some prior studies have selected agency theory only to explain their empirical 
results (Chalevas, 2011; Zattoni et al., 2013). Therefore, like other research (Ntim et al., 2012a; 
Haniffa and Hudiab, 2006; Jakling and Johi, 2009), the current study adopts multiple theories to 
investigate the association among AAOIFI disclosure, CG characteristics and bank performance. 
Agency theory is adopted as a main theoretical framework in the current study because of its 
dominance in CG disclosure literature. Signalling theory, stakeholder theory and accountability 
theory are supplemented with agency theory because of the complicated nature of CG and 
disclosure phenomena. Moreover, there is a number of weaknesses when using individual 
theories (Chen and Roberts, 2010); however, more than one theory can complement another 
theory and enhance its potential strength.    
This study also refers to the main origins, namely the Quran and Maqasid Al-sharia, in regard to 
any Islamic concepts, which are guides to help people understand the purpose of Sharia 
governance. In the next subsections, agency, signalling, stakeholder and accountability theories 
are briefly reviewed. The reason for selecting these theories is because they help to illustrate the 
association between CG, disclosure, determinants and bank performance. 
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2.4.1 Agency theory  
 According to Clarke (2004), agency theory is widely used in different academic fields, such as 
accounting, marketing, finance and political science. Jensen and Meckling (1976), stated that 
agency theory is a relationship among principals (owners) and agents (management), where 
principals give the authority to managers to manage the company and make decisions. The main 
important issue in this contractual association is the disagreement of interest among the two 
sides (owners and management). The fundamental supposition of this agency issue is that 
because a manager’s pay-related benefit is based on a firm’s performance, managers tend to 
manage in a way that would focus on their self-interests (Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Ryan and 
Schneider, 2003). According to Kam (1990), one goal of agency theory is to supply illustrations 
regarding the kind of request for financial information, and the value of exposing this information. 
The annual report should have more information about the company because this would 
distinguish it from other poorly managed companies (Demski, 1974). In other words, disclosing 
extra information is perhaps a way of relieving the impact of the agency problem (Marston, 1996). 
Several studies have debated that voluntary disclosure decreases agency control costs (Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Also, Barako (2007), stated that the voluntary 
disclosure of financial reports could be used as an example of the application of agency theory. 
Moreover, Healy and Palepu (2001), stated that asymmetric information among owners and 
management in relation to the agency problem could be reduced by the voluntary disclosure in 
financial reports. Also, Fathi (2013), mentioned that to decrease agency conflict, managers could 
deliver the company’s performance information, to assert their position for shareholders and 
creditors, by being more transparent when they publish financial reports.  
Archer et al. (1998), state that there are three kinds of agency issues considered by agency 
theory. The first is that the managers of the firm may earn more non-pecuniary interests than 
those that would be incurred if the owners incurred the cost themselves. The second problem 
happens when directors invest in high-venture investments that subsequently put the lenders at 
risk; managers may support the shareholders by conceding the investments that would have 
meant a profit for the lenders. The third problem occurs when the managers are more informed 
regarding what is happening inside the organisation than the owners – this problem is called 
information asymmetry. 
According to Jensen and Meckling, (1976), good CG characteristics are needed to align the 
interest of directors with that of shareholders, and therefore minimise agency costs. IFIs usually 
face more agency problems than conventional banks (Safieddine, 2009). Antonio (2001), states 
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that agency problems also appear in the association between owners and IB agents. So, IFIs need 
good CG for many reasons. First, the problem of separation between owners and management, 
which based on agency theory, is a major factor in IBs compared with traditional banks. Also, IBs 
have more responsibility to shareholders and must make sure they are complying with Sharia 
(Safieddine, 2009; Sarker, 2000). Customers of IBs in Bahrain and Sudan are willing to withdraw 
their deposits if they discover a case of non-compliance with Sharia (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002). 
The consequence of non-compliance with Sharia in IBs could have a negative effect on their 
reputation, resulting in the loss of customers. To conform to the Sharia principles in IBs, there are 
important differences regarding agency structure in IBs compared to those seen in traditional 
banks (Zainuldain et al., 2018). For example, the unique contractual arrangements of mudarabah 
and musharakah investment accounts, present various kinds of agency problems among 
investment account holders (IAHs) who have cash-flow rights and shareholders who own the 
control rights (Safieddine, 2009).  
Generally, banks have a lower level of disclosure than other financial institutions, and this 
increases the agency problems. Agency theory is interested in the many ethical issues that 
emerge that are non-compliant with Sharia. This theory states that principals delegate powers to 
the agents to manage the company, and from the Islamic point of view this is considered as trust 
(Amanah). Therefore, the agents must strive to fulfil their contractual duties and responsibilities 
(Htay and Salman, 2013).   
In general, agency theory accepts that good CG leads to decreases in agency costs, improved 
governance practice, disclosure and financial performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Khan et al., 
2013). Thus, this theory is employed to investigate both the determinants of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure and the consequences. 
2.4.2 Signalling theory 
Signalling theory refers to how firms give signals to users through the financial report. It includes 
information about the consequences of management activity in recognition of an owner’s wishes, 
such as bank performance (Aryani, 2016). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), signalling 
theory is considered to be an expansion of agency theory, and it appeared to demonstrate the 
information asymmetry between owners and managers. The information asymmetry problem 
happens when one side in the market has further information than the other party (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). It has been used to illustrate the information introduced voluntarily by 
managers (Singh and Mitchell Van der Zahn, 2008; Elshandidy et al., 2013). The theory illustrates 
that staff with a high standard of education signal more information about their outcomes, to 
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distinguish themselves from other staff with a lower standard of education. Therefore, signalling 
theory clarifies how information asymmetry, among several parties in the market, can be 
reduced, with the more informed side signalling to the less informed side (Morris and Hough, 
1987). That means “an action taken by a high-type manager that would not be rational if that 
manager was a low type” (Scott, 2003: 422). 
From an Islamic perspective, IBs desire to differentiate themselves from other IBs that do not fully 
comply with Sharia, during voluntary disclosure CG and performance. So, IBs signal their 
compliance and financial achievement to society even if their achievement is not strong. Also, 
through signalling theory, this research is expected to provide evidence of the importance of 
transparency and disclosure in financial reports in IBs. According to Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
signalling theory was employed to illustrate directors’ incentives to disclose additional 
information in their annual reports. Financial statements have to disclose sufficient information 
through the managers, to notify particular signals to probable users. From a signalling theory 
perspective, IBs desire to distinguish themselves from the other IBs that are not completely 
compliant with Sharia, during voluntary disclosure in their annual reports. Thus, IBs will signal 
their financial performance, comply with Sharia and provide all other important information to 
stakeholders, to let them know that they are better than other banks. 
2.4.3 Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholders are people who have a direct or indirect interest in the business (Carroll and 
Buchholtz, 2014). Freeman (1994: 46), defined stakeholders as “any group of individuals who can 
affect or who are affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives”. Post et al. (2002: 
8), stated: “stakeholders in a firm are individuals and constituencies that contribute, either 
voluntarily or involuntarily, to its wealth-creating capacity and activities, and who are therefore its 
potential beneficiaries and risk bearers”. According to Gray et al. (1995), agency theory deals with 
the association among management and shareholders, whereas stakeholder theory deals with the 
association between management and all other stakeholders, such as an employee, owners, 
customers, suppliers and the government. Solomon (2010:15) defined stakeholder theory as 
follows: “Companies are so large, and their impact on society so pervasive that they should 
discharge accountability to many more sectors of society than solely their shareholders… not only 
are stakeholders affected by companies but they, in turn, affect companies in some way.”   
The above demonstration implies that companies have to save the interests of various 
stakeholders, involving shareholders (Clarke, 1998; Rhianon Edgley et al., 2010), although the 
expectation of stakeholders is different: employees want a good income and job security while 
38  
 
shareholders expect a remuneration return. Additionally, creditors wait for the company to have 
a powerful financial position in order to secure the safety of their investments, while the policy 
market expects compliance with CG regulations to protect their stakeholders’ interest. From an 
Islamic perspective, stakeholders expect IBs to comply with Sharia principles, therefore serving 
society and encouraging Islamic values. It can be seen that, regarding the Islamic way, 
administrative managers of IFIs are responsible to God (Allah) as an essential stakeholder. 
Stakeholders’ theory is usable with such research by measuring the function of IBs across 
different stakeholders via experimenting with the level of CG disclosure (compliance with Sharia 
to satisfy Allah first, then community, and obtaining a top financial performance to satisfy the 
owners). If the information is useful to stakeholders, it means that the information is also 
significant for stakeholders and meets with their interests.  
2.4.4 Accountability theory    
Based on an accountability theory, the expression ‘accountability’ alludes to the task of agents to 
supply information to all stakeholders. According to Jagadeesan et al. (2009), the managers’ 
responsibility is to achieve a realised set of tasks, which support the rules and standards that are 
viable in their positions in the company. Gray et al. (1995), state that to be socially responsible, 
agents need to give all information, financial or non-financial, to their stakeholders. The 
accountability between principals and agents differs; certain principals managers may be 
responsible for employees for their earning, health and security, while workers may be 
accountable for their job execution (Ismail, 2015). Based on the Islamic viewpoint, accountability 
is first to God as the prime principal, then the owners, community and other stakeholders. 
Therefore, this theory is usable to the current research through growth, and this meaning includes 
further than just the IBs’ investors and owners. Baydoun and Willett (2000), argue that firms like 
IBs should disclose all information demanded via their stakeholders and community. Stewart 
(1984), argued that there are two requirements for public accountability: the provision of 
information, and an estimate of the work to carry out as a consequence of providing the 
information’. In support, Ibrahim (2006) stated that, from this point, accountability is not only a 
function to report performance, but it is a function that is used to execute or not execute certain 
actions.  
This research adjusts the notion of accountability from an Islamic perspective that may affect the 
categories of the disclosure. Regarding this notion, IBs are demanded to disclose CG information 
first to satisfy Allah and then all other stakeholders.  
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2.5 Chapter Summary 
The conceptual framework of the current chapter covers the background on IBs (the history and 
principles of Islamic banking). Islamic finance has been one of the fastest-growing industries over 
the past three decades, and the Quran and Sunnah are the essential sources of Sharia. The major 
variance among Islamic and conventional finance is Islamic law. Furthermore, the main standards 
of Islamic banking are the ban of interest, the ban of uncertainty, the ban of gambling, payment of 
zakah, the PLS and legitimate transactions. 
The CG and accountability part covers a general introduction to CG and looks at this from an 
Islamic viewpoint. Accountability, transparency and adequate disclosure are the three essential 
ingredients in Sharia governance. AAOIFI is an international Islamic organisation that is a not-for-
profit corporate body that prepares accounting, auditing, governance, ethics and Sharia standards 
for IFIs and the industry. The AAOIFI governance standards are SSB, SR, ISR, AGC, independence of 
the SSB and statement of governance principles for IFIs. Accountability, from an Islamic 
perspective, is applied to all Muslims’ lives and their relationship with Allah and then with others. 
The theoretical framework covers agency theory, signalling theory, stakeholder theory and 
accountability theory. 
Agency theory is an association between principals (owners) and agents (management), where 
principals give authority to managers to manage the company and make decisions. Signalling 
theory is considered to be an expansion of agency theory, and it appears to demonstrate the 
information asymmetry among owners and managers. The information asymmetry issue happens 
when one side in the market has more information than the other side. 
Stakeholder theory deals with the association between management and all other stakeholders 
such as employees, owners, customers, suppliers and the government. While accountability 
theory, according to the Islamic viewpoint, indicates accountability to Allah as the prime principal, 
then the owners, the community and other stakeholders. The next chapter provides a display of 
the previous literature and hypotheses development. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
3.1 Overview 
The current chapter has three parts: part 1 consists of an overview followed by a discussion of CG 
disclosure in IFIs, and previous studies on CG disclosure in IFIs. Then, part 2 discusses the 
determinants of AAOIFI governance disclosure and hypotheses development. The whole 
hypotheses are developed according to the lack in the previous studies and supported by 
consistent theory. Finally, part 3 discusses the influence of AAOIFI governance disclosure on bank 
performance and hypothesis development. 
3.2 Part 1: The Quality of Corporate Governance Disclosure in the Annual Reports of 
Islamic Banks 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the objective of a CG code is to progress voluntary disclosure, 
transparency and accountability (Monks, 2011; Bouwman, 2011; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). 
Although AAOIFI governance is not part of the mandatory regulatory requirements for IFIs, this 
governance is employed voluntarily by leading IFIs across all significant Islamic finance 
jurisdictions (AAOIFI, Website, 2017). However, IFIs should disclose all relevant and reliable 
information about their operations through annual reports, to let stakeholders and society assess 
their compliance with Sharia and how they fulfil their accountability to both Allah and society 
(Salin et al., 2017). Rising research interest has been paid to measuring the level of disclosure with 
regard to CG in IFIs. With the importance of this in mind, this part aims to discuss previous 
research that examines the level of disclosure with regard to CG in IFIs. 
3.2.1 Prior studies on corporate governance disclosure in IFIs 
 
The range of voluntary disclosure in IFIs, where accountability and responsibility are assumed to 
be compulsory, is predicted to be higher than in non-IFIs, because IFIs have accountability to Allah 
first and then to society. Thus, the function of disclosure is owed fundamentally to Allah and then 
to the community (El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015). The level of disclosure with CG characteristics 
has been examined by some of the research in IFIs, using content analysis and disclosure index 
(Al-Baluchi, 2006; Vinnicombe, 2010; Paino et al., 2011; Aziah Abu Kasim, 2012; Ullah, 2013; 
Ahmad and Daw, 2015; Abdullah et al., 2015; Sulaiman et al., 2015; Srairi, 2015; El-Halaby and 
Hussainey, 2016; Ajili and Bouri, 2017; Salin et al., 2017; Hasan et al., 2017b; Grassa et al., 2017). 
Table 3.1 presents an outline of prior studies on CG discourse in IFIs. The standard methodology 
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used in most of the studies aforementioned above was to organise a relevant disclosure index. 
Some indexes were developed by using the indices of previous studies, such as Srairi, (2015) and 
Salin et al (2017), or by following guidelines published via the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM)), such as Paino et al (2011) and Aziah Abu Kasim (2012), and others are 
based on AAOIFI governance standards, such as (El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2016; Al-Baluchi, 2006; 
Vinnicombe, 2010; Ullah, 2013; Ahmad and Daw, 2015). Other studies used mixed guidelines for 
their disclosure index, namely Sulaiman et al. (2015), who used the guidelines issued by BNM in 
2007, the AAOIFI in 2008 and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) in 2006. Similarly, 
Abdullah et al. (2015), used a disclosure checklist based on various international CG benchmarks, 
containing the OECD principle of CG 2004, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
2006, AAOIFI governance standards and the IFSB. Also, Ajili and Bouri (2017) used an index based 
on the International Accounting Standards Board (IFRS) and AAOIFI standards. Although some of 
the previous studies used AAOIFI governance standards, such as Abdullah et al. (2015) and El-
Halaby and Hussainey (2016), these studies only used a specific CG standard. Abdullah et al. 
(2015) used standard No. 6 only, while El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) used standards Nos. 1 and 
No. 5. Also, Al-Baluchi (2006) created an index that includes 104 items based on AAOIFI standards, 
but just one item related to AAOIFI governance standard No. 1, which stated that in item 17 
(Sharia supervisory board report) other items are related to accounting and auditing standards. 
Although Majid et al. (2011) developed a comprehensive CG disclosure index based on guidelines 
available to IFIs (BNM, IFSB and AAOIFI) and the index includes 123 items across the dimension, 
they did not clarify the sub-items in their index, and they did not use this index to measure the 
level of disclosure. 
Overall, there are many studies on aspects of Sharia governance (Aziah Abu Kasim, 2012; Salin et 
al., 2017; Paino et al., 2011) and the compliance of AAOIFI standards (Al-Baluchi, 2006; 
Vinnicombe, 2010; Abdullah et al., 2015; Sarea, 2012), a disclosure index used as a research 
method in some studies. For example, Abdullah et al. (2015), who investigated the determinants 
of voluntary CG disclosure practices of 67 IBs in the Southeast Asian and GCC region in 2009, and 
the research employed disclosure index based on AAOIFI standards, the IFSB “is an 
international standard CG guidance”, the OECD’s principles of CG (2004) and the BCBS (2006 
paper). The index included 81 items, but most of these items did not relate to AAOIFI governance, 
as the study focused on standard No. 6 only. In addition, the study was based on AAOIFI standards 
issued in 2010. However, the study sample was from 2009 and for specific countries only (the 
Southeast Asian and the GCC regions).  
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El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016), studied 43 IBs that adopted AAOIFI across eight countries based 
on 2015 AAOIFI standards; the index included 214 items required by AAOIFI standards. However, 
these items did not study all of the AAOIFI governance, but standards No. 1, No. 5 and No. 7 only; 
the study was limited to one year only: 2013. Similarly, Ajili and Bouri (2017), measured and 
compared the level of compliance with the disclosure requirement provided by the IFRS and 
AAOIFI in a sample of 39 IBs in GCC countries. The study adopted two disclosure compliance 
indexes: IFRS and AAOIFI. The AAOIFI index included 94 items related to accounting standards 
only, and they did not mention AAOIFI governance.  Salin et al. (2017) studied Sharia CG 
disclosure compliance and created an index of 127 items. These items studied standards No. 1 
and No. 6 only from AAOIFI. According to the check of prior research on AAOIFI governance 
disclosure index, most of the research is limited their study to scale AAOIFI governance in a single 
sample or a specific region, and the checklists in most of the previous studies did not study all of 
the AAOIFI governance (see Table 3.1). 
1TABLE 3.1: OUTLINE OF PREVIOUS STUDIES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE IN ISLAMIC FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
Author and Year Sample and 
Country 
Title Research 
Method 
Results 
Al-Baluchi (2006) 14 IBs  from 
Bahrain, 26 
from Sudan, 2 
from Qatar and 
2 from Jordan 
The impact of AAOIFI 
standards and other 
banks’ characteristics 
on the level of 
voluntary disclosure 
in the annual reports 
of IBs 
Content 
analysis 
The level of voluntary 
disclosure raised next to 
the enforcement of 
AAOIFI standards. 
However,  in Sudan, the 
level of voluntary 
disclosure was 
significantly lower than 
that in the other three 
countries 
Vinnicombe 
(2010)  
IBs in Bahrain 
from 2004 to 
2007 
AAOIFI reporting 
standards: measuring 
compliance 
Content 
analysis 
High levels of compliance 
in several places and 
relatively low levels in 
other places 
Majid et al. 
(2011) 
Bank Negara 
Malaysia 
(BNM) 
Developing a CG 
disclosure index for 
IFIs 
 Used an inclusive index 
of disclosure items 
gathered over all three 
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newly issued governance 
guidelines available to 
IFIs (BNM, IFSB and 
AAOIFI) 
Paino et al. 
(2011) 
  
 
17 IBs in 
Malaysia 
Sharia social 
responsibility and CG 
of the IBs in Malaysia 
Content 
analysis 
The high overall level of 
CG disclosure, 
approximately 91.91%, 
with 11 items 
 
Abu Kasim 
(2012)  
7 takaful 
operators in 
Malaysia in the 
2008/2009 
annual report 
Disclosure of Sharia 
compliance by 
Malaysian takaful 
companies 
Content 
analysis 
There is a scarcity of 
information to all 
stakeholders to make 
good  decisions 
Ullah (2013) Seven IBs in 
Bangladesh 
Compliance with 
AAOIFI guidelines 
regarding the general 
presentation and 
disclosure in the 
financial statements 
of IBs in Bangladesh  
Content 
analysis 
These banks comply with 
a mean of 44.68% of 
AAOIFI guidelines 
regarding the public 
show and disclosure in 
financial statements 
Ahmad and 
Khatun 
(2013) 
17 banks in 
Bangladesh 
Compliance with the 
Sharia governance 
systems of the 
AAOIFI: a study on 
Bangladeshi IBs 
 
Content 
analysis 
The Sharia compliance 
level of the IBs is higher, 
approximately 75% 
 
 
Ahmad and Ben 
Daw (2015) 
Fashlowm 
Islamic branch 
in Libya from 
2010 to 2013 
Compliance with 
AAOIFI guidelines in 
regard to the general 
presentation and 
disclosure by Libyan 
IBs 
Questionnaire 
and content 
analysis 
The result found the level 
of compliance with 
AAOIFI standards based 
on the general 
presentation disclosure 
in the annual reports was 
very low. 
Abdullah et al. 
(2015) 
67 IBs in the 
south-east 
Asian and GCC 
Determinants of 
voluntary corporate 
governance 
Content 
analysis 
The  voluntary CG 
disclosure level less than 
40% 
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regions in 2009 disclosure: evidence 
from IBs in the south-
east Asian and GCC 
regions 
Sulaiman et al. 
(2015) 
BNM in 2008, 
2007 and 2006 
respectively 
CG of IFIs in Malaysia Content 
analysis 
Different levels of CG 
quality in the annual 
reports of IFIs the year 
after the guidelines were 
incorporated in the 
comprehensive CG index 
Srairi 
(2015)  
27 IBs 
operating in 
five GCC 
countries for 
three years 
(2011–2013) 
CG disclosure 
practices and 
performance of IBs in 
GCC countries 
Content 
analysis 
Just two nations, the UAE 
and Bahrain, have a 
higher level of CG: 
approximately 57% and 
56.8% respectively 
El-Halaby and 
Hussainey (2016) 
43 IBs across 
eight countries 
(MENA) in 2013 
Determinants of 
compliance with 
AAOIFI standards by 
IBs 
Content 
analysis 
The mean of compliance 
level according to AAOIFI 
standards for the SSB is 
68%, CSR is 27%, and the 
show of financial  
positions is 73% 
Ajili and Bouri 
(2017) 
39 IBs in GCC 
countries 
between 2010 
and 2014 
A comparative study 
between IFRS and 
AAOIFI disclosure 
compliance: evidence 
from IBs in GCC 
countries 
Content 
analysis 
The study finds that the 
level of compliance with 
the IFRS is higher than 
that of compliance with 
the AAOIFI. Also, the 
compliance with 
IFRS/AAOIFI disclosure 
requirements is higher 
for larger and more 
established IBs 
Salin et al. 
(2017) 
16 IFIs in 
Malaysia  
Sharia compliance on 
CG disclosure: 
empirical evidence of 
Malaysian IFIs 
Content 
analysis 
The research found the 
majority of IFIs in 
Malaysia moderately 
disclosed the information 
regarding Sharia CG 
Hasan et al. 
(2017) 
39 banks in 
Bangladesh  
from 2011 to 
2014 
Influence of internal 
and external 
governance 
mechanisms on CG 
disclosure among 
Islamic and 
conventional banks 
Content 
analysis 
There is a variance in 
governance compliance 
among IBs and 
conventional banks, as 
IBs have a lower level of 
compliance 
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Generally, the prior research did not take the opportunity to expand the study of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure in IBs and further participate to the knowledge of AAOIFI governance, by 
creating a new index to include all AAOIFI governance issued in 2010. Furthermore, the sample 
also looks at the wider viewpoint, which includes 126 observations of IBs that mandatorily adopt 
AAOIFI. 
Regarding the level of disclosure, prior studies offered mixed results (Paino et al., 2011; 
Vinnicombe, 2010; Al-Baluchi, 2006). All found higher levels of disclosure in IFIs. Specifically, 
Vinnicombe (2010) examined the extent to which IFIs in Bahrain complied with AAOIFI standards 
in their financial reporting. The study found high levels of compliance in several places and 
relatively weak levels in other places. Similarly, with Paino et al. (2011), their research aimed to 
investigate the state of Sharia, social responsibility and CG in IFIs in Malaysia. They concluded that 
there was a high overall level of CG disclosure, approximately 91.91% with 11 items. Also, Srairi 
(2015), who investigated the influence of the CG disclosure level on bank performance for 27 IBs 
in GCC countries. He found that two countries only, the UAE and Bahrain, possess a higher level of 
CG disclosure approximately 57% and 56.8% respectively. El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) explore 
to what extent IBs that adopt AAOIFI standards were compliant with the AAOIFI; this was based 
on an examination of 43 IBs across eight countries. The study concludes that the mean 
compliance level of AAOIFI standards that were related to the presentation of a financial 
statement was 73%. Otherwise, some prior studies found the level of CG disclosure was low, such 
as Aziah Abu Kasim (2012), who measured the disclosure of Sharia compliance as reported via the 
Sharia committee in the annual reports of takaful companies in Malaysia. She found that there 
was a scarcity of information to help investors and other stakeholders to make well-informed 
decisions. Similarly, Ullah (2013) examined the level of compliance with AAOIFI guidelines 
regarding general presentation and disclosure in the financial statements of IBs listed in 
Bangladesh. The outcome of this study was that these banks complied with a mean of 44.68% of 
AAOIFI guidelines. Also, Abdullah et al. (2015) investigated the determinants of voluntary CG 
disclosure practices of 67 IBs in the south-east Asian and GCC region. They found that the average 
level of voluntary governance disclosure is less than 40%. Mahmood and Khatun (2013), who 
investigated the compliance level of 17 IBs in Bangladesh for the year 2011, created an index 
based on AAOIFI governance standards No. 1 to No. 5. The results show that the level of Sharia 
compliance in fully fledged IBs is higher than others, although the index in this study was 
dependent on AAOIFI governance. However, they did not study standard No. 6, and studied one 
specific year and one country only. 
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Recently, Salin et al. (2017) used data from all 16 IFIs in Malaysia, for one year only (2013), to test 
the range of Sharia CG disclosure compliance. The outcome of the study was that the majority of 
IFIs in Malaysia moderately disclosed information regarding Sharia CG. Also, Ajili and Bouri (2017) 
measured and compared the level of compliance with disclosure requirements via the IFRS and 
AAOIFI in IBs in GCC countries. The study found that the level of compliance with the IFRS is 
higher than the level of compliance with the AAOIFI. Also, the compliance with IFRS/AAOIFI 
disclosure requirements is higher for bigger and more established IBs. Lastly, Grassa et al. (2017) 
studied the impact of CG on IBs products and services disclosure on a sample of 78 IBs across 11 
countries from 2004 to 2012. The study found that there was a considerable advancement of 
products and services disclosure.  Based on the previous discussion, the study expected that IBs 
have a higher level of disclosure resulting in the following research hypothesis: 
H1: There is a high level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs. 
3.3 Part 2: The Determinants of AAOIFI Governance Disclosure 
One of the primary purposes of this research is to test CG mechanisms as the main determinants 
of AAOIFI governance disclosure. Various prior studies address the influence of CG mechanisms 
on disclosure, such as (Hasan et al., 2017b; Ho and Wong, 2001; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2013; 
Gisbert et al., 2014; Scholtz and Smit, 2015; Nguyen et al., 2014; Elfeky, 2017; Almanasir and 
Shivaraj, 2017), with little attention being given to AAOIFI governance (El-Halaby and Hussainey, 
2016; Abdullah et al., 2014 and Abdullah et al., 2015). Appendix B presents a summary of the 
literature that relates to how CG mechanisms impact the level of disclosure. The details of this 
table will be discussed in the next subsection (CG mechanisms).  
Due to the relatively small amount of research undertaken on AAOIFI governance in IBs, this 
research contributes to the CG literature on IBs by examining the determinants of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure in IBs. The next subsection shows the literature on CG mechanisms that 
can effect CG disclosure. These are an independent board, board size, board meeting, the duality 
of CEO position, ACs and ACM. The framework of the check is as follows for every chosen variable: 
the relevant theoretical literature is briefly disclosed, the previous empirical literature relating to 
the variable is then discussed and, finally, suitable hypotheses relating to the variable are stated. 
3.3.1 Corporate governance characteristics 
 
Based on previous empirical studies, better regulation of CG mechanisms needs a reasonable level 
of disclosure and sufficient information to decrease information asymmetries among whole 
47  
 
parties in the company (Joshi et al., 2016). Additionally, a robust CG structure raises the 
confidence of investors, as their investment will be guaranteed by the internal safeguard and a 
controlling system to ensure prudence regarding management activities. Therefore, this leads to a 
high level of disclosure and transparency requirements from public interest (Joshi et al., 2016). 
Depending on the agency theory framework, the CG characteristics are introduced to reduce 
opportunist behaviours among managers, to decrease input asymmetry and to ensure that 
managers work in the interest of the shareholder. It can improve a firm’s internal control and, 
consequently, develop the level of disclosure (Welker, 1995; Ho and Wong, 2001). Accordingly, it 
can be seen that CG characteristics could improve CG disclosure reporting. Therefore, the current 
research reviews prior studies that suggest there is an association among disclosure and CG 
mechanisms.  
  3.3.1.1 Independent directors 
Recently, independent directors have received increased interest from CG regulations and 
academic research (Almanasir and Shivaraj, 2017; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Ho and Wong, 2001). 
Also, academics have pointed out that independent directors can safeguard shareholders and 
assist in decreasing agency costs (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Fama (1980), argued that a board of 
directors is the primary internal control character for monitoring managers. Also, the existence of 
independent directors on the board may increase the quality of the financial statement (Peasnell 
et al., 2005). According to agency theory, independent directors are further capable of limiting 
managerial opportunities (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The theory also suggests that the presence of 
independent managers on the board can reduce information asymmetry (Allegrini and Greco, 
2013). Most of the prior research was found to have a positive relationship among CG disclosure 
and independent directors such as Abdullah et al. (2015), their research examines the 
determinant of voluntary CG disclosure of 67 IBs in the Southeast Asian and GCC region. They 
found that board independent has a significant and positive relationship with voluntary CG 
disclosure and their finding support that independent directors influence the level of voluntary CG 
disclosure. 
Similarly, Samaha et al. (2012) who found that the higher ratio of board independent increase the 
level of disclosure in 100 Egyptian listed companies. Arcay and Vazquez (2005) report that the 
ratio of independents on the board is positive associated to voluntary disclosure. Their research 
based on 117 firms listed on the Madrid Stock Market. Gisbert and Navallas (2013), they study the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and CG in a sample of 62 Spanish firms in 2005. They 
found that the ratio of independent directors is strongly related with increased level of disclosure. 
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 In addition, Haniffa and Cooke (2002), state that independent directors can help the board with 
their knowledge and experience. Similarly, Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2010) found that 
independent directors provide a high level of protection to shareholders. However, Ho and Wong 
(2001)  examined the association between the proportion of board independent and voluntary 
disclosure in a questionnaire survey sent to all chief financial officers in listed companies in Hong 
Kong. They found an insignificant association among disclosure and independent managers and 
they explain the reason for their result maybe companies in Hong Kong are probable to comply 
with mandatory disclosure only.  Thus, based on agency theory the following research hypothesis 
is developed: 
H2: There is a positive association between board independence and the level of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure. 
3.3.1.2 Board size 
 
The board of directors (BOD) plays an essential function in CG and contains an overall number of 
administrative and non-executive managers on the assembly. Based on agency theory, board size 
is a potential variable of CG with regard to the monitoring of management performance (Allegrini 
and Greco, 2013). Also, the theory suggests that a large number of board directors affects the 
operation of managerial monitoring activities and control (Healy and Palepu, 2001). According to 
previous literature, board size affects the level of monitoring and disclosure (Rahma and Bukair, 
2015). Also, previous studies found mixed results, as Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013), argue that the 
level of voluntary disclosure is positively influenced by increased managerial monitoring. 
Similarly, Al-Janadi et al. (2013), assert that board size enhances further efficient decision-making 
and extends information dealing capabilities. Also, Wang and Hussainey (2013), indicate that firms 
with larger boards are more likely to disclose information. Zaheer (2013), found that a larger 
board size positively influences the level of CG disclosure.  
Recently, and as consistent with previous studies, Grassa et al. (2017) found a positive 
relationship between board size and products and services disclosure in 78 IBs in 11 countries, 
throughout the period from 2004 to 2012. In contrast, others find no significant influence 
regarding board size on CG disclosure (Lakhal, 2005; Hasan et al., 2017b; Arcay and Vazquez, 
2005). According to signalling and agency theory, the current research anticipates that a greater 
board size will raise board control. The consequence of this is an improvement in the level of 
disclosure in IBs. Based on agency theory, this study hypothesises that: 
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 H3: There is a positive relationship between board size and the level of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure. 
 3.3.1.3 Board meeting 
 
The board’s performance is assessed by the number of meetings held during the year (Albawwat, 
2015). Kanagaretnam et al. (2007), suggested that the more board meetings that are held 
throughout the year, the more the company is able to execute a supervisory function better and 
reduce the problem of asymmetric information. Agency theory states that the frequency of board 
meetings affects the strength of the CG component (Khanchel, 2007). More board meetings allow 
members to supervise better managers, which leads managers to display high-disclosure 
information to stakeholders (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Laksmana, (2008), stated that more board 
meetings lead companies to be more likely to show an increased level of transparency. 
Similarly, Hasan (2011), contended that a high meeting frequency would tend to signal 
achievement and provide extra information to all stakeholders; this is coordinated with signalling 
theory. Accordingly, several previous studies found an positive relationship among assembly 
meetings and financial reporting and disclosure Such as Albawwat and Ali (2015) who study the 
relationship between board meeting and voluntary disclosure in interim financial reports in 
Jordanian listed firms for the 2009-2013 the outcome of their study concluded that the disclosure 
level in Jordan listed companies affected by the number of board meeting. While Fiori et al.(2016)  
examined the effectiveness of CG on voluntary disclosure in a sample of 35 companies that linked 
the Pilot programme in 2011 and a similar 137 firms that did not, they conclude that there is no 
association between a board meeting and the level of voluntary disclosure. Based on agency 
theory, this research hypothesises that:  
H4: There is a positive relationship between board meetings and the level of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure. 
3.3.1.4 Duality in position 
 
When the chairman of the board is also the CEO, the role of duality in the position occurs (El-
Halaby and Hussainey, 2016). The CEO is a significant factor of CG because of its sensitive kind, 
due to the relationship among the agents and owners (Krause et al., 2014). According to agency 
theory, CEO duality is viewed as harmful, because the agent may follow their self-interest at the 
expense of the owners. Also, the theory states that effective monitoring of management 
execution will be provided via the division among the two functions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
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Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  According to Gul and Leung (2004: 356), “Firms with CEO duality are 
more likely to be associated with lower levels of voluntary disclosure since the board is less likely 
to be effective in monitoring management and ensuring a higher level of transparency”. 
According to Donker and Zahir (2008), agency theory predicts that duality in position creates a 
single power for the CEO that influences the efficient control exercised by the board. The 
outcomes of previous studies provide mixed findings on the relationship among duality in a 
position and CG disclosure. Several studies found a negative relationship among the two 
variables: Ezat and El-Masry (2008), found that CEO is negatively correlated with corporate 
disclosure levels. Also, Elfeky (2017), analysed the CG determinants, focusing on the range of 
voluntary disclosure in companies listed on the Egyptian stock market, this study also found that 
CEO is negative and statistically insignificant with the level of corporate disclosure, and the study 
concluded that, with low duality in position, there is a greater opportunity to disclose information 
voluntarily. In addition, Gisbert and Navallas (2013), studied the association among voluntary 
disclosure and CG in 62 non-financial Spanish companies listed on the Madrid stock market in 
2005. They found that CEO is negatively and statistically significant, and this shows that duality in 
a position significantly decreases the disclosure of voluntary information. 
However, other studies did not find an important association among the two variables (Hasan et 
al., 2017b; Zaheer, 2013; Ho and Wong, 2001; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). While some studies 
found a positive relationship between the two variables, namely Wang and Hussainey (2013), who 
examined the impact of CG on the level of voluntary disclosure and found a positive association 
between CEO and the level of voluntary disclosure. Also, Abdullah et al. (2015), investigated the 
determinants of voluntary CG disclosure practice about 67 IBs. The study found that the 
separation of the role between the board chair and CEO is strongly significant and has a positive 
relationship with voluntary CG disclosure. This result suggests that good CG mechanisms improve 
the level of CG disclosure in their annual reports. 
Also, in previous literature, Peng et al. (2007) and Hashim and Devi (2008), suggest the two 
functions should be discrete, for causes of independence. In disclosure practice, this research 
supposes that the division of functions among the chair and chief executive will improve the 
monitoring fineness and decrease the interests of hiding information, resulting in improved CG 
disclosure in IBs. Based on agency theory, IBs without CEO duality issues are predicted to have a 
higher CG disclosure level. Thus, the study develops the following hypothesis: 
H5: There is a negative relationship between duality in a position and the level of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure. 
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3.3.1.5 Audit committee size 
 
Based on agency theory and signalling theory, companies with a larger ACS have a stronger 
incentive to maintain their independence and require more comprehensive disclosure standards 
(Fama, 1980; Spence, 1978). 
According to Mangena and Pike (2005), more effective control will be given to companies with a 
larger ACs. Barako et al. (2006), assert that ACS should lead to the integrity of the financial 
statement and monitoring of the firm’s internal financial regulation, moreover the development 
of corporate information disclosure. Also, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) assert that the function of the 
ACS is a central role to improve the level of disclosure in relation to the financial reports. 
Companies with a larger ACS are faithful to good quality financial performance (Abdullah, 2013). It 
can be argued that ACS can reduce agency conflicts by limiting the opportunistic behaviour of 
agents (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  
Some previous studies found a positive association between ACS and CG disclosure. For example, 
Almanasir and Shivaraj (2017) examined the determinants of CG voluntary disclosure in 61 firms 
listed in Jordan from 2010 to 2014. They report that appositive and significant relationship 
between ACS and voluntary CG disclosure. Similarly, Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) who 
reported that the higher number of AC lead to higher level of disclosure in 97 financial reports of 
Saudi Arabian listed firms from 2006 to 2007.  Joshi et al. (2012) find a positive and significant 
relationship between ACS and CG disclosure practice using 850 firms listed on the Malaysia Stock 
Market in 2013.  Meanwhile, Othman et al. (2014) found that there is an insignificant relationship 
between ACS and voluntary ethics disclosure in a sample of 94 firms listed on Malaysia stock 
market. 
 According to agency theory, the current research expects that a more significant ACS will increase 
board-controlling capabilities and, thus, give a positive impact on the disclosure level practice in 
IBs. Therefore, the study hypothesises that: 
H6: There is a positive association between ACS and the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure. 
3.3.1.6 Audit committee meeting 
Greco (2011), stated that the frequency of ACMs leads members to an accurate decision about a 
firm’s accounting principles, disclosures and evaluation. Also, Raghunandan et al. (2001), stated 
that audit committees that meet frequently are more likely to be well informed, more careful and 
more knowledgeable about the existing accounting and auditing issues, in relation to achieving 
their duties. Similarly, M. Allegrini (2011), highlighted that regular audit committee meetings 
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would ensure there are clarity and knowledge in relation to accounting and auditing issues. Prior 
research has suggested that the number of meetings impacts on there being enough time to 
control and gain compliance with responsibilities of financial performance (Li et al., 2012; Elzahar, 
2013; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016). Gray et al. (1995), assert that to be responsible, managers need 
to supply whole financial and non-financial information to their stakeholders.  
While some prior studies found an insignificant relationship between ACM and level of disclosure 
such as Madi et al. (2014), found no statistical association between the level of disclosure and 
ACMs, Othman et al. (2014) also report that ACM insignificant relationship with voluntary ethics 
disclosure in 94 companies listed in Malaysia Stock Exchange in one the year 2011.  
 Based on agency theory, the frequency of ACMs may provide a level of control in relation to the 
activities carried out by IBs and, therefore, provide better CG disclosure within their annual 
reports. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H7: There is a positive relationship between the ACM and the level of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure. 
3.4 Part 3: The Impact of AAOIFI Governance Disclosure on Financial Performance. 
As discussed in chapter 2, governance theories, especially agency theory, indicate that the 
enhancement of CG characteristics progresses a firm’s financial performance. According to 
Klapper and Love (2004), a good CG mechanism will lead to higher process performance and 
higher firm performance. Furthermore, an optimal CG mechanism raises the internal safeguard 
and will ensure the trust of investors regarding their investment (Zhang, 2012). 
The empirical literature examines the association between CG characteristics and a firm’s financial 
performance (Weir and Laing, 2000; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Black and Kim, 2012; Al-Ataibi , 
2017; Muriuki et al., 2017; Tariq and Abbas, 2013; Velte, 2017; Bhatt and Bhatt, 2017). Table 3.2 
gives a summary of the literature relating to CG disclosure and bank performance. The influence 
of a good corporate mechanism on firm performance output shows mixed results. For example, 
Nelson (2005), demonstrated that a higher quality of CG positively impacts firm performance. 
Similarly, Bhatt and Bhatt (2017), analysed the CG framework impact of firm performance on 113 
listed firms in Malaysia, and they found that firm performance is positively and significantly linked 
with CG. Also, Al–Ataibi (2017) investigated the extent of the impact of the principles of 
governance in improving firm performance. The study found that there is an influence of 
governance on developing firm Performance. Al-Najjar (2014) explored the relationship between 
53  
 
CG and firm performance in five countries in the Middle East. The study found that board 
independence positively impacts firm performance.  
Anis et al. (2017), investigated the impact of board characteristics on a firm’s financial 
performance. They studied 70 firms over six years, from 2005 to 2010, and the sample included 
the most active companies listed on the Egyptian stock market. The study found that firm size is 
statistically significant with ROA and the age of the firm is statistically significant with market 
performance, measured using Tobin’s Q, while the CEO and firm accounting performance have a 
negative relationship. Additionally, Garefalakis et al. (2017) investigated the effect of CG 
information on bank performance. The study found that board independence strongly supports 
bank efficiency and operations. 
In contrast, Hassan et al. (2016) examined the association between CG mechanisms and financial 
performance in all non-financial companies listed on the Palestinian stock exchange during 2010 
and 2012. The study found that corporate performance is negatively associated with CG. Similarly, 
Pearce and Patel (2017), found that board independence is not associated with firm performance 
and CEO is negatively associated with firm performance. Detthamrong et al. (2017), examined the 
association between CG and firm performance in 493 non-financial firms in Thailand between 
2001 and 2014. The study found that CG is not associated with firm performance. 
As far as this researcher knows, there is no prior study on the effect of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure on bank performance in IBs. Thus, the current research tries to examine this issue. 
According to the agency theory, the current research hypothesises that: 
 
H8: There is a positive association between the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure and 
performance in IBs. 
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2TABLE 3.2: A SUMMARY OF LITERATURE CONNECTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE AND PERFORMANCE 
Direction of Relationship Authors Country and Sample Empirical Finding Performance Measurement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive 
Pillai et al. (2017) 
 
349 companies in GCC 
during 2005–2012 
 
CG significantly affects firm 
performance 
 
Tobin’s Q and ROA 
 
Harun (2017) 
 
United Malacca Berhad 
(UMB)  
 
CG has a positive 
relationship with firm 
performance 
 
ROA and ROE 
 
Foyeke et al. (2015)  
 
137 companies in Nigeria 
during 2003–2010 
 
 ROA 
Amoateng et al. (2017) 
 
100 small and medium-size 
enterprises (SMEs) in Ghana 
during 2012–2016 
CEO is positively affected by 
ROA 
ROA and net profit margin 
(NPM) 
 
Alvarado and Bravo (2017) 
 
US-listed firms during 2008–
2012 
 
Board independence and 
board size are positively 
influenced by the firm 
performance 
Tobin’s Q 
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Ali et al. (2017)  
 
100 non-financial firms in 
Pakistan during 2006–2008 
 
CG improves firm 
performance 
ROA and ROE 
 
Al-Ataibi (2017)  
 
Companies listed on the 
Kuwaiti stock market 
 
 Market value add (MVA), 
return on investment (ROI), 
NPM, ROA and return on 
ordinary share EPS 
 
Siswanti et al. (2017) 
 
Nine IBs during 2010–2015 
 
CG has a significant impact 
on firm performance 
 
Albawwat et al. (2015) 
 
Companies listed on the 
Jordanian stock exchange 
during 2009–2013 
 
The quality of disclosure 
leads to high performance 
 
Ogege and Boloupremo 
(2014) 
 
Nigerian banks 
 
A positive relationship 
between CG and firm 
performance  
ROE and ROA 
Hussain and Abdulhadi 
(2017) 
 
124 companies in Malaysia 
 
Board size and board 
composition have a 
significant impact on firm 
ROA 
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performance 
Garefalakis et al. (2017) 
 
86 banks during 2008–2011 
 
 
Board independence 
strongly supports bank 
efficiency and operations 
ROA 
Al-Najjar (2014) 
 
 
Publicly listed companies in 
five countries in the Middle 
East 
 
Board independence is 
positively associated with 
firm performance 
ROA, ROE and stock price 
return 
Silva et al. (2017) 
 
Companies listed in BM& 
FBovespa during 2010–2014 
 
Board size is positively 
associated with firm 
performance 
ROA 
Taherian and Karampour 
(2017) 
 
Firms listed on the Tehran 
stock exchange 
 
A significant effect between 
board size, CEO and firm 
performance 
ROA 
 
 
Negative 
Hassan et al. (2016) 
 
Firms listed on the 
Palestinian stock market 
over 2010–2012 
 
CG is negatively associated 
with firm performance  
ROA, ROE and MBVR 
Pearce and Patel (2017) Publicly traded companies in CEO is negatively associated ROA 
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 the USA 
 
with performance 
Amoateng et al. (2017) 
 
100 SMEs in Ghana during 
2012–2016 
Board size is negatively 
associated with firm 
performance 
ROA and ROE 
 
Vithessonthi et al. (2017)  
 
493 firms in Thailand during 
2001–2014 
 
ACs is negatively associated 
with firm performance 
ROE 
 
 
 
 
No Relation 
Pearce and Patel (2017) 
 
Publicly traded companies in 
the USA 
 
Board independence is not 
associated with 
performance 
ROA 
Hatt et al. (2008) Malaysian-listed companies 
 
CG is not significantly 
associated with firm 
performance 
Tobin’s Q 
Haassouna et al. (2017) 
 
85 Egyptian listed 
companies during 2006–
2010 
No significant relationship 
between disclosure and firm 
performance  
ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q and 
the market/book value 
(M/BV) 
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3.4.1 Corporate governance mechanisms and firm-specific characteristics (control variables)  
The study objective is to examine the impact of AAOIFI governance disclosure level on bank 
performance. Thus, the independent variable, at this stage of the study, is the AAOIFI governance 
disclosure score, and bank performance is the dependent variable, as indicated by ROA and ROE. 
The rest of the variables relate to CG characteristics and firm-specific characteristics and are 
considered as control variables. 
3.4.1.1 Independent directors and firm performance 
 
According to agency theory, independent directors help to reduce agency problems between 
agents and principals (Fama, 1980). Additionally, from signalling theory, “the presence of 
independent members on the board can serve as a signal to the existence of fewer agency 
problems” (Black et al., 2006). Fama and Jensen, (1983) argue that independent directors, with 
their expertise and connections to a firm, can then improve firm value. Moreover, Goodstein et al. 
(1994), suggest that the monitoring increases and affects firm value through a high number of 
independent directors. 
Empirical studies have found mixed results between independent directors and firm performance. 
A positive relationship is noted by Al-Najjar (2014), who explored the under-researched 
relationship between CG and firm performance in tourism companies. The study reported that 
board independence is found to be positively related to firm performance as measured by ROA. 
Similarly, using 27 IBs in five Arab Gulf countries for three years (2011–2013), Srairi (2015), found 
that the IBs with a high level of CG disclosure report a high level of performance measured by 
ROA and ROE. Also, Anis et al. (2017) studied the impact of board characteristics on bank 
performance using a sample of 70 firms over six years. They found a positive association between 
the independent board and bank performance. Furthermore, (Bravo and Reguera‐Alvarado, 2017; 
Pearce and Patel, 2017 and Garefalakis et al., 2017) found a significant and positive relationship 
between the two variables. 
On the other hand, Bozec (2005), investigated 25 Canadian companies from 1976 to 2000, 
measured by ROA, return on sales and Tobin’s Q, the study found that firm value was lower in 
companies that had a board dominated by independent board members. Al-Maghzom et al. 
(2016) found no significant association between the two variables. Recently, Molnar et al. (2017) 
also found no significant relationship between the independent board and firm performance. 
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3.4.1.2 Board size and firm performance  
Allegrini and Greco (2013), state that board size is a vital factor that can affect management 
behaviour. Agency theory suggests that a larger board may have increased managerial costs, 
which then negatively affect firm value (Yawson, 2006). For instance, a large board may increase 
board expenses, remuneration and other allowances. A larger board can lead to an increase in 
agency costs and reduce firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Previous studies found mixed results between board size and firm performance. Gordon et al. 
(2012), suggested that more efficient CG practices are related to board size, which positively 
affect financial performance. Similarly, a larger board may attract more qualified members who 
may improve board decisions (Yawson, 2006). Al-Najjar (2014), found that large boards increase 
firm profitability. However, small boards show a greater level of efficiency in the stock market. 
Recently, (Hussain and Hadi, 2017; Taherian and Karampour, 2017; Anis et al., 2017; Pillai and Al-
Malkawi, 2017 and Silva et al., 2017) found a positive and significant relationship between the 
two variables. 
In contrast, some studies found the relationship between board size and firm performance is 
negative and insignificant, such as Amoateng et al. (2017), who studied the impact of CG practices 
on the performance of SMEs in Ghana. They found that board size has a negative and insignificant 
impact on firm performance. Similarly, (Hassan et al., 2016; Pearce and Patel, 2017 and 
Garefalakis et al., 2017) found an insignificant and negative association among the two variables.  
3.4.1.3 Frequency of directors meetings’ and performance 
The main responsibility of a board director is monitoring the firm’s operation (Mahadeo et al., 
2012; Khan et al., 2013). Hence, regular board meetings lead to good monitoring by managers 
(Vafeas, 1999). Regular board meetings can increase firm performance by relieving agency 
problems (Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013).  
The existing literature on the association between the frequency of board meetings and firm 
performance is mixed. According to Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013), the relationship between 
the frequency of board meetings and financial performance is positive. According to agency 
theory, this may reduce conflicts and help to influence shareholders positively. Upadhyay et al. 
(2014) found a positive relationship between the two variables by using a sample of US firms. 
Similarly, Albassam (2014), pointed to a positive relationship between the frequency of board 
meetings and performance. 
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 On the other hand, Vafeas (1999) states that a high frequency of board meetings can increase 
agency costs. For example, travel expenses and meeting expenses can have a negative effect on 
firm value (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Vafeas (1999), as mentioned above, and Fich and Shivdasani (2006), also found that the frequency 
of board meetings had a negative effect on firm value. Similarly, Christensen et al. (2015) found 
the same result. Also, Hassan et al. (2016), found a negative relationship between the two 
variables. Recently, Chou and Buchdadi (2017), examined the impact of board meetings on 
banking practice in Indonesia. They found that board meetings enhance the operational 
performance of the bank. 
3.4.1.4 CEO duality and firm performance 
Agency theory proposes that CEOs should run the firm in the best interest of shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Jensen (1993) and Blackburn (1994), argue that merging the roles of 
chairperson and CEO may undermine the board’s controlling power.  
White and Ingrassia (1992), assert that CEO duality can lead to a decline in performance because 
of the agency cost if the CEO practices their interest at the expense of the shareholder. CEO 
duality is an essential dimension of governance which affects firm performance (Mollaha and 
Zamanb, 2015). According to agency theory, CEOs should run a firm in the best interests of 
shareholders (Chen et al., 2011). Mollaha and Zamanb (2015), investigated the impact of CEO 
power on financial performance during the period 2005–2011. They found a negative impact on 
firm value. 
Similarly, Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008), argued that CEO duality could present self-serving 
chances to control board meetings that may have a negative effect on corporate financial 
performance. Similarly, Anis et al. (2017) found a negative relationship between CEO duality and 
firm performance. Also, Albassam (2014), found a negative impact on the two variables. 
On the other hand, Boyd (1995), found that CEO duality leads to a higher return on investment. 
Recently, (Opata and Awino, 2017; Pearce and Patel, 2017 and Scafarto et al., 2017) found a 
positive relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. In addition, (Garefalakis et al., 
2017; Taherian and Karampour, 2017; Hussain and Hadi, 2017 and Muriuki et al., 2017) found a 
significant association among the two variables. Some research studies found that CEO duality 
does not affect firm value, such as Bozec (2005), who found the insignificant impact of CEO duality 
on firm value in a sample of 25 Canadian firms between 1976 and 2000.  
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3.4.1.5 Audit committee size and firm performance 
ACs enforcement plays a vital role to ensure adequate CG to all stakeholders (Velte, 2017). 
Agency theory proposes that ACs decrease the conflict of interest and asymmetric information 
between management and investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Zhang et al. (2007), stated that 
ACs is still valued as one of the essential governance characteristics that are recommended for 
developed governance accountability, transparency and reporting quality in firms. Most of the 
prior studies suggest that firms that employ large audit firms tend to have a high level of agency 
conflicts, and they aim to decrease the existing level of conflict through the staffing of external 
firms (Inchausti, 1997). 
Chan and Li (2008) investigate the impact of ACs on the firm value of 200 firms and found a 
negative association between the two variables. Similarly, Detthamrong et al. (2017) examined 
the association between CG and firm performance for a panel of 493 firms in Thailand during the 
period 2001–2014. They found that ACs had a negative effect on firm performance. Also, Hassan 
et al., (2016), found a negative association among the two variables. 
3.4.1.6 Firm characteristics and firm performance 
Following previous studies (Aggarwal et al., 2008; Hassan et al., 2009; Harun, 2017; Al-Najjar and 
Al-Najjar, 2017; Bravo and Reguera‐Alvarado, 2017) the current study considers some firm 
characteristics, these controls are firm size, liquidity, leverage and firm asset growth. 
Al-Akra and Ali (2012) assert that firm size impacts on firm value because larger firms find it easier 
to obtain sources of funding. Also, significant total assets can be used internally as sources for the 
firm, and managers have more flexibility in using assets in the firm and, as a result, there is an 
improvement in firm performance and an increase in firm value Ezat and El-Masry, (2008). So, in 
previous studies, such as Hassan et al. (2009), a positive relationship is seen between company 
size and company performance. Similarly, Bravo and Reguera‐Alvarado (2017), found a positive 
association between company size and company performance. Also, Anis et al. (2017) found the 
same association between the two variables. Thus, the larger firm is usually expected to have a 
better value, especially regarding firm performance (Samaha et al., 2012). 
Liquidity is another variable that can affect firm performance. From a signalling theory 
perspective, companies with high liquidity tend to highlight their positive liquidity outcomes to 
indicate their abilities to investors. Also, agency theory confirms the relationship between 
liquidity and firm performance. Prior studies found a significant positive relationship between 
liquidity and operation standards (Schipper, 1991; White and Ingrassia, 1992). In contrast, Al-
Maghzom et al. (2016) found a negative association between liquidity and firm value. 
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In regard to leverage, this might have a positive influence on bank performance.  According to 
Hodgson and Stevenson-Clarke (2000), this effect might take place because tax deductibility on 
borrowing may result in a reduction in the cost of capital, which greatly raises company 
performance. In previous studies, there are mixed results for the association between firm value 
and leverage. Companies with rising leverage seek to have great operations to obtain higher profit 
growth (Ouma, 2012). Also, Pillai and Al-Malkawi (2017) found a significant relationship between 
leverage and firm performance. Meanwhile, some previous studies found a negative association 
between leverage and firm value (Ammann et al., 2011; Mangena et al., 2012; Bravo and Reguera‐
Alvarado, 2017; Hassan et al., 2016; Harun, 2017).  
Firm asset growth is related to the existence of firms because company growth is related to a rise 
in work actions (Henry, 2008). According to Henry (2008), firms may receive a good valuation with 
better growth opportunities. Empirically, prior studies have found a significant relationship 
between company growth and bank performance (Henry, 2008; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006).  
3.5 Chapter Summary 
The current chapter supplied literature discussions of CG disclosure in IBs, according to the prior 
studies in the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure, its determinants and bank performance. The 
research identifies different study gaps that need to be accomplished.  
Shortly, the study hypotheses of the current research can be distributed into three prime groups, 
according to research questions and objectives. Firstly, a group that is related to the level of 
AAOIFI governance disclosure. Secondly, the group of hypotheses that is linked to a relationship 
between the CG characteristics and AAOIFI governance disclosure, and the third group is linked to 
bank performance and AAOIFI governance disclosure level. 
The following chapter will present a consideration of the research methodology and methods 
applied to achieve the research questions.  
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the research methodology used in this current research to obtain the study 
aim, response to the study questions and examines the hypotheses. In addition, it presents how 
the data is collected, the study sample, the reliability, and how the variables are measured. This 
chapter includes discussions on the research philosophy, approach and methodology used to 
measure the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure, the determinants and bank performance. 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
The research philosophy is the approach used to collect data and then analyse, and consequently 
utilise, this data (Collis et al., 2003). Interpretivism and positivism are the two main approaches 
that can be used in the management research (Bryman, 2015). Positivism is supported by 
scientists’ views that the nature of knowledge is based on realism. Collis and Hussey (2009: 56) 
demonstrate positivism in management research as thus: “Today, researchers conducting 
business research under a paradigm that stems from positivism still focus on theories to explain 
and predict social phenomena”. Positivism illustrates the causal association between variables 
that can help to develop theories from the findings. Also, positivism is the view that social 
phenomena can be measured, and thus they can be interpreted using quantitative methods of 
analysis (Bryman, 2015; Saunders et al., 2007). On the other hand, interpretivism depends on the 
principles of idealism and explores the understanding of social phenomena. Also, interpretive 
philosophy emphasises the being of difference, which is necessary to enhance the research 
process between people and objects of the natural sciences. The process, therefore, requires a 
social science path to identify the subjective meaning of social action (Saunders and Lewis, 2009). 
Table 4.1, shows the difference between the positivism and the interpretivism philosophy. A 
paradigm is therefore characterised by sides, by an assured methodology that is adopted by 
researchers for acquiring or developing knowledge. A research paradigm is also concerned with 
two central concepts: the nature of the phenomenon under study and the function of the role of 
the researcher. Clarity on the research paradigm being followed assists researchers in conducting 
their studies more efficiently. Research methods and philosophies are two critical concepts that 
are consistent in a research paradigm. 
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3TABLE 4.1: COMPARISON OF POSITIVISM AND INTERPRETIVISM 
Panel A: Common Terms Used to Describe the Paradigms 
Positivism Interpretivism 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Objective Subjective 
Scientific Humanist 
Traditionalist Phenomenological 
Panel B: Features of the Paradigms 
Positivism Interpretivism 
A large sample is involved Used with small samples 
Concerned with hypothesis testing Helpful in generating theories 
Produces precise, objective and quantitative data Produces ‘rich’, subjective and qualitative data 
Produces results with high reliability but low 
validity 
Produces findings with low reliability but high 
validity 
Allows results to be generalised from the sample 
to the population 
All findings can be generalised from one setting to 
another setting 
Source: Collis and Hussey (2009:58-62) 
 
The current study uses the positivism philosophy. It examines the reality of an already existing 
phenomenon, the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs. The researcher uses existing 
theories in the emergence of the hypothesis that is tested and can, therefore, either be accepted 
or rejected (Saunders and Lewis, 2009). 
4.3 Research Approach 
Deductive and inductive are the two main research approaches. The deductive approach is based 
on theory (or theories), with a developed hypothesis that is based on the theories. The study 
strategy is prepared to explore the hypothesis based on the gathered data (Saunders and Lewis, 
2009). Meanwhile, with the inductive path, the data is based on the phenomenon that is gathered 
and tested and, consequently, a theory is established (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Babbie, 2015). In 
this research, the deductive path is used. Down this path, the study developed a hypothesis 
according to existing literature and theories and used a statistical method to examine the 
developed hypotheses. This approach corresponds with the aim of the research that is to identify 
the determinants and the bank performance on the level of compliance of AAOIFI CG. The 
differences between the research approaches (deductive and inductive) can be explained as 
follows: 
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1FIGURE 4.1: DEDUCTIVE PROCESS 
 
2FIGURE 4.2: INDUCTIVE PROCESS 
 
Source: Alotaibi  (2016:115-116) 
 
4.4 Research Methodology 
The current research investigates the level of disclosure of AAOIFI governance and tests the 
hypotheses of its determinants and its impact on bank performance. Milne and Adler (1999: 237) 
state that most researchers in the social accounting field have “focused on the disclosure 
organisations make in their annual reports. The research method that is most commonly used to 
assess organisations’ social and environmental disclosures and accountability is content analysis”. 
According to Campbell, (2000:48), annual reports “can be accepted as an appropriate source of a 
company’s attitudes towards social and ethical reporting”. Also, Buhr (1998:169), regarding an 
annual report, asserted that “they are the only form that is institutionalised and provided on a 
regular basis year after year”. Access to annual reports is easy, as they can be downloaded from a 
bank’s website.  
Crotty, (1998 :3) defined research methods as “the technique or procedures used to gather and 
analyse data related to some research question or hypothesis”. The current study adopted 
quantitative content analysis research methods in measuring the AAOIFI governance disclosure of 
IBs that adopt AAOIFI standards as mandatory. The financial reports of sample IBs from 2013 to 
2015 analysed using disclosure index and content analysis.  
66  
 
AAOIFI governance disclosure mentions to the standard of AAOIFI governance information 
disclosed in the annual report. The researcher measured the level of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure by the amount of AAOIFI governance information that is issued by the bank in the 
annual report. To measure the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure volume in the research, the 
un-weighted path is used to code and size AAOIFI governance disclosure through the annual 
report. Thus, ‘1’ is assigned for every AAOIFI governance disclosed in the annual report, and ‘0’ is 
assigned if the annual report does not provide any AAOIFI governance disclosure items. Each bank 
has been given a score of quantity, which represents the total AAOIFI governance disclosure items 
in the annual reports. It includes all AAOIFI governance standards from No. 1 to No. 6. 
To examine the impact of AAOIFI governance disclosure between the sample IBs, annual reports 
have been used as the primary resources in gathering data. While in measuring the bank 
performance, the researcher calculated the ratios manually based on the income statement and 
balance sheet that were collected from the www.fitchconnect.com. To test the hypotheses and 
test the relationship among the main variables, the research employed OLS regression.  
4.5 Sample and Data 
The sample includes all IBs that have mandatorily adopted AAOIFI standards. There are ten 
countries that have mandatorily adopted AAOIFI standards “Bahrain, Syria, Qatar, Sudan, Tunisia, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Oman and Mauritius” (Al Qamashoui and Hussainey, 2016). However, 
the study excludes IBs in Lebanon, Tunisia and some banks from Sudan, because the researcher 
did not have access to these banks’ annual reports and, despite sending emails to these banks, 
they did not reply. The years the study focused on were from 2013 to 2015, and this period 
includes 126 banks in total. The reason for selecting this period was because the latest IBs that 
adopted AAOIFI standards was in 2013 (Bank Nizwa), and 2015 was the most recently available 
annual reports produced by the sample of IBs. Table 4.2 shows the sample of this current study 
(IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards).  
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4 TABLE 4.2: SAMPLE OF THIS CURRENT STUDY (IBS THAT ADOPT AAOIFI STANDARDS AS MANDATORY) 
                                Bank 
Bahrain 
1. Khaleeji Commercial Bank 
2. First Energy Bank 
3. Arab Banking Corporation (ABC) 
4. Bahrain Islamic Bank 
5. Venture Capital Bank 
6. Ithmaar Bank 
7. Gulf Finance House 
8. Al Salam Bank of Bahrain 
9. Bank Alkhair 
10. Albaraka Islamic Bank Bahrain  
11. Seera Investment Bank 
12. International Investment Bank 
13. Citi Islamic Investment Bank 
14. Investors Bank 
15. Liquidity Management Centre  
16. Ibdar Bank 
17. Kuwait Finance House-Bahrain 
Qatar 
18. Qatar International Islamic Bank 
19. Qatar First Bank 
20. Barwa Bank 
21. Masraf Al Rayan 
22. Qatar Islamic Bank Doha 
23. Q invest Bank 
Sudan 
24. Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan 
25. Al Shamal Islamic Bank 
26. Saving & Social Development Bank 
27. Farmers Commercial Bank 
28. Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 
29. Tadamon Islamic Bank 
30. Blue Nile Mashreg Bank 
31. United Capital Bank 
Jordan 
32. Jordan Islamic Bank 
33. Islamic International Arab Bank 
34. Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank (Safwa Islamic Bank 
Syria 
35. Syria International Islamic Bank 
36. Albaraka Bank Syria 
37. Cham Bank 
Palestine 
38. Arab Islamic Bank 
39. Palestine Islamic Bank 
Oman 
40. Bank Nizwa 
41. Alizz Islamic Bank 
Mauritius 
42. Century Banking Corporation 
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4.6 Content Analysis 
There is a wide range of definitions of content analysis; the majority agreeable one is that defined 
by Berelson (1952: 18) as: “Content analysis as a research technique for the objective, systematic 
and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication”. According to Guthrie 
and Abeysekera (2006:14), “Content analysis of annual reports is a technique for gathering data”. 
Content analysis is an important tool that has been used in the analysis of documents and texts 
that searches quantified content regarding predetermined categories. In prior CG disclosure 
studies, content analysis has been widely used (Samaha et al., 2012). The current study uses the 
disclosure index, which cross-checks with the annual report to identify the level of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure by IBs. The annual reports read line by line, the result ‘1’ given if there is 
bank disclosure in AAOIFI governance information and 0 otherwise. Some of the previous 
researchers have used this method in estimating either the preciseness of detail or level of 
disclosure in annual reports (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Aribi, 2009; 
Alotaibi, 2016; Harun 2016 and Abdullah, 2013).  
The current research has chosen the content analysis technique to examine data around the level 
of AAOIFI governance disclosure, gathered from the annual reports of IBs. Content analysis is a 
suitable method for quantifying data during the reading of annual reports, as pre-determined 
groups can be used in a way that can be readily repeated (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
4.7 AAOIFI Governance Index 
The current study uses a comprehensive unweighted disclosure index to answer the first question 
in the study. It includes all AAOIFI governance standards issued in 2010. Consequently, a ‘1’ is 
given for each item in the AAOIFI governance index disclosure in the annual report and ‘0’ if 
otherwise. Every bank has been given a score based on the whole figure of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure items, in the annual report.  The unweighted disclosure index means that all items are 
given similar results and importance (Shehata, 2014). Beattie et al. (2004: 126) stated that: 
“disclosure index studies are based on the general principles of content analysis as a well-
established method in the social sciences”.  Following the Beattie et al. (2004), the researcher 
developed a comprehensive AAOIFI governance index as “a partial type of content analysis”. 
Many types of research have employed a disclosure index as a study method (Maali et al., 2006; 
Aribi, 2009; Abdullah, 2013; Ismail, 2015; El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2015 and Harun, 2016). 
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According to Guthrie and Abeysekera (2006: 11), “a disclosure index is a research instrument 
comprising of a series of pre-selected items which, when scored, provide a measure that indicates 
a level of disclosure in the specific context for which the index was devised”. Previous studies 
(Maali et al., 2008; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hassan and Harahap, 2010) employ several stages 
to develop the disclosure index. Therefore, in conducting this research, the researcher performs 
these stages. First, to measure the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure, the items in the index 
were developed based on all AAOIFI governance standards from No. 1 to No. 6, issued in 2010. 
Second, the items included in the index are selected very carefully by reading the AAOIFI 
governance, and then, the researcher selected the main dimensions of the index, which consisted 
of six main AAOIFI governance standards. After that, each item was divided into sub-items, based 
on essential points in each standard. For example, the first main dimension is SSB (AAOIFI 
governance No. 1), which is divided into 14 sub-items – six are related to SSB and eight are related 
to the SSB report.  
 The index consists of 56 items that were created to measure the level of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure. The dimensions aimed to determine the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure using a 
CG index and the level of the AAOIFI governance sections in the annual reports. Table 4.3 shows 
the outline of the major dimensions in measuring AAOIFI governance disclosure in the sample IBs 
that adopt AAOIFI. 
 Third, the process and confirmation of the AAOIFI governance disclosure index take place. The 
researcher confirmed items built in the index through discussion with the academic judge, namely 
Professor. Adel Ahmed (Al Ain University, UAE), Dr Zakaria Ali-Arabi (University of Central 
Lancashire), Dr Taswar Nawaz (Plymouth University) and my director of the study, Professor 
Khaled Hussainey. Finally, after confirming the index, the researcher decided whether to define a 
weighting to the AAOIFI governance disclosure checklist or not. In the current research, an 
unweighted AAOIFI governance index is employed to measure the level of CG disclosure. The 
reason for using an unweighted disclosure index is due to several researchers confirmed that both 
unweighted and weighted scores, generally lead to the same results when a large number of 
items are included (Marston and Shrives, 1991). In addition, this method has been used widely in 
previous research in measuring disclosure practices (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Abdullah, 2013; 
Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012 and Harun, 2016). Therefore, the study has selected this method, in 
measuring the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure quantity of IBs that adopt AAOIFI governance 
around the world.  
 
70  
 
5TABLE 4.3: AAOIFI GOVERNANCE INDEX 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Sharia Review (SR) 
15  Examination of the extent of an institution's compliance with Sharia in 
all activities – covers contracts, transactions, policies etc. 
AAOIFI 
(2010, p.14) 
16  The SR of an IFIs Sharia review does not relieve management’s 
responsibility for compliance 
AAOIFI 
(2010, p.14) 
17 Ensure that the activities carried out by an IFI do not contravene 
Sharia 
AAOIFI 
(2010, p.14) 
18 Reviewing other information and reports, such as circulars, minutes, 
operating and financial reports, policies and procedures 
AAOIFI 
(2010, p.15) 
19 Discussing findings with a member of IFI management AAOIFI 
(2010, p.15) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal Sharia Review 
 
(ISR) 
20 Carried out by an independent department or part of the internal 
audit department 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.22) 
21 Continuous examination and evaluation of the extent of an 
institution’s compliance with Sharia 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.22) 
22 The charter will be approved by the SSB of the IFI and issued 
by the board of directors 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.22) 
23 The charter will be regularly reviewed AAOIFI (2010, 
p.22) 
24 The charter will make clear no executive authority has 
responsibility for the activities they review 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.22) 
25 The staff have an appropriate educational background and 
training relevant to the ISR 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.23) 
26 Comply with the code of Ethics for Accountants and Auditors of 
IFIs issued by the AAOIFI 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.23) 
27 At least a quarterly written report will be prepared, which must 
be signed by the head of the ISR 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.25) 
No. Governance Standards Item 
No. 
Items/Scoring (1 if compliant, 0 otherwise) Reference 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Sharia Supervisory 
Board (SSB) 
 
 
 
 
 
*Items related to the 
SSB report 
1 At least three members appointed by shareholders at the annual 
meeting 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.4) 
2 Experts in Islamic commercial jurisprudence AAOIFI (2010, 
p.4) 
3 The role, responsibilities and authorities of the board AAOIFI (2010, 
p.4) 
4 SSB seek the service of consultants who have expertise in 
business, economics, law and accounting 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.4) 
5 Approval/acceptance of the appointment of the SSB AAOIFI (2010, 
p.4) 
6 The dismissal of a member of the SSB will require a 
recommendation by the board of directors and be subject to the 
approval of the shareholders at a general meeting 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.5) 
7* The SSB report signed by the board members AAOIFI (2010, 
p.7) 
8 Information about the opinion of the board regarding the bank’s 
complete compliance with the rules of Islamic Sharia 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.6) 
9 Information about the bank’s accountability of zakah AAOIFI (2010, 
p.6) 
10 Information about the bank’s accountability of actions that do 
not follow Sharia and how the bank deals with it 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.6) 
11 information around profit distribution processes AAOIFI (2010, 
p.6) 
12 information around the independence of the Sharia board and 
the of topicality the board 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.6) 
13 SSB has performed appropriate tests of documents, procedures 
and reviews of work, as appropriate, for the compliance with 
Sharia 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.6) 
14 information around the date of the report and name of the bank AAOIFI (2010, 
p.7) 
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4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Audit and Governance 
Committee (AGC) for 
IFIs 
 
      
28 Review of internal controls (including an internal audit) AAOIFI 
(2010, 
p.32) 
29 Reviewing resources and skills, the scope of responsibility, 
overall work programme and reporting lines of the internal audit 
AAOIFI 
(2010, 
p.33) 
30 Reviewing the major outcome of an internal audit AAOIFI 
(2010, 
p.33) 
31 Reviewing the IFIs code of ethics and the effectiveness with 
which it is implemented  
AAOIFI 
(2010, 
p.33) 
32 Reviewing the effectiveness of the IFIs system for monitoring 
compliance with Sharia rules and principles 
AAOIFI 
(2010, 
p.33) 
33 Reviewing the IFIs accounting policies and practices and 
reporting requirements 
AAOIFI 
(2010, 
p.33) 
34 Ensuring that independence and professional integrity of 
auditors is not compromised 
AAOIFI 
(2010, 
p.33) 
35 Review of interim and annual accounts and financial reports AAOIFI 
(2010, 
p.34) 
36 Reviewing the compliance with Sharia rules and principles AAOIFI 
(2010, 
p.34) 
37 Formally established by the board of directors from its non-
executive members and appointed by the board of directors 
AAOIFI 
(2010, 
p.35) 
38 The AGC must not have less than three members AAOIFI 
(2010, 
p.36) 
39 The report of the AGC is submitted to the board of directors, 
through the chairman of the board, and copies sent to the CEO  
AAOIFI 
(2010, 
p.36) 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
Independence of the 
Sharia Supervisory 
Board 
40 SSB members will be fair, intellectually honest and free from 
conflict of interests 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.44) 
41 SSB members are not to subordinate their judgment on Sharia 
supervision matters to others 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.44) 
42 SSBs avoid potential and actual situations that impair their ability 
to make objective professional judgments 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.44) 
43 SSB members are not employees of the same IFI AAOIFI (2010, 
p.44) 
44 SSB members are not involved in any matter regarding 
managerial decisions and operational responsibilities of the IFI 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.44) 
45 Identify any situations that may impair independence and resolve 
them 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.45) 
 
No. Governance 
Standards  
Item 
No. 
Items No. Sub-items Reference 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
Statement of 
Governance 
Principles for 
IFIs 
46 Effective Sharia 
compliance structure 
 
46.1 The interaction between the SSB or 
its members and management 
should be transparent 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.56) 
46.2 The responsibility for the conduct of 
the overall affairs of the IFI by Sharia 
rests with the board of directors 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.56) 
47 Fair treatment of equity 
holders 
47.1 Equity holders should have access to 
vital corporate information about the 
conduct of the overall affairs of the 
IFI to allow them to make an 
informed judgment 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.57) 
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47.2 The BOD and management should 
be involved with the equity holders 
and responsible for managing 
successful and productive 
relationships with the equity holders 
 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.57) 
47.3 Controlling equity holders should 
safeguard their interests 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.57) 
48 Equitable treatment of fund 
providers and other 
significant stakeholders 
48.1 Safeguard against the risks of 
inequitable treatment of fund 
providers and other significant 
stakeholders 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.57) 
48.2 Provide adequate and timely 
information about major changes to 
its business that can have material 
consequences regarding their 
interests in the IFI 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.57) 
49 Fit and proper conditions 
for board and management 
49.1 Selection of members of BOD, SSB 
and management should be 
transparent and based on a 
predefined set of criteria 
 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.58) 
50 Effective oversight 
 
50.1 The BOD should set a clear strategic 
plan that sets forth the IFI business 
strategy and management plans to 
implement it 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.58) 
50.2 The BOD should establish a well-
aligned management structure that 
fosters the proper segregation of 
duties and enhances accountability 
and effectiveness of any 
management oversights 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.58) 
50.3 Set effective financial and non-
financial performance measures for 
the periodic assessment of the 
effectiveness of governance 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.58) 
51 Risk management 51.1 The BOD should understand its role 
and that of management in the area 
of risk management 
 
Management is responsible for 
assessing and managing the IFI 
disclosure to various risks 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.59) 
51.2 Approve the IFI risk strategy, and set 
tolerance levels for risks the IFI 
assumes, and establish the 
framework for management of the 
risks it takes on in its business 
 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.59) 
51.3 Establish a programme for 
succession planning and leadership 
development 
AAOIFI (2015, 
p.59) 
52 Avoidance of conflicts of 
interest  
 
52.1 Identify all situations of potential 
conflicts of interest and institute 
codes and policies to ensure 
situations leading to such conflicts 
are avoided at all times 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.60) 
52.2 Those charged with governance 
should act in a manner that is free 
and objective in perspective 
 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.60) 
53 Appropriate compensation 
policy oversight 
53.1 Developed on an independent and 
transparent basis 
 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.60) 
54 Public disclosure  54.1 Adopt high standards of reporting 
and satisfy the information needs of 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.60) 
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owners, investment account holders, 
other counterparties, regulatory, 
zakah and other related agencies  
 
 
55 Code of conduct and ethics 
 
55.1 Adopt policies, a procedure 
consistent with Sharia, to promote a 
code of ethical and responsible 
behaviour by a member of BOD, 
members of SSB, management and 
employees 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.60) 
56 Appropriate enforcement of 
governance principles and 
standards 
56.1 Have a mechanism to ensure the 
principles and standards of 
governance are adhered to and 
monitored 
AAOIFI (2010, 
p.61) 
 
  
The method used in measuring the AAOIFI governance disclosure level of the sample of IBs is as 
follows: 
AAOIFI governance disclosure (i, t) = ∑𝑁𝑖=1  score (j) 
Where: 
AAOIFI governance disclosure = reporting checklist result for each bank (i) and the year (t) 
N = number of items in the index 
J = references every item involved in the checklist 
Thus, the value of the index for each bank (i) for the year (t) is obtained as the sum of the 
outcome allocated to every item in the outcome (j). It can be standardised as follows: 
 
AAOIFI CGD (i, t) =  ∑         (  
∑  𝑁𝑖=1 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 (𝑗)
𝑁
)𝑋100 =  
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝑖,𝑡)
𝑁
 𝑋100 
 
4.8 Validity and Reliability of the AAOIFI Governance Index 
Reliability is the degree that implementation research makes the same outcomes on refined 
attempts (Hassan and Marston, 2018). It can be seen that reliability means that with repeated 
coding by various researchers the result will not change (Ismail, 2015). According to Krippendorff 
(2004:211), the “research procedure is reliable when it responds to the same phenomena in the 
same way regardless of the circumstances of its implementation”. The validity of the study can be 
obtained through “careful selection of the sample of media content to be analysed” Macnamara, 
(2005:13). According to Omar and Simon (2011:177), regarding the validity of disclosure index, 
“the index can be considered to be valid if it expresses what the researcher intended”. Previous 
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studies suggest that if the content analysis was conducted only once or by only one person, it 
might not be reliable (Neuendorf, 2010; Hussainey et al., 2003).  
The study follows some steps to ensure the reliability and validity of the research, involving: (1) a 
pilot study was conducted. It aimed to test the level of AAOIFI governance compliance by IBs, as is 
strongly recommended (Gray et al., 1995). A pilot study is considered to be a fundamental step 
before deciding on the actual categories (Milne and Adler, 1999).  In the current research, the 
small-scale experiment was managed to familiarise the researcher with the gathered data and 
banks’ actions. Thus, the pilot study was managed for the next purpose: (a) to decide the 
appropriateness of the items chosen, and to ensure the accuracy of the study; (b) to guarantee 
the chosen item is suitable for the content analysis; and (c) in case of any uncertainty or 
translation issue, the researcher consult one of her supervisors. (2) The researcher consulted 
another academic expert to ensure the avoidance of any possible error, such as misunderstanding 
or biases during the translation, whereby a sentence may have had more than one concept. 
The sample for the pilot study was randomly chosen from several countries, to examine the level 
of AAOIFI governance disclosure. The study chose four IBs which adopted AAOIFI standards as 
mandatory and used annual reports from 2014 to 2015. It also used the AAOIFI governance index 
(see Table 4.3). The researcher read the annual reports line by line and cross-checked them with 
the index. The researcher assigns a value of 1 if a disclosure item exists in the annual report and 0 
otherwise. Then, the actual score for each bank was divided by the maximum score. The major 
outcomes for this pilot study show weak AAOIFI governance levels in some banks (Qatar 
International Islamic Bank and United Capital Bank), about 12% for each bank, and high AAOIFI 
governance levels in other banks (Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank and Ithmaar Bank) 66% and 60%, 
respectively. Table 8 shows the results of the pilot study. 
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6TABLE 4.4: PILOT STUDY 
         Banks   
 
    Items 
Jordan Dubai Islamic 
Bank (2014) 
Qatar international 
Islamic Bank (2014) 
Ithmaar Bank (2015) United Capital Bank 
(2014) 
1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 0 
3 1 1 1 0 
4 1 0 1 0 
5 1 0 1 0 
6 0 0 0 0 
7 1 1 1 0 
8 1 0 1 0 
9 1 0 1 0 
10 1 0 0 0 
11 1 0 0 0 
12 1 0 1 0 
13 1 0 1 0 
14 1 1 1 0 
15 1 1 1 0 
16 1 0 1 0 
17 1 0 0 0 
18 1 0 1 0 
19 1 0 1 0 
20 0 0 0 0 
21 0 0 0 0 
22 0 0 0 0 
23 0 0 0 0 
24 1 0 0 0 
25 1 0 0 0 
26 0 0 0 1 
27 0 0 0 0 
28 1 0 0 0 
29 0 0 1 0 
30 0 0 1 0 
31 0 0 0 0 
32 1 0 1 1 
33 1 0 1 0 
34 1 0 1 0 
35 1 0 1 1 
36 1 0 1 1 
37 1 0 1 1 
38 1 0 1 0 
39 1 0 1 0 
40 0 0 1 0 
41 0 0 0 0 
42 0 0 0 0 
43 0 0 0 0 
44 0 0 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
46 1 0 0 0 
47 0 0 1 0 
48 1 0 1 0 
49 1 0 1 0 
50 1 0 1 0 
51 1 1 1 1 
52 0 0 1 0 
53 0 0 0 0 
54 1 0 1 0 
55 1 0 1 0 
56 1 0 0 0 
Total 37 7 34 7 
Per cent  66 12 60 12 
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4.9 AAOIFI Governance Disclosure Determinants 
 4.9.1 Regression model  
 
To empirically investigate the association between the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure and 
CG particular mechanisms in IBs, the researcher used the following OLS regression to estimate the 
relationship between AAOIFI governance disclosure and CG variables. According to Leventis 
(2001), in most disclosure studies, OLS is the most commonly used technique, where the 
dependent variable is the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure, the independent variables are 
the whole CG variables. In addition, firm characteristics such as (firm size, leverage, liquidity and 
asset growth) and year and country dummies are used as control variables. Consequently, the 
current study uses the following OLS multiple regression model: 
      Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 +………..+ β21X21 + ε 
 Where: 
Y= AAOIFI governance disclosure level (dependent variable)  
X1 - X6 = independent CG variables consist (are as shown in Table 4.5 below) 
X7 - X21 = control variables (are as shown in Table 4.5 below) 
β0 = intercept 
β1….. β21 = regression model coefficients (parameters) 
ε = random error (the differences between the predicted and observed value of the AAOIFI 
governance disclosure in sample banks) 
4.9.2 Firm characteristics as a control variable  
 
This part discusses firm characteristics as a control variable. Previous studies suggested that firm 
characteristics are determinants of disclosure (Malone et al., 1993; Wallace et al., 1994; Ahmed 
and Courtis, 1999; Watson et al., 2002; Hassan et al., 2006 and Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011). 
The variables are liquidity, leverage, firm size and asset growth. Also, year and country dummies 
are used in this study as control variables. 
4.9.2.1 Firm size 
The most common variable used in investigating CG disclosure is the determinant of firm size. 
Larger firms have a major agency problem due to the complication of their capital structure 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, to reduce agency costs in larger firms, there is a need to 
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disclose more information to different users (Eng and Mak, 2003; Inchausti, 1997; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Based on signalling theory, there is a positive relationship between firm size and 
corporate disclosure, by suggesting that large firms tend to attract financial analysts and offer 
more information to investors (Schipper, 1991). 
Empirically, previous studies found that the association between firm size and the level of 
disclosure is positive ( Al-Shammari, 2012; A. Bokpin, 2013; Abdullah et al., 2015; El-Halaby and 
Hussainey, 2016; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Wang and Hussainey, 2013 and Elfeky, 2017). 
Meanwhile, some other studies found an insignificant association between the two variables 
(Grassa et la., 2017; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2013; Herwiyanti et al., 2015; Rajab and Handley-
Schachler, 2009). According to these mixed results, it is suggested that large firms have more 
incentives to increase the level of CG disclosure in IBs. 
 4.9.2.2 Firm liquidity 
Agency theory and signalling theory can illustrate the relationship between liquidity and level of 
CG disclosure. However, the results of previous studies are mixed. For example, Al-Moataz and 
Hussainey, (2013) and Oyelere et al. (2003), found a positive relationship between the liquidity 
and disclosure level, while Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), found insignificant impact between 
liquidity and narrative risk disclosure. Based on agency theory, the association between liquidity 
and disclosure predicts a negative relationship. Agency theory mentions that firms with a higher 
departmental proportion in their capital structure should be those with high agency costs 
(Watson et al., 2002), with a few mentioning liquidities as a problem in managing firms’ working 
capital, which, therefore, will lead to an increase in agency costs. Based on the above arguments 
and findings, this study examines the effect of liquidity as one of the determinants of CG 
disclosure. 
 
4.9.2.3 Firm leverage 
Agency theory mentions that increases in agency problems, due to a high level of debt, raise free 
cash flows (Jensen, 1986). Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013), assert that firms with a higher level of 
debt tend to disclose more CG information to their creditors. Xiao et al. (2004), illustrate the 
relationship between leverage and corporate disclosure based on agency theory. They discuss 
that raised disclosure can minimise debt-holder inclinations, to give a level of price protection 
against transfers from themselves to shareholders. Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), conclude that 
based on the agency theory a high leverage ratio leads to high agency costs and that monitoring 
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costs in highly leveraged firms are bound to rise when debt holders convert a more preventive 
covenant into debt contracts.  
Empirical researches show leverage as a significant factor that impacts on the level of disclosure, 
with the association between leverage (gearing) and CG as mixed. (Barako et al., 2006; Elshandidy 
et al., 2011; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy et al., 2013 and Elfeky, 2017) Found a 
positive relationship between the two variables. Meanwhile, (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham 
and Cox, 2007) found an important association among the two variables. The current research 
explores the potential impact of leverage on CG disclosure reporting. 
4.9.2.4 Asset growth 
Asset growth is a helpful tool that may reduce the problem of information asymmetry between 
the company and the financial institution (Gaver and Gaver, 1993). According to Henry (2008), 
business activities can influence the growth of firms immediately, and that may then raise the 
requirements for external capital. Chung and Zhang, (2011), Hossain and Reaz, (2007) and Klapper 
and Love (2004), assert that the growth rate, as measured by average sales growth, has a positive 
impact on good CG. Also, Nejati (2013) reports that firms with improvements in asset growth 
year-on-year, tend to disclose more information in their annual reports. 
Based on agency theory, a robust governance framework can be useful to firms to help them 
achieve their external financial requirements (Beiner et al., 2006). The current study explores the 
potential impact of asset growth on CG disclosure reporting.  
Table 4.5 provides a summary of the definitions and measurements regarding dependent, 
independent and control variables that are used to examine AAOIFI governance disclosure 
determinants. 
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7TABLE 4.5: SUMMARY OF DEPENDENT, INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
Variable  Definition  Measurement  Source  
Y  CGD 
of AAOIFI 
governance score 
by IBs 
The percentage of 
AAOIFI governance 
information 
disclosure by IBs 
Annual report 
X1 Board 
independence 
 
The proportion of 
independent non-
executive directors 
on the board 
Annual report 
X2 Board size Number of board 
members 
Annual report 
X3 Board meeting The whole number 
of board meetings 
over the year 
Annual report 
X4 ACs  The whole number of 
AC members 
Annual report 
X5 ACM The whole number of 
AC meetings over 
the year  
Annual report 
X6  CEO 1 = chairman and 
CEO are different; 0 
= chairman and CEO 
are the same 
Annual report 
X7 Firm size The natural 
logarithm of the 
firms’ total assets 
Fitch Connect 
(balance sheet and 
income statement) 
X8 Liquidity  Current ratio = 
current total asset to 
current total liability 
Fitch Connect 
(balance sheet and 
income statement) 
X9 Leverage  Long-term debt to 
total equity 
Fitch Connect 
(balance sheet and 
income statement) 
X10 Asset growth Firm asset-growth 
ratio 
Fitch Connect 
(balance sheet and 
income statement) 
X11_ X13 Year dummy   
X14- X21 Country dummy   
 
 
4.10 AAOIFI Governance Disclosure Consequence  
 4.10.1 Regression model  
 
To examine the hypothesis regarding the effect of AAOIFI governance disclosure on bank 
performance (H8), the research controls several CG characteristics and firm characteristics. The 
following equation summaries and presents the empirical model that tests the effect of AAOIFI 
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governance disclosure on bank performance.  Table 4.6 outlines the definition and measurement 
of each variable.  
Bank performance = β0 + β1X1 + β2 X2 +…………… β21X21 + ε 
    Where:  
The bank performance will be measured by ROA and ROE 
β1 = independent variables (CGD score in IBs) 
Β2 - β21 = control variables  
8TABLE 4.6: A SUMMARY OF DEPENDENT, INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES, DEFINITIONS AND 
MEASUREMENTS THAT ARE USED TO EXAMINE FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Variable  Definition  Measurement 
ROA  Return on asset  
 
Net income of its total assets  
 
ROE Return on equity Net income in relation to its 
total equity  
 
X1 (CGD) 
The quantity of AAOIFI 
governance score by IBs 
The percentage of AAOIFI 
governance information 
disclosure by IBs 
X2 Board independence The proportion of 
independent non-executive 
directors on the board 
X3 Board size Number of board members 
X4 The frequency of directors 
meetings 
The total number of 
directors’ meetings during 
the year 
X5 Duality in position 1 = chairman and CEO are 
different; 
0 = chairman and CEO are 
the same 
X6  ACS  The total number of AC 
members 
X7 Firm size The natural logarithm of the 
firm’s total assets 
X8 Firm liquidity Current ratio = current total 
asset to current total liability 
X9 Firm leverage Long-term debt to total 
equity 
X10 Firm asset growth Firm asset-growth ratio = 
(P2 - P1)/P1 
X11 - X13 Year dummy The year 2013, 2014 and 
2015 
X14 - X21 Country dummy All eight countries in the 
sample 
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4.11 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter presents an introduction to study methodology and methods employed in the 
current research to obtain the study aim and objectives. It supplies insight into the full study 
procedure that is fundamental for the aim of guaranteeing the originality and quality of the 
research. In achieving the main aim of the study, the researcher decided to narrow the focus and 
adopt a quantitative approach. To use a manual content analysis approach, a disclosure index was 
developed to measure the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs that mandatorily adopt 
AAOIFI standards. To ensure the level of validity of the checklist, the researcher took a 
precautionary measure in improving the checklist. The researcher assessed the accuracy of the 
study tool by conducting a pilot study.  
The chapter also discusses all of the variables (dependent and independent) that are employed to 
investigate the determinants which concentrate on CG characteristics. The current research 
employed bank performance to investigate the consequences of AAOIFI governance disclosure in 
IBs. To examine the hypothesis established in this research the OLS model has been employed to 
investigate the association between the variables as a whole. The following chapter will discuss 
the first empirical finding of the research and answer the first research question. 
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Chapter 5: Results of AAOIFI Governance Disclosure Level  
 
5.1 Overview 
In answering research question one, this chapter provides a statistical description of the level of 
AAOIFI governance disclosure between the samples of IBs. The significance of the current chapter 
is to provide an evident vision of AAOIFI governance disclosure practice in IBs, based on the 
checklist built, employing the AAOIFI governance standards 2010 guidelines. This chapter will 
provide the disclosure level by each bank, across countries and years, and a cross-dimensional 
analysis of AAOIFI governance disclosure among IBs that have adopted AAOIFI standards as 
mandatory from 2013 to 2015. 
5.2 Level of AAOIFI Governance Disclosure in Banks and Countries  
The disclosure level for every bank through three years (2013–2015) is presented in table 5.1. It 
shows that the Arabic Islamic Bank in Palestine and the Syria International Islamic Bank are the 
banks with the highest level of disclosure regarding AAOIFI governance standards, at 70%, 
followed by the Jordan Dubai IB, at 68%. The lowest level of disclosure is Blue Nile Mashreg Bank 
in Sudan, at approximately 4%. Although Bahrain is the steward country for the AAOIFI, it also has 
a large number of Islamic banks that have followed the AAOIFI standards. The Central Bank of 
Bahrain requires that all IFIs must have a licence and comply with the AAOIFI (Vinnicombe, 2010). 
The outcome of the level of disclosure is surprising because it is less than 50% for most IBs in 
Bahrain. In addition, it can be seen that the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure for IBs in 
Bahrain over the three years, has remained at the same level. This may be due to the fact that the 
national CG committee in Bahrain established the CG code in the Kingdom of Bahrain, and it has 
been active since January 2011 (Kingdom of Bahrain; Ministry of Industry, Commerce & Tourism; 
and the Central Bank of Bahrain, 2011). Thus, there is interference between this code and the 
AAOIFI governance standards in IBs. Also, the AAOIFI does not enforce its standards in the annual 
reports as mentioned by Karim (1996) the AAOIFI has no powers to enforce its standards. 
Unlike the IBs in Bahrain, the Syria International Islamic Bank and the Arab IBs in Palestine have 
developed the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in their annual reports from 45% in (2013) to 
70% in (2014) in the Arab IBs. This result may be because these banks have adopted a policy of 
disclosure and transparency (Syria international IB, 2015). The disclosure policy in Arab IBs 
requirements, in particular, those outlined by the code, regulation and directive, ensure that 
important information reaches the decision-makers and all other stakeholders (Arab IBs’ annual 
reports, 2015). The other reason for this improvement may be because there are only two IBs in 
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Palestine and there is competition between them; the vision for Arab IBs is to produce a high-
quality service, provide staff training on the Islamic banking system and gain trust from society. 
Thus, this quality of service could be lead Arab IB to disclose more information about CG to obtain 
satisfaction from all stakeholders. 
Similarly, IBs in Oman have improved their AAOIFI governance disclosure level. For example, Bank 
Nizwa’s level of AAOIFI governance disclosure was only 18% in (2013), while in (2014) and (2015) 
the results were 50% and 52% respectively. The reason for this bank’s improvement was that it 
was only established in 2013 and it started to increase and improve the level of information in its 
annual reports in the following years. This improvement may be because they become more 
aware about the importance of AAOIFI governance in IBs 
Otherwise, most of the IBs in Sudan have reduced the level of AAOIFI governance. For example, 
the level of AAOIFI governance in the Savings and Social Development Bank was 13% in (2013), 
but this figure was reduced to 7% in (2015). The reason for this result was because there are 
serious economic and political issues in Sudan such as growing the foreign debt. The economic 
situations in Sudan become worse because the Sudanese pound depreciation contra foreign 
currencies and since 1983 the civil war affect the economic situations as well. These situations 
may have an impact on the IBs (Hussien, 2001).  
Table 5.2 presents the disclosure level for every country, and it highlights that Jordan and 
Palestine have a high mean disclosure level of approximately 52%, with a maximum of 68% and 
70% respectively. The reason for this high level compared with other countries may be as 
discussed in the CG practice in IBs (GROUP, 2017:13) “Established local institutes that are focused 
on CG, such as the institutes of CG in Jordan, are often more effective ways of delivering training 
and increasing awareness also through the training raise the quality of board members and others 
in key governance positions”. Oman’s mean level of disclosure is 43%, while Sudan and Qatar 
have the lowest levels, 15% and 20% respectively. The overall average disclosure is 33%, and this 
outcome presents that, overall, there is a low level of disclosure for AAOIFI governance. It is lower 
compared with some previous studies, such as (Paino et al., 2011; Vinnicombe, 2010; Al-Baluchi, 
2006 and El-Halaby and Hussainey, 2016), which found a higher level of disclosure in IFIs. 
However, the findings are in line with Aziah Abu Kasim (2012), Ullah (2013) and Abdullah et al. 
(2015), who also found a lack of information and a level of compliance that was less than 40%. 
The data confirm the result in the CG practices in IBs (2017), which indicates that Sharia 
governance is the second weakest theme in IBs, with an average score of 3 (50.2%) 
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According to these findings, the researcher discussed the results with academics and 
professionals who are experts in IFIs and AAOIFI standards and asked them the next question: 
What are the reasons for the low AAOIFI governance disclosure levels in IBs? 
The first person (A) is from Bahrain and is an academic expert in IFIs. His answer was specifically 
about Bahrain, which is the host country for the AAOIFI, but, unfortunately, the mean level of 
disclosure is very low, at 38%. He said the reason for this level is because “Bahrain’s banking 
sector applies the local CG code and perhaps there is an overlap between both of the 
regulations.” He also stated, “in such cases, the more regulations, ‘CG code and AAOIFI CG’ we 
have, the less performance we get according to agency theory, which will increase the cost of 
preparing the information, and that will negatively affect the performance.” 
The second person (B), who is a member of the AAOIFI governance standards, said that “Although 
the AAOIFI standards exist and are clear and comprehensive, the AAOIFI does not have the power 
to apply these standards as mandatory.” His answer is in line with Karim (1996) who states that 
AAOIFI pronouncement is intended to serve IBs in the different countries in which they operate, 
but, at present, the AAOIFI has no powers to enforce its standards.  
The third person (C), who is an expert in IFIs, said: “Islamic banks remain a relatively new industry 
(40 years old) with many demands, but they are dependent on traditional industries, as their 
independence is not yet complete. IBs should appoint a central authority to monitor and 
scrutinise the validity of Islamic standards, as was seen in Bahrain and Kuwait during the past few 
months when they carried out an external Sharia audit.” 
The last person (D), who is an expert in IBs, said: “Islamic banks are emerging economies – 
governance has not yet been achieved, and we are still at the beginning of the road.” 
The discussion agreed that there is overlap between AAOIFI governance standards and local CG in 
IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI; in addition, AAOIFI governance standards are comprehensive 
and obvious. However, the AAOIFI does not have the power to compel its principles, and this is 
the main reason for the low level of disclosure of the AAOIFI governance. From the agency theory 
and accountability theory perspective, IBs have to disclose extra information about CG to 
decrease agency costs and enhance their responsibility, first to Allah and then to the community. 
However, based on analysis across banks and countries, the current research finds the level of 
AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards, are not influenced 
by the issuance of AAOIFI standards. Therefore, the first hypothesis of the study, which expected 
there to be a high level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs, is rejected. 
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                      Level of Disclosure 
Bank      
2013 2014 2015                                        Level of Disclosure 2013 2014 2015 
1. Khaleeji Commercial Bank  (Bahrain) 25% 25% 25% 22. Qatar Islamic Bank Doha    (Qatar) 25% 25% 25% 
2. First Energy Bank         (Bahrain) 50% 50% 50% 23. QINVEST           (Qatar) 16% 16% 16% 
3. ABC Islamic Bank    (Bahrain) 41% 41% 41% 24. Faisal Islamic Bank Sudan     (Sudan) 18% 18% 18% 
4. Bahrain Islamic Bank    (Bahrain) 34% 34% 34% 25. Al Shamal Islamic Bank      (Sudan) 21% 21% 21% 
5. Venture Capital Bank     (Bahrain) 45% 45% 45% 26. Saving & Social Development Bank      (Sudan) 13% 13% 7% 
6. Ithmaar Bank           (Bahrain) 54% 54% 54% 27. Farmers Commercial Bank      (Sudan) 20% 18% 18% 
7. Gulf Finance House      (Bahrain) 27% 27% 27% 28. Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank     (Sudan) 20% 20% 20% 
8. Al Salam Bank of Bahrain    (Bahrain) 48% 48% 48% 29. Tadamon Islamic Bank      (Sudan)   23% 23% 18% 
9. Bank Alkhair        (Bahrain) 43% 43% 43% 30. Blue Nile Mashreg Bank    (Sudan) 4% 4% 4% 
10. Albaraka Islamic Bank Bahrain     (Bahrain) 45% 45% 43% 31. United Capital Bank     (Sudan) 9% 9% 9% 
11. Seera Investment Bank       (Bahrain) 36% 36% 36% 32. Jordan Islamic Bank    (Jordan) 61% 52% 52% 
12. International Investment Bank    (Bahrain)  36% 36% 36% 33. Islamic International Arab Bank        (Jordan) 45% 45% 20% 
13. Citi Islamic Investment Bank    (Bahrain) 23% 23% 23% 34. Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank- Renamed to Safwa Islamic Bank    (Jordan)  64% 64% 68% 
14. Investors Bank       (Bahrain) 41% 41% 41% 35. Syria International Islamic Bank    (Syria) 66% 66% 70% 
15. Liquidity Management Centre     (Bahrain)  38% 32% 32% 36. Albaraka Bank Syria     (Syria) 11% 30% 30% 
16. Ibdar Bank     (Bahrain) 48% 48% 48% 37. Cham Bank      (Syria) 7% 5% 43% 
17. Kuwait Finance House-Bahrain    (Bahrain) 30% 30% 30% 38. Arab Islamic Bank    (Palestine) 45% 70% 70% 
18. Qatar International Islamic Bank    (Qatar)  13% 13% 13% 39. Palestine Islamic Bank   (Palestine) 39% 48% 41% 
19. Qatar First Bank         (Qatar) 16% 16% 16% 40. Bank Nizwa    (Oman) 18% 50% 52% 
20. Barwa Bank      (Qatar) 14% 14% 14% 41. Alizz Islamic Bank    (Oman) 38% 50% 50% 
21. Masraf Al Rayan   (Qatar)   38% 38% 38% 42. Century Banking Corporation   (Mauritius) 36% 41% 41% 
9TABLE 5.1: DISCLOSURE LEVEL BY BANK 
Table 5.1: Disclosure Level by Bank 
Table 11: Disclosure Level by Bank 
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10TABLE 5.2: AVERAGE LEVEL OF DISCLOSURE ACROSS ALL COUNTRIES IN THE SAMPLE 
    Descriptive Statistics  
Year 
No. of 
Banks 
Bank 
From 
Sample Minimum Maximum Mean 
Country 
Ranking 
 Std. Deviation 
2013        
Bahrain 17 40% 23% 53% 39% 4 9% 
Qatar 6 14% 13% 38% 20% 6 9.49% 
Sudan 8 19% 4% 23% 16% 7 6.8% 
Jordan 3 7% 44% 64% 57% 1 10.4% 
Syria 3 7% 7% 66% 28% 5 33% 
Palestine 2 5% 39% 45% 42% 1 3.7% 
Oman 2 5% 18% 50% 34% 2 22.7% 
Mauritius 1 2% 36% 36% 36% 3 - 
2014        
Bahrain 17 40% 23% 53% 39% 4 9% 
Qatar 6 14% 13% 38% 20% 6 9.49% 
Sudan 8 19% 4% 23% 16% 7 6.8% 
Jordan 3 7% 44% 64% 54% 1 9.9% 
Syria 3 7% 5.3% 66% 33% 5 30% 
Palestine 2 5% 48% 69% 59% 1 15% 
Oman 2 5% 37% 51% 45% 2 10% 
Mauritius 1 2% 41% 41% 41% 3 - 
2015        
Bahrain 17 40% 23% 53% 39% 4 9% 
Qatar 6 14% 13% 38% 20% 6 9.4% 
Sudan 8 19% 4% 21% 14% 7 6.8% 
Jordan 3 7% 20% 68% 46% 1 24.5% 
Syria 3 7% 30% 70% 48% 5 20% 
Palestine 2 5% 41% 70% 55% 1 20% 
Oman 2 5% 5% 5% 5% 2 0 
Mauritius 1 2% 41% 41% 41% 3 - 
Average 
disclosure) 
 
33% 
 
 
 
 
87  
 
5.3 Level of disclosure by year 
Table 5.3 shows descriptive statistics of the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure for the same 
sample period separately. The average CG disclosure in 2013 was 32%, with a range of 3.5% as a 
minimum and 66% as a maximum. In 2014, there was a small increase of 2%, which took the 
average CG disclosure to 34%. In 2015, the level of CG disclosure remained stable, at 34%, with a 
maximum of 70% and a minimum of 3.5%. Overall, the results show that most IBs experienced a 
small increase in their level of CG disclosure over the sample period. This result indicates that 
there was an upward trend in the average amount of AAOIFI governance disclosure being made 
by the IBs in the study sample. For example, for Bank Nizwa, in Oman, the level of disclosure in 
2013 was 18% only, but this then increased to 50% in 2014 and then reached 52% in 2015. The 
reason for this increase for this bank may be because it was established in 2013, then it may have 
become more aware of the importance of AAOIFI governance, which may have encouraged it to 
disclose more information about AAOIFI governance. 
11TABLE 5.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF AAOIFI GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE LEVEL FOR THE SAMPLE PERIOD 
2013–2014 
Years No. Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2013 42 35% 66% 32% .1603 
2014 42 35% 70% 34% .1679 
2015 42 35% 70% 34% .1686 
Overall 126     
 
The researcher employed the t-test to show if the differences between the years are significant 
or not. Table 5.4 shows the variance between the years 2013 and 2014, and the results in this 
table illustrate that the t-difference is -.558, which is less than 2, and the p-value is .288, which is 
more than 5%; this indicates that the variance between these years is not significant. Similarly, 
Table 5.5 shows the differences between years 2013 and 2015, and, as a result, found that the t-
test is -.0557 and the p-value is .289, more than 5%, and this means that the differences 
between the years are not significant. This indicates that disclosure in IBs is sticky from year to 
year and managers of IBs do not change their disclosure policy over time.  
  
12TABLE 5.4: T-TEST RESULT COMPARING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 2013/2014 
Years N Mean SD t Sig (P) 
2013 42 .32 .1603 -.558 .2886 
2014 42 .34 .1679   
 
 
88  
 
 
13TABLE 5.5: T-TEST RESULT COMPARING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 2013/2015 
Years N Mean SD t Sig (P) 
2013 42 .32 .1603 -.0557 .289 
2015 42 .34 .1686   
 
5.4 Level of disclosure by dimensional analysis 
Based on 126 observations of annual reports from sample IBs, table 5.6 shows that the SSB 
standard has the highest score across all AAOIFI governance, at 63%; followed by the Statement 
of Governance Principles for IFIs, at 48%, and the Audit & Governance Committee (A&GC) for IFIs, 
at 26%. While the ISR and independence of the SSB have similar results, at approximately 10%, 
the lowest average disclosure related to the AAOIFI governance disclosure index is SR, at 9%. 
From the author’s viewpoint, the sample of IBs tended to disclose more information about the 
SSB, which may be due to the importance of their report (because it is compulsory in the annual 
reports), and to ensure to their stakeholders that management is concerned with the SSB role. 
Also, IBs do not disclose information about the SR (the function of the SSB) as, perhaps, they 
might think the SSB report provides enough information on the role of the SSB. The current result 
is in line with Besar et al. (2009), who assert that the SSB report important information in the 
annual report and should include all of the necessary information, to provide confidence to 
shareholders and all other stakeholders, to ensure that whole IB activities and deals are compliant 
with Sharia.  
For the ISR standard, the level of disclosure is low for most of the IBs in the sample study. This 
may be because it is a part of the internal audit department, and they do not separate the roles. 
Lastly, it is difficult to find information about the independence of the SSB. However, the 
researcher found this information was implied in certain sentences, and she checked her 
understanding with an independent body to confirm that they reached the same meaning. For 
example, see appendix 1 for items No. 40 and No. 41.  
Overall, it can be seen that the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure by dimensional analysis has 
increased in most of the CG standards. This indicates that IBs have become more aware of the 
importance of CG, and so they have disclosed more information in their annual reports in recent 
years than they have done previously. Table 5.6 presents descriptive statistics of the dimensional 
AAOIFI governance index score across 42 IBs and aggregates the disclosure that contains whole 
parts in their annual report. All the examples for each item can be found in Appendix 1.  
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TABLE 5.6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTIC OF DISCLOSURE LEVEL WITH AAOIFI GOVERNANCE  
AAOIFI Governance  Total Items Average Disclosure Level 
2013 2014 2015 
SSB 14 59% 62% 63% 
SR  5 3% 4% 9% 
ISR 8 7% 10% 10% 
A&GC 12 26% 28% 26% 
Independence of SSB 6 7% 9% 10% 
Statement of Governance Principles for IFIs 11 49% 50% 48% 
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5.5 Chapter Summary  
The analysis shows that the average level of AAOIFI governance disclosure among all IBs was 33%; 
the highest level of AAOIFI governance disclosure was by Arab Islamic bank in Palestine and Syria 
international Islamic banks, at 70%, and the lowest level of disclosure was by the Blue Nile 
Mashreg Bank in Sudan, at 4%. 
The disclosure level for each country shows that Jordan and Palestine have a high mean level of 
disclosure, about 52%, while the lowest level was for Sudan, at 5%. The trend for AAOIFI 
governance disclosure over the period of the study shows that most IBs experienced an increase 
in their AAOIFI governance disclosure in their annual reports. Looking at the dimensional analysis, 
the highest level of AAOIFI governance disclosure was SSB, at 63%, while the lowest average level 
of disclosure was SR, at 9%. The following chapter presents the outcomes and discusses the 
determinants of AAOIFI governance disclosure, to answer the second research question. 
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Chapter 6: Findings and Discussion of Determinants of AAOIFI Governance 
Disclosure (empirical results) 
6.1 Overview 
In answering question 2: To what extent do CG mechanisms affect AAOIFI governance disclosure 
in IBs? The purpose of this chapter is to provide descriptive statistics of the dependent, 
independent and control variables. Then, the chapter checks the OLS assumptions like normality, 
multicollinearity and auto correlation. And finally, the chapter provides an empirical test for the 
determinants of AAOIFI governance disclosure. 
6.2 Descriptive analysis  
Table 6.1 reports descriptive statistics. The sample is composed of 126 observations. The mean 
value of the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure is 33%. This means that 33% of the AAOIFI 
governance disclosure items in the checklist are disclosed, on average, per annual report. The 
minimum value is .035, and the maximum value is .70 for the disclosure level, and this indicates 
that several annual reports are disclosed a little information, approximately 3.5% of the AAOIFI 
governance disclosure items, whereas there are others that disclose much more, namely 70% of 
the AAOIFI governance disclosure items. This reveals that the level of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure in IBs is weak. This may be due to the fact that AAOIFI governance is not mandatory. 
This outcome is consistent with several prior types of research, such as Abdullah et al. (2015), 
who investigated the determinants of voluntary CG disclosure practice of 67 IBs in the south-east 
Asian and GCC region. They found that the mean voluntary disclosure level was less than 40%. 
However, El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016), found the mean compliance standard of AAOIFI 
standards is 73%. 
Regarding independent variables, the average value of board independence is .25; the result 
means that 25% of independent managers include in  the assembly in the sample Compared with 
a study by Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) the current mean value is less than this study which was 
the rate of 47%, and Scafarto et al. (2017), who found the mean value was 51% for non-financial 
Italian companies. Table 6.1 shows the less value for independent managers is 0.00, with the most 
value of 100%. This indicates that some IBs do not have independent directors such as the 
Liquidity Management Centre in Bahrain, while for others all members are independent directors, 
for instance, Bank Nizwa in Oman. 
The mean value for Board size is 9 indicating that the mean number of members on the sample 
board is approximately nine.  The maximum value of 16 highlights that there are several 
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assemblies with a larger number of board members, while the minimum value of 3 indicates that 
there are some boards with only three members. In comparison with previous studies, the mean 
value for this variable, is 8.84, as found by Hassan et al. (2017); 4 for a minimum value and 13 for 
maximum value. Also, Shahid et al. (2017) found an average value of 9.13, with a maximum value 
of 13 and a minimum value of 6. The mean value for board size found by Mollaha and Zamanb 
(2015) was 9, with a maximum value of 24 and a minimum value of 3. The mean value of 6 for the 
frequency of board meeting, indicates that the average number of board meetings is six times per 
year. A minimum value of 2 indicates that some board members are meeting twice only during 
the year. 
Moreover, the maximum value of 10 times is similar to the mean value found by Hassan et al. 
(2016), with approximately six board meeting in a year. The mean value of the duality in position 
(CEO) variable is .98. This indicates the CEO and the chairman of the board are different in most of 
the IBs (98%), which is similar to the findings of (Mollaha and Zamanb, 2015), who had a mean 
CEO value of .109.  
Table 6.1 also presents that the average value of the ACs variable is 3.33, with a minimum value of 
3 and a maximum value of 6. The outcome reveals that several IBs have three audit committee 
members, while some have AC with a maximum value of six members. This matches with the 
mean value (3.06) of audit committee members found by Detthamrong et al. (2017), who 
obtained a minimum value of .00 and a maximum value of five members. The mean value of the 
ACM variable is 4.31, with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 8. This indicates that 
the audit committee of the sample IBs is held, on average, four times per annum. The mean value 
of the number of ACM reported by Al-Najjar and Al-Najjar( 2017) is 2. 
With regard to the control variables (firm characteristics), namely leverage (LEVE), firm size 
(F.SIZE), liquidity (LQ) and asset growth (ASSET GTH), the mean values obtained are 22.7 for LEVE, 
2,378.9 for F.SIZE, 4.15 for LQ, and 15.6 for ASSET GTH respectively. In comparison, the mean 
values of F.SIZE and LEVE, of sample listed companies in Palestine by Hassan et al (2016), are 
16.588 and .283 respectively, while the mean value of LQ reported by (Alotaibi (2016) is 1.393, 
and the mean value of asset growth reported by Bravo and Reguera‐Alvarado (2017) is .445. 
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14TABLE 6.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Disclosure level 126 .0357 .70 .332 .1646 
Board independence 123 0.00% 100.00% 25.28% 30.19% 
Board size 124 3 16 8.92 2.247 
Frequency of board meeting 83 2 10 5.73 1.616 
CEO 123 0 1 .98 .155 
ACS 84 3 6 3.33 .567 
ACM 80 1 8 4.31 1.208 
Firm size 126 7.33 22,893.2 2,378.9 4,090 
Liquidity 126 .00 73.5 4.15 12.22 
Asset growth 124 -34.9 118.07 15.6 22.981 
Leverage 126 .00 399.7 22.79 66.93 
 
6.3 Bivariate Correlation  
 
The rise in correlation between independent variables might be a consequence of the problem of 
multicollinearity (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). According to Acock (2008), the reliability of 
estimates is affected if there is an issue of multicollinearity. Also, the problem of multicollinearity 
may affect the evaluation of the significance of the variables in the regression result. As a 
consequence, it is necessary to match the full correlation of the independent variables together 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The Pearson correlation matrix is a fundamental instrument that is 
used to disclose multicollinearity as well as to scale the power and aspect of the linear 
relationship among any two variables. According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), the variables have 
a rise correlation if they have a score that is higher than .80. Therefore, the Pearson correlation 
matrix shows that multicollinearity is not issued in this research. It is obvious that relationships 
between the explanatory variables are under .80. 
Table 6.2 explains the bivariate correlation between all disclosure and independent variables that 
are related to company mechanisms and CG. The results show that the level of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure is statistically positively correlated with board independence (B.IND) .385 and ACs .400, 
and these correlations are statistically significant at 5%; this is also true for board size (B.SIZE), 
board meeting (B.M) and ACM. However, the correlation between AAOIFI governance and CEO is 
negatively associated. Similarly, a negative correlation exists between firm characteristics (firm 
size, liquidity, asset growth and leverage). 
Furthermore, a test for multicollinearity is conducted by calculating the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) after each regression model. Based on previous studies (Field, 2009b; Gujarati, 2003) 
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whether the VIF value is greater than 10, there is multicollinearity issue. The results, shown in 
Table 6.4, show that the VIF value is higher than 1 and less than 10. As a consequence, there are 
no multicollinearity problems in this study. 
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15TABLE 6.2: PEARSON CORRELATION MATRIX 
 Dis level B.IND B.SIZE B.M CEO ACs ACM  F.SIZE LIQ A.GRO LEV 
N 126 123 124 83 123 84 80 126 126 124 126 
Dis level 1 .385** .080 .161 -.053 .400** .193 -.026 -.018 -.132 -.162 
B.IND  1 .047 -.192 -.321** -.022 -.248* -.019 .010 -.124 -.193* 
B.SIZE   1 .022 .323** .482** .138 .176 -.135 .154 .069 
B.M    1 -.032 .086 .193 .168 -.174 .145 .073 
CEO     1 .114 -.003 .093 .036 .108 .055 
ACs      1 .167 .252* -.049 .193 -.119 
ACM       1 .013 -.021 .183 .123 
F.SIZE        1 -.101 -.022 -.059 
LIQ         1 -.072 -.043 
A.GRO          1 .078 
LEV           1 
Dis level refers to the percentage level of AAOIFI governance disclosure; B.IND is the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board; B.SIZE is the number of board 
members; B.M is the board meeting frequency; CEO is a dummy variable: 1 = chairman and CEO are different; 0 = chairman and CEO are the same; ACs is the total number of audit committee 
members; ACM is the total number of meetings during the year; F.SIZE is firm size, measured employing the value of total assets; LIQ is firm liquidity, measured using the current ratio 
(current assets/current liabilities); A.GRO is asset growth; and LEV is firm leverage, measured using the ratio of total liability to total assets.  
* and ** indicate a significant level at .05 and.01  
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6.4 Checking normality 
According to Gujarati and Porter (2009:100), “the normality assumption is not crucially needed for 
large data”. Meantime, since the figure of IBs is just 42, it has to be tested by normality. The level 
of normality can be checked by two methods: graphical and numerical. Both of these methods, 
normality plots and normality tests, have been employed in the current study. 
6.4.1 Graphical method 
Using the statistical software SPSS 24, the normality plots and histogram were as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3FIGURE 6.1: NORMAL P-P PLOT OF REGRESSION STANDARDIZED 
RESIDUAL OF DETERMINANTS OF AAOIFI GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE 
4FIGURE 6.2: HISTOGRAM OF DETERMINANTS OF AAOIFI GOVERNANCE 
DISCLOSURE 
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6.4.2 Numerical method 
There are numerous numerical processes that can be employed to examine the assumption of 
normality. The current research utilised the Kolmogorov–Smirnov check to guarantee that the 
data is normally divided. Table 6.3 illustrates that all the variables have a significant value of less 
than .05, for example, the p-value for disclosure level, is 016 with a mean of 33, which indicates 
that the variables are not normally distributed. So, the researcher following most of the previous 
disclosure studies (Cook,1998; Pallant,2005) to transform control variables “Firm size” is 
transformed using log of the main value because be more close to normal distribution. 
 The two methods used to test normality (graphical and numerical) suggest the different result, 
the first one indicates that error is normally distributed, which is considered to be necessary when 
carrying out hypotheses testing on regression parameters. While the second one indicate that the 
variables are not normal distribution, therefore, the current study solve this problem by 
transforming the firm size to log firm size 
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16TABLE 6.3: NORMALITY TESTING ONE-SAMPLE KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TEST 
 Dis level  B.S B.IND B.M CEO ACs ACM F.SIZE LIQ A.GRO  LEV 
N 126 123 124 83 123 84 80 126 126 124 126 
 
Normal Parameters ab  
Mean .3326190 8.92 25.2846% 5.73 .98 3.33 4.31 2.8977 4.15794 15.6168 22.793 
Std. Deviation .1646821 2.247 30.19459% 1.616 .155 .567 1.208 .71243 12.227 22.9819 66.934 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .089 .127 .311 .169 .538 .424 .302 .094 .385 .144 .367 
Positive .089 .115 .311 .169 .437 .424 .302 .051 .385 .144 .342 
Negative -.078 -.127 -.201 -.117 -.538 -.278 -.273 -.094 -.367 -.072 -.367 
Test Statistic .089 .127 .311 .169 .538 .424 .302 .094 .385 .144 .367 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .016c .000c .000c .000c .000c .000c .000c .008c .000c .000c .000c 
a. Test distribution is normal 
b. Calculated from data 
c. Lilliefors significance correction 
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6.5 Regression analysis 
Based on the above results (multicollinearity and normality), there is a suggestion that the 
relationship between dependent and independent is ‘linear’. Therefore, the basic and typical 
choice for the relationship between dependent and independents variables is called ‘multiple 
linear regression model’. Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999), define the OLS regression as a 
powerful technique, especially when the model contains continuous and dummy variables. Before 
using OLS, some principle assumptions were made, which the researcher has outlined above:  
 Linearity: the relationship between the dependent and independent variable should be 
linear. 
 Normal distribution: there is no linear relationship between two or more independent 
variables (no multicollinearity) and transformed control variable to become more 
approximate to a normal distribution.  
Table 6.4 presents the results obtained from conducting a multiple regression analysis (OLS) to 
test the study hypotheses and to discover the determinants of AAOIFI governance disclosure. The 
overall model was shown to be statistically significant, where the F-value was found to be 5.074 
(0.000), and the adjusted R2 was found to be 51%. This indicates that the independent variables 
explain 51% of the variation regarding the AAOIFI governance disclosure variable. This ratio is 
similar to the percentage reported by El-Halaby and Hussainey (2016) for 43 IBs across eight 
countries (51%). Moreover, it is higher than the percentage reported by Abdullah et al. (2015) for 
a sample of 157 IBs in the South East Asian and GCC regions (38%). However, relatively, it is lower 
than the result of 61% that was reported by Scholtz and Smit (2015) in a study of sample 
companies listed on the Alternative Exchange in South Africa. In addition, it is important to check 
the Durbin-Watson autocorrelation; the Durbin–Watson statistic is always between 0 and 4. The 
value in the current study is 1.614, which means there is no autocorrelation in the sample. 
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17TABLE 6.4: REGRESSION RESULT: DETERMINANTS OF AAOIFI GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE 
  
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
 
t-statistics 
 
 
 
 
Sig. 
 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
 
Std. Error 
 
VIF 
(Constant) .108 .110 .985 .330  
Board independence .000 .001 .305 .762 3.286 
Board size -.003 .007 -.416 .679 2.923 
Frequency of board 
meeting 
-.001 .009 -.090 .928 1.858 
CEO duality .036 .085 .427 .671 3.111 
ACs .091*** .025 3.677 .001 2.209 
ACM .007 .010 .713 .479 1.455 
Log Firm size -.016 .023 -.717 .477 2.710 
Liquidity .001 .001 1.250 .217 1.138 
Asset growth -.001** .001 -2.403 .020 1.792 
Leverage .000 .000 -.991 .326 1.376 
Fixed effect Year 
and 
country 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: AAOIFI governance disclosure Adjusted R-square .505 
R-square  .628 
F-value 5.074 
F Sig .000 
Durbin-Watson 1.614 
The table shows the regression outcomes for AAOIFI governance disclosure determinants in IBs. 
Board independence is the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board; board size 
is the number of board members; board meeting frequency is the total number of board meetings 
during the year; CEO duality is equal to 1 if the chairman and CEO are different and equal to 0 if they 
are the same; ACs is measured by the total number of AC members; ACM is measured by the total 
number of AC meetings during the year; firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; 
liquidity is measured employing the current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); asset growth is 
measured by comparing the total assets held by that bank in a given period to its total assets from a 
previous period ((present) - (past)/(past)); and leverage is measured using the ratio of long-term debt to 
total equity. In addition, country dummy and year dummy are used as control variables.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at .01, .05 and .1 level. 
Dependent variable: disclosure level. 
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6.5.1 Independent variables for corporate governance characteristics 
The coefficient of board independence (B.IND) was found to be statistically insignificant. It 
indicates that statistically, board independence is not significantly associated with the AAOIFI 
governance disclosure level. In other words, the results show that the percentage of independent 
directors does not affect the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure. This might suggest that 
independent directors at IBs are not qualified (e.g. have no Islamic Accounting or Finance degree 
and/or not a specialist in Islamic banking or have no awareness of AAOIFI standards) and 
therefore they are unable to suggest any improvement in disclosure levels.  Therefore, the 
researcher rejects the H2 that there is a positive relationship between board independence and 
the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure. This result is consistent with some previous studies, 
such as Solomon (2007), who stated that the level of disclosure does not increase in relation to 
the attendance of an independent board, due to some firms having a culture of disclosure and 
transparency. Similarly, Ho and Wong (2001) found an insignificant relationship between board 
independence and voluntary disclosure in listed firms in Hong Kong. 
On the other hand, the result is inconsistent with the agency theory argument, as Elfeky (2017) 
reported a significant positive association between the independent board and CG voluntary 
disclosure. Moreover, some empirical research has established a negative association between 
independent managers and the level of voluntary disclosure, such as Eng and Mak (2003). 
Consequently, concerning the first hypothesis of the study, the expectation of a positive 
relationship between the two variables is rejected. 
The second coefficient of board size is -.003, and this is negative and insignificant at any level of 
significance. The current outcome indicates that the number of board members does not affect 
the level of CG disclosure. The reason for this result maybe because board members in Islamic 
banks do not have experience of AAOIFI governance and they may be interested in examining 
other issues such as the compliance with Sharia. This confirms the results obtained in a set of the 
previous study by Carvalho et al. (2017) and Hassan et al. (2017) who found that board size does 
not affect voluntary disclosure. However, the result of this study is inconsistent with those found 
by Grassa et al. (2017) in a sample of 78 IBs in operation in 11 countries, which shows a positive 
association between product and services disclosure and board size. Also, the result of this study 
contradicts the agency theory argument, which maintains that larger boards hold a variety of 
experience that may improve the active role that leads them to improve disclosure level (Elzahar 
and Hussainey, 2012). Based on this study result, the researcher rejects the third hypothesis, that 
there is an expectation of a positive relationship between the two variables. 
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For the third variable, namely board meeting frequency, as measured by the number of annual 
meeting held by the board members, it is found that it does not play a role in improving the 
extent of CG disclosure in IBs. The coefficient of the board meeting is found to be statistically 
insignificant. This result could be related to the previous result (board size), because if the board 
size is not interested in AAOIFI governance disclosure or is not experienced in AAOIFI governance, 
then it will not be discussed in the meetings; whether they meet once, twice or more times during 
the year, board meeting frequency will not affect the level of disclosure of AAOIFI governance. 
This result is consistent with Albawwat and Hussein (2015), who found the frequency of board 
meetings is insignificant with the level of voluntary disclosure in Jordanian listed companies. 
However, the result is inconsistent with agency theory, which suggests that board meeting 
frequency affects the strength of GC, and the reported result by Laksmana (2008), who found a 
positive association between the frequency of board meetings and the level of voluntary 
disclosure in compensation practices. This result leads the researcher to reject the fourth 
hypothesis of the study that there is expected to be a positive relationship between the two 
variables. 
Duality in position (CEO) is also found to be positive and insignificant, which is inconsistent with 
the study expectation that CEO duality issues lead to a higher CG disclosure. This result indicates 
that CEO duality does not affect the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs. This result may 
be due to the fact that IBs place more focus on the role of Sharia governance and the 
independence of SSB than duality in position; and, as a result, if there is duality in position in IBs, 
this does not affect the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure. In other words, Sharia governance 
is more significant than CG characteristics in IBs. This finding is inconsistent with the result 
obtained by non-Islamic banks literature such as Wang and Hussainey (2013) who found that CEO 
duality improves disclosure practice. On the other hand, Hasan et al. (2017a) studied 56 
scheduled banks in Bangladesh and found that duality plays a negative role in the extent of CG for 
IBs. Consequently, with respect to the fifth hypothesis of the study, the expectation of a negative 
relationship between the two variables is rejected. 
For the fifth variable, that of ACS, the coefficient of ACS is found to be statistically significant, at 
1%, and its significance was positive, which indicates that the number of members on an audit 
committee affects the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs. AAOIFI governance has sent a 
number of roles for AC members include [1] reviewing the interim and annual accounts and 
financial reports and [2] reviewing the IFIs accounting policies and practices and reporting 
requirements.  The researcher, therefore, believes that IBS will appoint members at AC who have 
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relevant qualifications such as a degree in Islamic banking, Islamic Accounting, Islamic Finance as 
well as a good knowledge of AAOIFI standards.  
The result is consistent with the expectations of the study and agency theory, which argues that 
ACS is one of the CG characteristics that reduce agency issues via developing disclosure, Barako et 
al. (2006). Also, the result of Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012), in a sample of 97 financial reports 
in Saudi Arabia, found ACs to be the primary determinant of CG disclosure. This result indicates 
that a higher number of AC lead to a higher level of CG disclosure. 
Similarly, the results of Albawwat and Hussein (2015), of Jordanian-listed companies, show that a 
major degree of voluntary disclosure is demonstrated at a high level of CG, especially with regard 
to ACS. However, the result of the study is inconsistent with the result obtained by Alsaeed 
(2006), which found an insignificant association between ACS and CG disclosure. Based on this 
study, the result of the sixth hypothesis of the study, which expects there to be a positive 
relationship between the two variables, should be accepted. 
The ACM is found to be insignificant: this result indicates that ACM does not have an impact on 
the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs, which is inconsistent with this study’s 
expectations that the more frequent the ACM, the greater the extent of CG disclosure. This might 
indicate that in the ACM, the members discuss non-financial reporting AAOIFI issues such as 
reviewing resources and skills, the scope of responsibility, overall work programme and reporting 
lines of the internal audit; reviewing the major outcome of an internal audit; reviewing the IFIs 
code of ethics and the effectiveness with which it is implemented; reviewing the effectiveness of 
the IFIs system for monitoring compliance with Sharia rules and principles; ensuring that 
independence and professional integrity of auditors is not compromised; Reviewing the 
compliance with Sharia rules and principles.  
This result does not agree with the argument that frequent audit meetings during the year, 
provide AC members with an increased chance to discuss and evaluate the issues, before dealing 
with the financial reporting practice to help the company (Li et al., 2012). Also, this result is in line 
with Othman et al. (2014), who found no statistically significant relationship between the two 
variables. Persons (2009), found that firms with more frequent audit meetings are more likely to 
have a higher level of voluntary disclosure. This result leads to a rejection of the seventh 
hypothesis of the study, which expects there to be a positive relationship between the two 
variables. 
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6.5.2 Control variables of firm characteristics  
Regarding four control variables of firm characteristics, only one is found to be statistically 
significant, namely asset growth. The other three control variables, namely liquidity, firm size and 
leverage, are found to be statistically insignificant. 
Asset growth is found to be statically significant and negative (at significant level 5%), which 
implies that banks with a lower level of growth are more likely to disclose more CG information. 
This is inconsistent with the argument by Nejati (2013), who reported that firms with an increase 
in asset growth year-by-year, tend to disclose extra information in their annual reports. 
Firm size is found to be statistically insignificant, which indicates that larger banks tend to make 
lower levels of disclosure regarding AAOIFI CG-related information. This is inconsistent with the 
argument of agency theory that states that larger firms face higher agency costs that arise from a 
high level of information asymmetry, which leads to managers providing more information (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1983). It is also inconsistent with Elfeky (2017), who found that the association 
between firm size and the level of CG disclosure is positive. However, the result is consistent with 
Grassa et al. (2017) who found an insignificant association between the two variables. 
The results of the study show an insignificant relationship for the variable of bank liquidity, which 
indicates that high liquidity bank provides more AAOIFI governance information. The result is 
consistent with the results of Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), who found an insignificant impact 
between liquidity and narrative risk disclosure. On the other hand, Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 
(2012), found a positive relationship between liquidity and disclosure level. The results also 
indicate the existence of an insignificant relationship between leverage and the level of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure. Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013), assert that firms with higher debt tend to 
disclose more CG information to their creditors. The result of the study is inconsistent with Elfeky 
(2017), who found a positive relationship between the two variables. However, it is in line with 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Abraham and Cox (2007), who found an insignificant association 
between the two variables. 
From the above analysis, it shows that ACS plays an important role in the IBs that mandatorily 
adopt AAOIFI standards to enhance AAOIFI governance disclosure. It is consistent with agency 
theory, that argues that ACS is one of the most important CG mechanisms that help to reduce 
agency problems by developing disclosure (Barako et al., 2006). In addition, agency theory Fama 
(1980) and signalling theory Spence (1978), show that larger audit firms have a stronger incentive 
to maintain their independence, and require more stringent and extensive disclosure standards.  
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From the researcher’s viewpoint, the reason for this result may be due to the fact that IBs that 
mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards, are following the standards with regard to this point, which 
requires there to be at least three audit committee members (AAOIFI, 2015). Also, there is a 
greater possibility that ACS leads to the disclosure of more information to all stakeholders 
because of the high level of accountability to ensure that IBs are compliant with Sharia. The other 
reason for this result may be because ACs in relation to IBs is unlike ACS in relation to non-IFIs, as 
the responsibility of ACS in IBs is not only to perform an audit of the financial information, but 
also to be compliant with sharia. The outcomes also support the accountability theory for IBs, 
regarding the accountability to Allah and stakeholders by disclosing information to them.  
 
6.6 Endogeneity Problems 
Endogeneity is a problem that occurs when looking at the effect of CG on voluntary CG disclosure 
and firms’ financial performance (Ammann et al., 2011). It can be said that endogeneity occurs if 
the dependent and explanatory variables have a high correlation with error terms when using 
multiple regression analysis (Ntim et al., 2012). Based on previous studies, three essential factors 
can explain the reasons for endogeneity in the regression model: 1. measurement errors; 2. 
omitted variables; and 3. simultaneity (Ntim et al., 2012; Ammann et al., 2011). So, endogeneity 
could be seen as a threat if it is caused by a weak econometric model (Larcker and Rusticus, 
2010). 
There are many reasons for endogeneity. First, the main reason for endogeneity is measurement 
errors (Omar and Simon, 2011). Related to CG disclosure index, the explanatory variables may be 
endogenous if they cannot be adequately structured. For example, measuring CG disclosure by 
the use of a developed index focuses on financial disclosure rather than non-financial disclosure 
(Albassam, 2014). The second reason is the omission of control variables, for instance, the 
unavailability of data (Van Lent, 2007). Black et al. (2006a), indicate that CG is likely to correlate 
with economic variables that may cause endogeneity. Third, simultaneity emerges when the 
explanatory variable is simultaneously determined by the dependent variable (Ntim et al., 2012; 
Jo and Harjoto, 2011). 
Endogeneity can raise the bias in the regression model results (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010, 
Ammann et al., 2011, Jo and Harjoto, 2011). It can be seen that previous studies did not discuss 
the problems of endogeneity adequately (Black et al., 2006). Thus, the current research attempts 
to address any potential endogeneity problems. This helps to ensure the robustness and stability 
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of the estimated coefficients. In this regard, the study uses alternative approaches of statistical 
and econometric methods to check the endogeneity problem. 
According to previous studies endogeneity problems are addressed by using two econometric 
methods (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Ntim et al., 2012 and Ammann et al., 2011). The first 
method uses a lagged structure, which is considered suitable to deal with omitted variables and 
simultaneity problems. The second method uses instrumental variables (IV), which deal with the 
potential problems caused by measurement errors and omitted variables (Renders et al., 2010; 
Black et al., 2006). The current study uses the first method to address the potential endogeneity 
problems in line with some previous studies (Al-Bassam et al., 2015). 
6.6.1 Estimation of a lagged structure 
To address the potential endogeneity problems, the main models are re-estimated with a one-
year lag between the dependent variables and the explanatory variables (Ntim et al., 2012). This is 
because the dependent variables may also be affected by the previous years’ CG characteristics 
(the explanatory variables). For example, the proportion of board independence may not 
influence the governance practices and financial performance in the same year. Therefore, this 
sample excluded 2013 as the first year, thereby reducing the total number of observations in the 
sample from 126 to 84. This subsection reports and discusses the results obtained by estimating 
the lagged structure for the CG disclosure model. 
6.6.1.1 Lagged structure and AAOIFI corporate governance disclosure model 
Table 6.5 shows the comparison results obtained from the lagged structure regression and main 
regression models (unlagged) to examine the relationship between CG mechanisms and the level 
of AAOIFI governance disclosure. More precisely, panel A shows the statistical results obtained 
from the unlagged structure model, while panel B shows the results of the estimated lagged 
structure. 
As shown in Table 6.5 coefficients of explanatory variables in the unlagged model have a similar 
significance and magnitude with the lagged structure estimation model. Specifically, ACs is found 
to be positive and to have the same level of significance. However, the other CG characteristics 
are found to be insignificant with the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in both of the models. 
Concerning the control variables, the coefficients in both unlagged and lagged structures are 
different. In particular, asset growth has a negative and significant relationship in the unlagged 
model, but a negative and insignificant relationship in the lagged model. Moreover, leverage has 
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an insignificant relationship with AAOIFI governance disclosure in the unlagged model. However, 
it has a negative and significant relationship in the lagged model.  
The adjusted R2 showed a slight variation between unlagged and lagged structure models 
reported in panels A and B in Table 6.5 respectively. Specifically, it is approximately 50% and 63% 
in the unlagged and lagged structures respectively. The F-value in the unlagged structure is 5.074 
at a 1% level of significance. Similarly, in the estimated lagged structure, the F-value is 5.590 at a 
1% level of significance. Therefore, the results show that there is a relative similarity between the 
main regression model (unlagged) and the estimated lagged structure model. This implies the 
robustness of the findings and also supports the results reported in section 6.5 related to the 
AAOIFI governance disclosure model.  
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18TABLE 6.5: REGRESSION RESULTS OF ESTIMATED LAGGED STRICTURE FOR THE AAOIFI GOVERNANCE 
DISCLOSURE MODEL 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Panel A: Main regression 
results 
– unlagged structure 
 
Panel B: Estimated lagged 
structure regression 
 
 
Board independence .000      (.762) .001        (.264) 
Board size -.003      (.679) -.009     (.326) 
Frequency of board meetings -.001     (.928) -.011     (.298) 
CEO duality .036      (.671)  .071     (.512) 
Audit committee size       .091      (.001)*** .080     (.009)*** 
Audit committee meeting  .007     (.479) .020      (.181) 
Firm size -.016     (.477) -.001     (.961) 
Liquidity .001      (.217) .002      (.143) 
Asset growth   -.001       (.020)** -.001     (.121) 
Leverage .000      (.326) -.002     (.033)** 
Year dummies Included Included 
Country dummies Included Included 
Constant .330 .555 
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.614 1.858 
F-value 5.074 5.590 
Adjusted R2 .505 .631 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels of significance respectively. Chapter 4 provides a detailed definition of the 
measurement method of all the variables used. Panel B introduced 2013 as a one-year 
lag.    
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6.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter aimed to examine the second research question: “To what extent do CG mechanisms 
affect AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs?” Descriptive statistics for all of the variables are 
summarised in Table 6.1, in which the average value of AAOIFI governance disclosure level is 33, 
pointing that 33% of the AAOIFI governance disclosure items in the prepared list are disclosed, on 
average, in each of the annual reports. Comparisons were drawn with the results and findings 
from the studies of others. This was followed by a correlation analysis and regression analysis. 
Notably, all the coefficients in the Pearson correlation matrix are less than 0.8, indicating that 
they are low, and, therefore, that there is no multicollinearity between the variables selected in 
the study.  
The regression analysis data (presented in Table 6.4) shows an overall statistically significant 
model with an F-value of 5.074, and an adjusted R2 of 50%, which indicates that 50% of the AAOIFI 
governance disclosure variable is explained by the variations of all the independent variables in 
the model. The empirical test presents that ACs is positive and significant with AAOIFI governance 
disclosure in IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards. This result is consistent with studies by 
(Al-Moataz and Hussainey; 2013 and Albawwat and Hussein, 2015) and it is also in line with 
AAOIFI governance, which requires that there are at least three members in the audit committee 
of IFIs. It can be stated that IBs with a large ACs do engage, to some extent, in AAOIFI governance 
disclosure. Otherwise, the other CG variables (board independence, board size, CEO duality, the 
frequency of board meeting and audit committee meeting) have no significant relationship with 
the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs. This is consistent with some previous studies, 
such as Ho and Wong (2001), who found that CG does not affect the level of disclosure. The 
chapter also discusses the tests used to check robustness and examines the existence of potential 
endogeneity problems. The lagged structure was used to examine potential endogeneity 
problems. The results based on re-estimation of the main models to the lagged structure model 
show great similarity with the findings of the main regression model (un-lagged regression). The 
next chapter discusses the findings related to the impact of AAOIFI governance disclosure on bank 
performance. 
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Chapter 7: Findings and Discussion of the Impact of AAOIFI Governance 
Disclosure on Performance 
7.1 Overview 
In answering study question 3: What is the impact of AAOIFI governance disclosure on the IBs’ 
performance? The current chapter provides descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent 
and control variables. This chapter then checks the OLS assumptions like normality, 
multicollinearity and auto correlation. Lastly, this chapter provides an empirical analysis of the 
impact of AAOIFI governance disclosure on bank performance 
7.2 Descriptive analysis  
Table 7.1 shows the outline of the descriptive statistics gained from applying the paradigm to the 
third research question. Here, ROA and ROE are the dependent variables, AAOIFI governance 
disclosure is the independent variable, and the rest are control variables.  
19TABLE 7.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE CONSEQUENCE OF AAOIFI GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ROA 126 -30.35 22.28 .94 5.971 
ROE 126 -40.56 22.28 7.75 13.56 
Disclosure level 126 .035 .69 .33 .164 
Frequency of board meeting 83 2 10 5.73 1.616 
CEO 123 0 1 .98 .155 
ACs 84 3 6 3.33 .567 
Liquidity 126 .00 73.5 4.157 12.227 
Firm size 126 7.33 22,893.2 2,378.9 4,090.82 
Asset growth 124 -34.96 118.07 15.614 22.98 
Leverage 126 .00 399.7 22.79 66.93 
Board independence 123 0.00% 100.00% 25.2846% 30.19459% 
Board size 124 3 16 8.92 2.247 
 
7.2.1 Return on asset and return on equity  
As per the descriptive statistics in Table 7.1, the mean value of the ROA variable is .94, with a 
minimum value of -30.35 and a maximum value of 22.28. This mean value is higher than the value 
of .031 for a number of Chinese-listed firms in a study by Molnar et al. (2017) and also higher than 
the value of .016 obtained for some companies listed on the Palestinian Stock Exchange in a study 
by Hassan et al. (2016). For the variables of ROE, the mean value is 7.75. This mean value is lower 
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than the value of 15.82 for five companies in Nigeria in research carried out by Falaye and 
Oloyede (2017). However, it is higher than the value of .1487 for some Islamic and non-Islamic 
banks in the GCC region in a study by Chazi et al. (2018). 
7.2.2 Independent variable and control variables  
These variables are the same as described in section 6.2 in this chapter. 
7.3 Bivariate Correlation  
Table 7.2 below shows the outcomes of the correlation analysis of the data from the third 
empirical stage. It is offered in the shape of a Pearson correlation matrix between the dependents 
and the whole of the chosen independent variables. The Pearson correlation is employed to 
examine if there is any relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. This 
Pearson correlation matrix is, thus, a helpful primary instrument for detecting multicollinearity. 
Gujarati and Porter (2009), states that a high correlation is indicated when a correlation 
coefficient is higher than 0.80; so, a situation of multicollinearity exists if this correlation 
coefficient is less than this value. As shown in Table 7.2, the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between all the selected variables is less than 0.80, which is relatively low. This suggests that no 
variable exhibits the problem of multicollinearity. 
Furthermore, a test for multicollinearity is done by calculating the VIF after each regression 
model. Based on previous studies (Field, 2009a; Gujarati, 2003), if the VIF value is further than 10, 
there is a multicollinearity problem. The outcomes in tables 7.3 and 7.4 present the VIF values 
higher than 1 and less than ten, as a consequence there are no multicollinearity problems in this 
study. 
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20TABLE 7.2: RESULT OF THE CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCE OF AAOIFI GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE 
 ROE ROA 
Disclosure 
level 
The 
frequency of 
board 
meeting CEO ACs Firm size Liquidity Asset growth Leverage Board size 
Board 
independence 
ROE 1 .662** -.209* .163 .166 .012 .039 -.084 .306** .464** -.003 -.403** 
ROA  1 -.265** .089 .340** .127 .052 .018 .256** .162 .130 -.438** 
Disclosure level   1 .161 -.053 .400** -.026 -.018 -.132 -.162 .080 .385** 
Frequency of 
board meeting 
   1 -.032 .086 .168 -.174 .145 .073 .022 -.192 
CEO     1 .114 .093 .036 .108 .055 .323** -.321** 
ACs      1 .252* -.049 .193 -.119 .482** -.022 
Firm size       1 -.101 -.022 -.059 .176 -.019 
Liquidity        1 -.072 -.043 -.135 .010 
Asset growth         1 .078 .154 -.124 
Leverage          1 .069 -.193* 
Board size           1 .047 
Board 
independence 
           1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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7.4 Checking normality 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, since the number of IBs is just 42, the normality must be 
examined. The level of normality can be checked by the graphical method; normality plots have 
been employed in the current study. 
7.4.1 Graphical method 
Using the statistical software SPSS 24, the normality plots and histogram were as follows: 
5FIGURE 7.1: HISTOGRAM OF CONSEQUENCES OF AAOIFI GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE MEASURED BY ROA 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6FIGURE 7.2: NORMAL P-P PLOT OF REGRESSION STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL 
(ROA) 
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The graphical method used to test normality suggests that error is normally distributed, 
which is considered to be necessary when carrying out hypotheses testing on regression 
parameters. 
 
7FIGURE 7.3: HISTOGRAM OF AAOIFI GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE MEASURED BY ROE 
 
8FIGURE 7.4: NORMAL P-P PLOT OF REGRESSION STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL 
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7.5 Regression analysis  
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show the empirical analysis of the impact of AAOIFI governance disclosure on 
bank performance. Table 7.3 used ROA as a dependent variable and the F-value of 2.721 (.003). 
The model is found to be statistically significant overall, and the adjusted R2 value of .292 (29%) 
indicates that the independent's variables explain 29% of the variation regarding the impact of 
AAOIFI governance disclosure on bank performance. This proportion is less than the 56% reported 
by Hassan et al. (2016) but higher than the 18% reported by Hassouna et al. (2017). In addition, it 
is important to check the Durbin-Watson autocorrelation: the Durbin-Watson statistic is always 
between 0 and 4, but the value in the current study is 1.614, which means there is no 
autocorrelation in the sample. 
While Table 7.4 used ROE as a dependent variable and gave the F-value of 3.835 (.000), the model 
is found to be statistically significant overall, and the adjusted R2 value of .547 (55%) indicates that 
the independents variables explain 55% of the variation regarding the impact of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure on bank performance level of AAOIFI governance disclosure. The result is 
higher than the 1% reported by Khan et al. (2017) and the 5% reported by Ogege and Boloupremo 
(2014). As before, it is important to check the Durbin-Watson autocorrelation: the Durbin-Watson 
statistic is always between 0 and 4, but the value in the current study is 2.075, which means there 
is no autocorrelation in the sample.  
The outcomes of the regression test for Table 7.3, are found a statistically insignificant 
relationship between AAOIFI governance disclosure and bank performance measured by ROA. 
This result highlights that the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure does not affect the IBs’ 
performance measured by ROA. This confirms the findings of Hassouna et al. (2017), who found 
no significant relationship between transparency and disclosure practice and corporate 
performance. However, the results are contrary to those obtained by Albawwat and Hussein 
(2015), which indicate that the quality of voluntary disclosure appears to have a high correlation 
with the performance of companies, and also to the findings of Foyeke et al (2015), who 
investigated this relationship in companies in Nigeria and who also established a significant 
positive association between bank performance and CG disclosure.  
Concerning the findings of the regression analysis for Table 7.4, are also found a statistically 
insignificant relationship between AAOIFI governance disclosure and bank performance measured 
by ROE. This indicates that the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure does not affect the IBs’ 
performance measured by ROE. This outcome is in line with the findings of Hassouna et al. (2017), 
who indicated the absence of a significant relationship between overall transparency disclosure 
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index and ROE ratio. On the other hand, (Hassan et al., 2009) found a highly significant, but 
negative association between the two variables. 
According to the results above, in tables 7.3 and 7.4, these show that there is an insignificant 
relationship between AAOIFI governance disclosure and ROA/ROE at any significant level. 
Therefore, hypothesis H8, which expected a positive relationship between AAOIFI governance 
disclosure and bank performance, is rejected. To explain this unexpected result, the researcher 
looked at the relationship between bank performance and other control variables. In the 
regression analysis, as outlined in tables 7.3 and 7.4, it shows that there is a significant negative 
relationship between bank performance and board independence, which indicates that having a 
higher proportion of independent directors across the board will not improve the overall level of 
CG disclosure. This outcome is in disagreement with Al-Najjar( 2014), who found that board 
independence is positively related to bank performance, and also Bravo and Reguera‐Alvarado( 
2017), who examined the relationship between board independence and bank performance in 
US-listed firms. They found that board independence positively influences firm performance. 
With regard to other control variables in both regression results, four out of a total of nine were 
found to be statistically significant, namely board independence, board size, asset growth and 
leverage. The other five, namely board meeting, CEO, ACs, firm size and liquidity, were found to 
be statistically insignificant. 
According to the test, the research did not find any significant relationship between bank 
performance and AAOIFI GC disclosure in IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards. This result 
indicates that AAOIFI governance disclosure does not affect bank performance in IBs. This result is 
in line with Hassouna et al. (2017), who also found no significant relationship between disclosure 
and corporate performance. From the researcher’s viewpoint, the main reason for this result is 
because the aims of IBs are to be compliant with Sharia principles, to have an active role in the 
community and to deliver exceptional value to clients and shareholders by focusing on Sharia 
compliance. Moreover, IBs focus on being an effective corporate citizen and accepting their social 
responsibility to help develop the community, more than on how to make a profit. 
Regarding CG variables generally, the research finds that the best governance drives to higher 
bank performance. Particularly, board size has a positive and significant impact on bank 
performance, and this outcome is consistent with some researches (Bravo and Reguera‐Alvarado, 
2017). Also, board independence has been shown to have a negative and significant relationship 
with bank performance. This finding is inconsistent with Al-Najjar (2014), who found a positive 
association between firm performance and board independence. 
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Furthermore, the other CG characteristics have shown no significant relationship with bank 
performance. In practical terms, regarding firm-specific characteristic variables, this outcome 
presents that asset growth is positively connected with bank performance, as shown in tables 7.3 
and 7.4. This is consistent with previous researches, which found a positive and significant 
association between asset growth and bank performance, such as Klapper and Love (2004). This 
result indicates that IBs’ performance is affected by the growth of asset. Moreover, the research 
found a positive and significant association between leverage and bank performance. This result 
supports the outcome by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), who found a positive and significant 
association between leverage and bank performance. 
However, the study found no significant association between liquidity, firm size and bank 
performance. This might be causing the fact that one of the key aims of accounting and reporting, 
from an Islamic viewpoint, is to ensure that the business is accountable and adheres to Islamic 
principles (Sharia) (Maali et al., 2006). 
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21TABLE 7.3: REGRESSION RESULT: CONSEQUENCES OF AAOIFI GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE (ROA) 
  
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
 
 
t- Statistics 
 
 
 
Sig. 
 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
 
Std. Error 
 
VIF 
(Constant) 
-11.304 7.101 -1.592 .117  
CG disclosure 
1.402 9.226 .152 .880 2.383 
Board 
independence 
-.093 .042 -2.228 .030 3.128 
Board size 
1.106 .439 2.520 .015 2.371 
Board meeting 
frequency 
.847 .591 1.432 .158 1.859 
CEO duality 
1.009 5.797 .174 .862 2.972 
ACs 
-1.290 1.897 -.680 .499 2.723 
Firm size 
.388 1.575 .246 .807 2.704 
Liquidity  
.070 .068 1.039 .304 1.130 
Asset growth  
.090 .037 2.409 .019 1.762 
Leverage 
.039 .015 2.518 .015 1.247 
Fixed effect  Year and 
country 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Adjusted R square .292 
R-square  .461 
F-value 2.721 
F Sig .003 
Durbin–Watson 1.614 
The table shows the regression results for the consequences of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs 
measured by ROA. Board independence is the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the 
board; board size is the number of board members; board meeting frequency is the total number of 
board meetings during the year; CEO duality is equal to 1 if the chairman and CEO are different and 
equal to 0 if they are the same; ACs is measured by the total number of AC members; firm size is 
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; liquidity is measured using the current ratio (current 
assets/current liabilities); asset growth is measured by comparing the total assets held by that bank in a 
given period to its total assets from a previous period ((present) - (past)/(past)); leverage is measured 
using the ratio of long-term debt to total equity; and ROA is measured using net income/total assets. In 
addition, country dummy and year dummy are used as control variables.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at .01, .05 and .1 level. Dependent variable: ROA. 
 
118 
 
22TABLE 7.4: REGRESSION RESULT: CONSEQUENCES OF AAOIFI GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE (ROE) 
  
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
      
 
t- Statistics 
 
 
 
Sig. 
 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
 
Std. Error 
 
VIF 
(Constant) -1.946 11.933 -1.63 .871  
CG disclosure -11.719 15.503 -.756 .453 2.383 
Board independence -.116 .070 -1.658 .103 3.128 
Board size 1.225 .737 -1.658 .102 2.371 
Board meeting 
frequency 
.463 .994 .466 .643 1.859 
CEO duality -2.420 9.741 -.248 .805 2.972 
ACs -2.847 3.187 -.893 .376 2.723 
Firm size 3.425 2.647 1.294 .201 2.704 
Liquidity  .092 .114 .811 .421 1.130 
Asset growth  .161 .062 2.575 .013 1.762 
Leverage -.054 .026 -2.064 .044 1.247 
Fixed effect  Year and 
country 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE 
Adjusted R-square .404 
R-square  .547 
F-value 3.835 
F Sig .000 
Durbin–Watson 2.075 
The table shows the regression results for the consequences of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs 
measured by ROE. Board independence is the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the 
board; board size is the number of board members; board meeting frequency is the total number of 
board meetings during the year; CEO duality is equal to 1 if the chairman and CEO are different and 
equal to 0 if they are the same; ACs is measured by the total number of AC members; firm size is 
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; liquidity is measured using the current ratio (current 
assets/current liabilities); asset growth is measured by comparing the total assets held by that bank in a 
given period to its total assets from a previous period ((present) - (past)/(past)); leverage is measured 
using the ratio of long-term debt to total equity; and ROE is measured used net income/total equity. In 
addition, country dummy and year dummy are used as control variables.  
***, ** and * Indicate significance at .01, .05 and .1 level. Dependent variable: ROE. 
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7.6 Endogeneity Problems  
As previously stated in the prior chapter, the current study employed a lagged structure to 
address endogeneity problems. 
 
7.6.1 Lagged Structure and Consequences of AAOIFI Governance Disclosure 
This subsection shows the results from both the lagged and the unlagged paradigms to investigate 
the association between AAOIFI governance disclosure and bank performance. Panel A in Table 
7.5 presents the outcomes according to the unlagged framework, while panel B presents the 
estimated lagged framework model (for both accounting measurements: ROA and ROE). 
Firstly, panels A and B report the outcomes gained from the unlagged and lagged structure 
paradigms, respectively, to investigate the impact of AAOIFI governance disclosure and ROA. 
Particular, the outcomes present a huge likeness in statistical important and volume, with little 
change in some of the control variables. The ratio of independent managers shows a negative and 
significant association with ROA in both models. However, board size is positive and significant in 
the first model while insignificant in the second model (lagged). Moreover, the frequency of board 
meetings was found to be positive and significant in the first model (unlagged) but positive and 
insignificant, with ROA, in the second model (lagged). 
The coefficients and magnitudes of firm characteristic variables for unlagged and lagged 
framework models seem to be similar. Specifically, asset growth shows a significantly positive 
relationship with ROA in both models. Leverage is significantly and positively related to ROA in the 
unlagged structure model, while it is insignificantly related to ROA in the second model (lagged). 
The adjusted R2 is similar in both model panels (A and B) and shows that R2 is 29% and 23% in the 
unlagged and lagged structure respectively. This implies that 29% of the variation can be 
explained by the examined variables. 
The F-value is 2.721 and 1.844 at a 1% level of significance in the unlagged and lagged structures 
respectively. This similarity in the outcomes confirms that the results gained in the major 
paradigm are robust, and suggest that the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs that adopt 
AAOIFI standards as mandatory, does not affect bank performance measured by ROA. 
Secondly, regarding the ROE rate, panels A and B in Table 7.5 present that the outcomes from the 
unlagged and lagged framework paradigm are comparatively similar, with little change in the 
control variables. Regarding the explanatory variable, CG disclosure shows a negative and 
insignificant relationship to ROE in both models. The expected result for all variables is for 
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leverage to show similar coefficients and magnitudes. There is some likeness for the adjusted R2 
between the unlagged and lagged framework, at approximately 40%, while it is 26% in the 
estimated lagged framework. The F-value is 3.835 in the unlagged framework paradigm and 2.009 
in the lagged framework model, both at a 1% level of significance. This further supports the 
robustness of the consequences of the AAOIFI governance disclosure paradigm.  
23TABLE 7.5: REGRESSION RESULTS OF ESTIMATED STRICTURE FOR CONSEQUENCES OF AAOIFI GOVERNANCE 
DISCLOSURE 
Independent 
Variables 
Panel A: Major regression results – 
unlagged structure 
Panel B: Estimated lagged structure 
regression 
       ROA        ROE      ROA        ROE 
CG disclosure 1.402     (.880) -11.719 (.453) 11.060  (.321) -3.345  (.862) 
Board independence  -.093   (.030)** -.116   (.103) -.109   (.030)** -.146    (.089)* 
Board size 1.106   (.015)** 1.225  (.102) .758   (.135) .886      (.311) 
Frequency of board meetings .874    (.158) .463    (.643) 1.441 (.050)** 1.548    (.217) 
CEO duality 1.009   (.862) -2.420  (.805) -1.744 (.783) -8.103    (.465) 
Audit committee size -1.290  (.499) -2.847  (.376) -1.767 (.379) -2.820   (.420) 
Firm size .388    (.807) 3.425  (.201)  1.828  (.332) 4.260    (.197) 
Liquidity .070    (.304) .092    (.421) .054    (.534) .118      (.435) 
Asset growth .090    (.019)** .161    (.013)** .112   (.026)** .186     (.033)** 
Leverage .039    (.015)** -.054  (.044)** .057 (.404)  .032    (.789) 
Year dummies         Included       Included        Included          Included 
Country dummies        Included        Included       Included          Included 
Constant     -11.304       1.946    -12.545       -4.650 
Durbin-Watson statistics        1.614       2.075        2.555       2.026 
F-value        2.721***      3.835***       1.844***       2.009*** 
Adjusted R2         .292       .404         .231       .264 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, **and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance respectively. Chapter 4 gave a specifics introduction of the measurement process of overall 
the variables employed. 2013 is introduced as a one-year lag. 
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7.7 Chapter Summary 
The current chapter aimed to examine the third study question: “What is the impact of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure on the IBs’ performance?” The descriptive statistics of the variables overall 
are outlined in Table 7.1, in which the average value of ROA is .94 while the mean value of ROE is 
7.75. Comparisons were drawn with the results and findings from the studies of others. This was 
followed by a correlation analysis and regression analysis. Notably, all the coefficients in the 
Pearson correlation matrix are less than 0.8, indicating that they are low, and, therefore, there is 
no multicollinearity between the variables selected in the study. 
The regression analysis presented in tables 7.3 and 7.4 present that the relationship between 
AAOIFI governance disclosure and bank performance is insignificant and that it is inconsistent 
with the hypothesis expected. Thus, the hypothesis is rejected. For the CG characteristics as 
control variables, the results find that board size and board independence impact the level of 
bank performance, while CEO, ACs and board meeting frequency do not affect bank performance. 
Also, regarding firm characteristics, the study found that asset growth and leverage do affect bank 
performance, while firm size and liquidity do not affect bank performance at all. This might be 
because IBs aim to support society rather than to focus on how to make a profit. The chapter also 
discusses the method employed to examine robustness and checks the existence of potential 
endogeneity problems. The lagged structure was employed to test possible endogeneity issues. 
The outcomes, based on the re-estimation of the major paradigms to the lagged framework 
model paradigm, have significant similarity with the findings of the main regression model (un-
lagged regression). The next chapter will discuss the conclusion of this study. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Overview 
The aim of the current study is to examine the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs that 
adopt AAOIFI standards as mandatory, and identify the determinants and consequences of the 
level of AAOIFI governance disclosure. The research was guided by the positivist paradigm and 
involved analysing the content of documents for information relating to AAOIFI governance 
disclosure, and correlation and regression analysis on the gathered quantitative data. The sample 
contained 42 IBs across eight countries that adopted AAOIFI standards as mandatory over the 
period 2013 to 2015. Overall 126 observations were made. 
The CG mechanisms considered in this research are: board independence, board size, the 
frequency of board meetings, CEO, ACs and ACM. Also, four firm mechanisms were examined that 
were addressed as control variables in the second part of the research. They are: firm size, 
leverage, asset growth and liquidity. Finally, the adoption of ROA and ROE ratios were used to 
represent bank performance. 
This chapter outlines the main results in each of the three parts of the study, highlights the 
essential contributions made via this research, and gives a critical reflection on the results. It also 
provides research implications, highlights the limitations of the research and offers proposals for 
further study. 
 
8.2 Main Findings and Contributions  
The first research question was: “To what extent is the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in 
IBs?” To answer this question, the current study provides a new comprehensive index based on all 
AAOIFI governance standards updated in 2010, which includes 56 items. The current study 
expects high standards of AAOIFI governance disclosure from IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI 
standards, due to these standards having comprehensive guidance for IFIs. However, the results 
of this research do not provide evidence in terms of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs in the 
sample of this research. The average level of AAOIFI governance disclosure between all of the 
samples was 33%, which indicated that the level of AAOIFI governance standards disclosure for 
IBs is low. Also, the level remained comparatively low for each country throughout the three years 
of the study. The Arabic Islamic Bank in Palestine and the Syrian International Islamic Bank were 
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the banks that disclosed the highest levels of AAOIFI governance standards – approximately 70%, 
while the bank that disclosed the lowest level was the Blue Nile Mashreg Bank in Sudan – 
approximately 4%. This means that 70% of the required information relating to AAOIFI 
governance disclosure was disclosed in the Arabic Islamic Bank in Palestine and the Syrian 
International Islamic Bank, and only 4% was disclosed by the Blue Nile Mashreg Bank in Sudan. 
While in the situation of IBs in Oman, the results highlighted that there was an advance in the 
level of AAOIFI governance disclosure, from 18% in 2013 to 52% in 2015. This means that IBs in 
Oman increased the level of required information for the AAOIFI governance. Also, the trend for 
AAOIFI governance disclosure in relation to the reporting of CG information has increased slightly 
in most IBs over the sample period. The highest dimensional analysis score across all AAOIFI 
governance was the SSB standard, at 63%, and the lowest was SR, at 9%. 
Overall, regardless of the high expectation of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs, the analysis 
highlighted that the majority of IBs that adopt AAOIFI mandatorily, disclosed significantly lower 
results than what is required. The underperformance in the AAOIFI governance disclosure practice 
of IBs might be because AAOIFI governance standards are not mandatory and the AAOIFI cannot 
enforce these standards in IFIs. Moreover, there is both a culture that exists in these countries 
and a political system that is followed, which may mean that there is a preference not to disclose 
every aspect of Islamic life. Also, some of the countries in the sample do not have a CG code. So, 
there is an important need for the AAOIFI governance and Sharia governance to offer clear 
guidance that is enforced and integrated into IBs, to progress the level of disclosure in these 
banks. 
With regard to the second research question: “To what extent do CG mechanisms affect AAOIFI 
governance disclosure in IBs?” The current research contributes to Islamic accounting literature, 
by identifying the drivers for the disclosure of AAOIFI governance standards, and by considering 
the impact of bank governance on the disclosure level among IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI 
standards. The study found that ACs was the only characteristic that was statistically significant 
and positive, and all of the other CG characteristics were statistically insignificant. This result 
indicates that IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards were following the standards with 
regard to this point, which requires there to be at least three members of an audit committee 
(AAOIFI, 2015). Also, there is a greater possibility that ACs in IBs leads to the disclosure of more 
information to all stakeholders because there is a high level of accountability to ensure that IBs 
are compliant with Sharia. Of the control variables (firm characteristics), only one of them was 
found to be statistically significant, namely asset growth.  
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With regard to the third research question: “What is the impact of AAOIFI governance disclosure 
on the IBs’ performance?” In this study, the AAOIFI governance disclosure index, structured in the 
first empirical research, is used as an independent variable. ROA and ROE are used as measures of 
financial performance and the CG characteristics, firm mechanisms are used in this paradigm as 
control variables, which consider the most significant factors for CG disclosure and financial 
performance relationship.  
Next, revising the theoretical framework of the association between CG disclosure and bank 
performance, based on agency theory, which accepts that better CG leads to a reduction in 
agency costs; improved governance practice; voluntary disclosure; and financial performance 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983), it is hypothesised that there is a positive association between the level 
of AAOIFI governance disclosure and financial performance in IBs. The study found that the 
association between AAOIFI governance disclosure and financial performance is statistically 
insignificant in both of the models. This result is inconsistent with the hypothesis and argued 
theoretical framework. Therefore, it can be seen that a high level of AAOIFI governance disclosure 
does not affect the financial performance of IBs. The reason for this outcome might be due to the 
reality that the main aim of IBs is to comply with Sharia principles, to have an active role in the 
community, and to deliver the expectation of value to clients and shareholders by focusing on 
Sharia compliance, more than just making a profit. Also, this may be because other factors such as 
SSB characteristcs or corporate social responsibility disclosure, impact the financial performance 
of IBs more than AAOIFI governance disclosure.    
Of the control variables in both regression results, four out of a total of nine were found to be 
statistically significant, namely – board independence, board size, asset growth and leverage. The 
other five, namely – board meeting, CEO, ACs, firm size and liquidity – were found to be 
statistically insignificant. 
8.3 Critical Reflections on the Results 
As the results of the AAOIFI governance disclosure level showed, the sample of IBs that 
mandatorily adopt AAOIFI did not disclose information about AAOIFI governance in their annual 
reports. Considering that the AAOIFI governance standards are primarily the main aspect of Sharia 
governance in IFIs (to ensure compliance with Sharia principles), these results are discouraging. 
A probable interpretation of the findings may be related to the overlap between AAOIFI 
governance standards and local code of CG in some countries. This mean IBs in these countries 
may be following local CG code more than AAOIFI governance, or because the AAOIFI governance 
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is not mandatory like other AAOIFI standards. So, IBs may only be following the AAOIFI mandatory 
standards such as accounting and auditing. Therefore, the AAOIFI organisation should critically 
discuss the importance of enforcing its standards in countries that mandatorily adopt the AAOIFI 
standards, through the regulatory body in each country. 
The next point is the nature of democratic culture; most of the sample countries do not consider 
the importance of CG, which is a serious issue that should be studied in each country. This is 
because the political systems in these countries such as, Sudan and Bahrain do not encourage the 
disclosure of more information. Hence, the importance of CG, in general, and Sharia governance, 
in particular, in these countries should be critically debated by the central bank in each country 
and the government in relation to disclosure, accountability and transparency. Moreover, Sharia 
governance aims to comply with the role of Sharia and its principles, and ensure that there is 
fairness between all stakeholders. However, IBs should be open to disclosure and transparency 
and be compliant through AAOIFI governance, as the disclosed information is a part of the Sharia 
governance system. Therefore, IBs should consider the importance of disclosure to all 
stakeholders. 
The consequences of critically evaluating the results found by this research means that the factors 
causing the low level of disclosure, must be investigated in relation to the AAOIFI governance 
disclosure of IBs, rather than immediately concluding that there is a low level of disclosure. Thus, 
it is fundamental to observe IBs’ disclosure practice and explore the perceptions of the directors 
of IBs regarding AAOIFI governance disclosure, which will be a major factor in attaining a 
conclusion to the findings.   
 
8.4 Research Implications 
Some theoretical and practical implications are made about AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs. 
These implications can be summarised as follows:  
8.4.1 Theoretical implications 
The analysis provides support for the arguments relating to agency and signalling theory, which 
suggest that a large AC have better auditing performance standards than small AC (Fama, 1980; 
Spence, 1973). The outcomes showed a significant positive association between AAOIFI 
governance disclosure and ACs. The outcomes proved that the audit committee significantly 
affects the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs. Therefore, if there is a rise in the level of 
AAOIFI governance disclosure practice, IBs may have to increase their ACs. 
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The outcomes of low-level CG disclosure in IBs are inconsistent with the accountability and 
stakeholder theories, as Gray et al., (1995) states that to be socially responsible agents they need 
to provide all financial or non-financial information, to their stakeholders. The results showed that 
IBs are still less interested in their AAOIFI governance disclosure practice, which may be because 
these standards are used voluntarily by IFIs (AAOIFI, website, 2017).  
Concerning the result of the insignificant effect of AAOIFI governance disclosure on bank 
performance (measured using ROA and ROE ratios) – this outcome is disagreeing with the 
outcomes of several types of research that are based on agency theory scope (Al-Najjar, 2014; 
Alvarado and Bravo, 2017). These papers suggest a positive association between CG 
characteristics and bank performance. According to the findings, it demonstrates that AAOIFI 
governance disclosure did not afford any significant effect to IBs’ performance that is conflicting 
with the theoretical claim discussed in the current research. This result indicated that AAOIFI 
governance disclosure does not affect the bank performance, and this might be due to the fact 
that the aim of IBs is to ensure compliance with Sharia and also to support society. Moreover, IBs 
are more interested in being effective corporate citizens and accepting their social responsibility 
to help develop the community, rather than focusing on how to make a profit. 
8.4.2 Practical implications 
The current study provides some practical implications, as follows: 
There are variations between disclosure practices in IBs’ annual reports. For these reasons, the 
policymakers and managers of the banks should provide more information in the annual reports 
for stakeholders. The result calls for more transparency in relation to AAOIFI governance, if banks 
want to be deemed extremely worthy in the eyes of their stakeholders. 
This result showed that the disclosure of AAOIFI governance information was limited in the annual 
reports for the chosen IBs. Thus regulatory council and policymakers might identify the minimum 
level of AAOIFI governance that every bank should disclose in an annual report. Furthermore, this 
finding is significant for IBs, which may be aware that more AAOIFI governance disclosure might 
have an important impact on the image of the company. Moreover, policymakers should in the 
future, be more effective in supporting IBs, by introducing training workshops to explain the 
importance of AAOIFI governance to internal sharia review members, audit and governance 
members. It could also be helpful for the AAOIFI organisation to be cooperative and work extra 
closely with the central banks for the countries that adopt AAOIFI standards as mandatory, to 
ensure IBs in these countries are following the AAOIFI standards. The researchers might profit 
from this research since there are a few studies on AAOIFI governance. The research gives 
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opportunities for further research in other IFIs by looking at the results and limitations of the 
current study.  
The results shown in the current study can be useful for the role of the SSB in the IBs, because the 
SSB has the ability to review and confirm that all of the activities are completely compliant with 
Sharia rules. This means that the SSB could have the authority to prohibit and evaluate the banks’ 
guidance when necessary. Otherwise, the SSB should disclose AAOIFI governance information to 
the public. To do so, IBs will highlight their AAOIFI governance standards, and that, in turn, will 
increase their reputation and improve the faith of current clients and, as a consequence, engage 
with new investors and realise a higher level of trust from the public in IBs. This implication is 
supported by the result of El-Halaby et al. (2018) which suggested that IBs should improve the 
level of disclosure to engage more clients, based on their faith and loyalty of following sharia 
compliance.  
 
 
8.5 Research Limitations and Suggestions for Future study 
This study has a number of limitations that could be taken as avenues for future study. Firstly, this 
research focuses on IBs that adopt AAOIFI standards as mandatory only, which includes eight 
countries only. The designs of the current study could be implemented in all IBs around the world 
that could be a good object for future studies. Secondly, the current study used the six variables 
of CG and the four variables of firm characteristics, based on available data. Future studies may 
consider other CG characteristics, such as ownership variables, managerial ownership, family 
ownership and SSB variables, and consider the influence of country features, like legal systems, 
political factors and cultural issues, to compare between the different cultural and environmental 
contexts between countries. 
Thirdly, this research is limited to just IBs. Future study might consider other IFIs, for example, 
Islamic insurance companies and Islamic investment companies. Fourthly, this research focuses 
on two measurements of bank performance, ROA and ROE, but it would be good to employ other 
firm performance measures, such as profit margin measures. Fifthly, this research depends on the 
annual reports only as a research source. Further research could include the collection of data 
from other sources, like websites, social networks and interim reports. Sixthly, the current study 
focuses on IBs that mandatorily adopt the AAOIFI standards only, while there are other IBs that 
follow the AAOIFI standards voluntarily. Therefore, further research could compare the AAOIFI 
standards of compliant banks with non-compliant ones. In addition, the researcher was unable to 
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arrange an interview with the SSB to get its judgment on AAOIFI governance disclosure and its 
function of encouraging IBs to offer a greater level of disclosure and transparency. Further 
research could be to carry out a qualitative study by interviewing the SSB. Another further 
direction could be regarding the test of the association between AAOIFI governance disclosure 
and the reputation of IBs. Finally, the sample used in the current study draws on only 126 annual 
reports over three years, because of the difficulties in collecting more annual reports. Therefore, 
further research could be to study more years.  
   
8.6 Epilogue 
In conclusion, the purpose of this research is to investigate the level of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure in IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards, and also examines the determinants 
and consequences of AAOIFI governance disclosure. Regardless of the empirical proof of this 
study, which reveals that the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure was low, the function of IBs is 
an important role with regard to providing services and products that are compliant with Sharia 
principles. However, in enhancing the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure of IBs, the AAOIFI 
governance should be incorporated into the Islamic banking system to decrease the gap between 
the actuality and the aspirations of the purposes of Islamic principles.  
Generally, as the introduction and findings chapters show, this study has achieved its aim and 
objectives as outlined at the beginning of the study. Moreover, the study confirms that it has 
been methodically and scientifically managed in a structured method. 
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Appendices  
 
Appendix A: sample of AAOIFI Governance disclosure index 
Disclosure 
Items 
                        Statement   Source  
1. At least three 
members 
appointed by 
shareholders at 
the annual 
meeting 
“ Sharia Supervisory Board 
The Group’s activities are subject to supervision of Sharia Supervisory Board 
consisting of three members appointed by the general assembly of 
shareholders.” 
 
Q invest 
bank, (2013, 
p.52) 
2. Experts in 
Islamic 
commercial 
jurisprudence 
“An independent sharai supervisory Board approves alizz Islamic bank products 
and services. The member of shari’a Supervisory committee are the scholars 
with knowledge and expertise in Islamic jurisprudence” 
“ PhD is sharia & Law, in the field of financial contracts& Transactions, Al Azhar 
University,1985 master of Comparative jurisprudence, sharia & Law college, Al 
Azhar university, 1980” 
Alizz 
IB,(2013, 
p.25) 
 
Jordan Dubai 
IB 
(2013,P.30) 
3. The role, 
responsibilities 
and authorities of 
the board 
“Supervisory Board. The sharia ’a Supervisory Board believes that ensuring the 
conformity of its activities and investments with the provisions of Islamic 
sharia’a is the sole responsibility of the Bank’s Management while the Sharia’a 
Supervisory Board is only responsible for expressing an independent opinion 
and preparing a report thereabout” 
Bahrain 
IB,(2013,p.40
) 
4. SSB seek the 
service of 
consultants who 
have expertise in 
business, 
economics, law 
and accounting 
“Part-time lecturer at Arab Academy of financial & Banking Sciences” 
 
“Sheikh Yaqouby holds a Bachelor degree in economics and comparative 
religions from McGill University,Canada. He has authored a large number of 
books” 
Jordan Dubai 
IB 
(2013,P.30) 
 
Ithmar Bank 
(2014,p. 23) 
5.  Ensure that 
the IFI documents 
and confirms the 
SSB acceptance 
of the 
appointment  
“ While issuing this report, the Board confirm that the use of any document, 
instrument or contract or entering into any agreement or investment or 
carrying out any of the activities shall be approved in advance by the Board to 
ensure that it complies with the sharia ‘a requirements and the correct 
procedures shall be put into consideration while executing them” 
Alizz IB 
(2015,P.37) 
6.The dismissal of 
a member of the 
SSB will require a 
recommendation 
by the board of 
directors and be 
subject to the 
approval of the 
shareholders at 
general meeting  
 
“The Bank is fully committed to the Monetary Council resolution No. 792/m 
n/dated 2007, and its amendments, concerning the requirements of accepting 
the Shari'a Supervisory Board in Islamic banks and cases of withdrawal of 
acceptance.” 
Syria 
international 
IB 
(2015,p.35) 
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7. The SSB report 
signed by the 
board members. 
 
 
Investors 
Bank,(2013,p
.12) 
8.information 
around the 
bank’s 
accountability of 
zakah 
“Zakat is calculated in accordance to sharia standard on Zakat issued by the 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). 
Shareholders are responsible for payment of Zakat on their shares” 
Ithmaar 
Bank 
(2014,p.53) 
 
9. information 
around the 
bank’s 
accountability of 
actions that do 
not comply with 
Sharia and how 
the bank deals 
with it 
“All the gains made from sources denied by the provisions of the principles of 
Shari’a may be avoided and disbursed in the areas of good and have been 
obtained confirmations from the bank to spend them for charitable purposes 
and in accordance with our directives and the supervision of the Shari’a 
Supervisory Authority” 
“Gains made from sources prohibited by sharia were identified and transferred 
to the charity fund” 
Cham Bank ( 
2015,p.30) 
 
 
Ithmaar 
Bank 
(2014,p.53) 
 
10. information 
around how 
distribution 
processes in 
profit  
“ The distribution of profit and allocation of losses on investment accounts was 
in line with the basis and principles approved by the Sharia’a Supervisory Board 
and in accordance to Islamic Sharia” 
 
Bahrain IB 
(2015,P.41) 
11.information 
around the 
independence of 
the SSB with 
charter shows the 
aims of the board 
 
“The Shari'a Supervisory Board is solely responsible for expressing its 
independent opinion based on the monitoring of the operations, which is 
reflected in the system and the reports attached and submitted to the Board” 
Syria 
international 
IB 
(2013,p.24) 
12information 
around opinion 
for the SSB 
around complete 
compliance of the 
bank with the 
rules of Islamic 
sharia 
“ In our opinion:  
(1) The contracts, transactions and dealings entered into by the Bank during the 
year ended 31/12/2013 that we have reviewed are in compliance with the 
Islamic Shari’a Rules and Principles;” 
Investors 
Bank,(2013,p
.12) 
13.SSB     has 
complete suitable 
checks of 
documents, 
operation and 
reviews of job, as 
suitable, for the 
compliance with 
Sharia 
“We conducted our review which included examining, on a test basis of each 
type of transaction, the relevant documentation and procedures adopted by the 
bank” 
Investors 
Bank,(2013,p
.12) 
14.information 
around the date 
of the report  and 
“We have reviewed the principles and the contracts relating to the transactions 
and applications introduced by the investors Bank during the period ended 
Investors 
Bank,(2013,p
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name of the bank 31/12/2013” .12) 
15.Cheking of the 
scope of an IFIs 
compliance with 
Sharia in whole 
actions  
“Functions of the Shari'a Supervisory Board: Control the work and activities of 
the bank to ensure that its work is compatible with the provisions of Islamic law 
and review the operations to verify that they are free from any illegal activity. 
 
Palestine IB 
(2014,p.41) 
16. The SR of an 
IFIs Sharia review 
does not relieve 
management’s 
responsibility for 
compliance 
“According to the context of article (57) section (a) of the Bank’s Articles of 
Association which read: (Fatwa and Research Department is responsible for 
ensuring that all the bank’s business is performed in according with Islamic 
sharia rules and principles). The department conducted its review which 
included examining on a test basis of each type of transaction the relevant 
documentation and procedures adopted by the bank” 
Tadamon IB 
(2013,P.18) 
17 Guarantee 
that the actions 
done out by an 
IFI do not 
contravene 
Sharia 
“Forming and expressing an opinion on the bank's compliance with Islamic law 
and submitting periodic reports to the Board of Directors and the semi-annual 
and annual Shari'a Supervisory Report of the Public Authority and publishing its 
report on the legitimate activities of the Shari’a.” 
Palestine IB 
(2014,p.41) 
18.Checking 
other 
information and 
reports, like 
circulars, 
minutes, process 
and financial 
statement, plans 
and transactions 
  Studying the reports and observations of the Shari'a auditor on the 
performance of the daily tasks by the administrative administration and the 
scope of their compliance with the requirements of the Shari’a and guidance as 
necessary 
Palestine IB 
(2014,p.41) 
19. Discussing 
findings with a 
member of IFI 
management 
“Compose and express an opinion on the extent of the Bank’s commitment to 
the Islamic jurisprudence of financial transactions, present periodic sharia 
oversight reports to the Board of Directors and semi-annual and annual reports 
to the General Assembly, and publish its report, which must contain any 
objectionable activities that were found to sharia law, if any” 
Arab IB 
(2015,p.65) 
20 .complete by 
an independent 
department or 
part of the 
internal audit 
department 
 “Internal Shari'a Audit is an inseparable part of internal control and operates in 
accordance with the Bank's policies. The scope of the internal Shari'ah audit 
involves examining and evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Shari'a Control System with a view to changing if the existing system provides 
reasonable assurance that the Bank's management has taken responsibility for 
enforcing the Islamic Shari’a As determined by the Shari'a Supervisory Board of 
the Bank” 
Syria 
international 
IBs 
(2013,p.50) 
21.Continuous 
examination and 
evaluation of the 
extent of an 
institution’s 
compliance with 
Sharia 
“The importance of internal sharia auditing stems from the importance of its 
function to review the bank's commitment in all its operations and its 
transactions in the provisions and principles of Islamic Shari'a. It contributes to 
creating a climate of trust among the public of customers with Islamic banks 
and avoiding the dangers of reputation” 
“Provides appropriate recommendations to improve and enhance the 
compliance with sharia guidelines. This is done through review and approval of 
the contracts, agreement, policies, procedures, products’ manuals, process 
flows, core banking system, application of accounting standards, transaction, 
fees, charges, commissions, financial and management reporting etc. SCU is  
also responsible for the sharia non-compliance risk management function” 
Syria 
international 
IBs 
(2013,p.50) 
 
 
Alizz IB 
(2013,p.87) 
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22.The charter 
will be confirmed 
by the SSB of the 
IFI and published 
by the BOD 
The internal legal auditor submits the Shari'a Audit reports to the Board of 
Directors and the Audit Committee after the comments and recommendations 
are discussed with the appropriate administrative levels 
Syria 
international 
IBs 
(2013,p.50) 
 
23.The charter 
will be regularly 
reviewed 
“To ensure direct and regular communication of the internal Shari’a auditor 
with all administrative levels and with the Shari'a Supervisory Board, the Board 
of Directors, the Audit Committee, the Internal and External Auditors, and the 
Internal Bank Auditor. There should also be no limits to the scope of work of 
internal auditors or to restrict their access to any documents” 
Syria 
international 
IBs 
(2013,p.51) 
24.The charter 
will make clear no 
administrative 
power has 
accountability for 
the actions they 
check 
“Ensuring the independence of the internal audit department so that the 
Internal Shari’a Audit Department operates under the supervision of the Audit 
Committee”  
 “ The independence of the internal audit department is the independence of its 
work from the activities and areas of scrutiny while not assigned any executive 
tasks related to those activities and areas directly or indirectly to avoid the 
resulting conflict of interest, ensuring the objectivity and impartiality in its 
work” 
 
Syria 
international 
IBs 
(2013,p.50) 
25.The staff have 
an appropriate 
educational 
background and 
training relevant 
to the ISR 
“  Provide the internal audit department with adequate and qualified staff to 
carry out the legal/Shari’a auditing work” 
 
Syria 
international 
IBs 
(2013,p.50) 
26.conform with 
the code of Ethics 
for Accountants 
and Auditors of 
IFIs published via 
the AAOIF 
“Internal Shari'a Audit is an inseparable part of internal control and operates in 
accordance with the Bank's policies. The scope of the internal Shari'ah audit 
involves examining and evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Shari'a Control System with a view to changing if the existing system provides 
reasonable assurance that the Bank's management has taken responsibility for 
enforcing the Islamic Shari’a As determined by the Shari'a Supervisory Board of 
the Bank.” 
 
Syria 
international 
IBs 
(2013,p.50) 
27.Aminimum  
quarterly written 
report will be 
intended, that 
have to  sign via 
the leader of the 
ISR 
SCD (Sharia compliance department ) 
“SCD reports functionally directly to SSB reports in parallel to CEO with respect 
to administrative issues, SSB through SCD provides copies of the Sharia decision 
and resolutions to Board of Directors and CEO because management is 
responsible to assure that Sharia resolution are executed in the transactions 
and all products and services of the bank” 
Bank Nizwa 
(2015,p.9) 
28. Review of 
internal controls 
(including an 
internal audit) 
“The Audit Committee has the responsibility to assist the Board in discharging 
its oversight duties relating to matters such as risk and compliance, including 
the integrity of the Bank’s financial statements, financial reporting process and 
systems, internal controls and financial controls” 
Investors 
Bank 
(2013,p.52) 
29. Reviewing 
resources and 
skills, scope of 
responsibility, all 
job programme 
and reporting 
lines of the 
internal audit 
The audit Committee shall exercise the responsibility and authorities so 
assigned to it by virtue of the banks’ Law and other relevant statutes, this shall 
comprise reviewing the following:  
C. a) Scope, results and extent of adequacy of the Bank’s internal and external 
auditing  
 
Islamic 
International 
bank 
(2014,p.124) 
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30.Reviewing the 
major outcome of 
an internal audit 
“The audit committee approve the annual audit and controls its application, in 
addition to reviewing the audit notes; and the audit committee is considered 
responsible directly for supervision of the activities of the internal audit 
management” 
Jordan Dubi 
(2013,p.147) 
31.Checking the 
IFIs code of ethics 
and the efficiency 
with which it is 
complete 
  
32.Checking the 
effectiveness of 
the IFIs 
framework for 
monitoring 
compliance with 
Sharia rules and 
principles 
“Evaluate the effectiveness and adequacy of the scope and programs of internal 
audit” 
“Evaluation of the effectiveness and adequacy of the internal audit function and 
the extent of their contribution to ensuring compliance with the provisions and 
principles of Islamic law and specifically the fatwas and decisions issued by the 
Shari’a Supervisory Authority” 
Syria 
International 
IB 
(2015,P.31) 
33Checking the 
IFIs accounting 
policies and 
practices and 
reporting 
requirements 
“ Review the accounting and financial policies and procedures of the Bank” 
“ Reviewing the accounting policies suitability, all the business policies related, 
and ensuring the proper and suitable implementation of the new policies and 
all policies as well” 
Masraf Al 
Rayan 
(2013,p.26) 
Jordan Dubai 
IB(2013,P.14
7) 
34. Ensuring that 
independence 
and professional 
integrity of 
auditors is not 
compromised 
“The Board will form an audit committee composed of at least three 
experienced non-executive members of the Board of Directors. The committee 
practices its power according to powers granted by the Board” 
“ The majority of the members of this committee should be independent with 
an independent member chairing the committee” 
Jordan Dubai 
IB(2013,P.14
7) 
Masraf Al 
Rayan 
(2013,p.26) 
35. Check of 
interim and 
yearly accounts 
and financial 
statement 
“Independent review by internal and external auditors.  The Audit Committee is 
responsible for review of the integrity of the Bank’s financial reporting and 
report to the Board” 
Investors 
bank(2013,p.
49) 
36.Reviewing the 
compliance with 
Sharia principles 
“The Committee shall liaise and coordinate with the Shari'a Supervisory Board 
and the Governance Committee to ensure that reports on adherence to the 
provisions and principles of Islamic Law are prepared in a timely and adequate 
manner” 
Syria 
International 
IB 
(2015,p.32) 
37 .Formally 
established via 
the BOD from its 
non- 
administrative 
members and 
appointed via the 
BOD 
“3.4 Board Committees  
Consistent with the industry practice, the Board has established the following 
board sub-committee with defined roles and responsibilities” 
“Members of management, representative of internal and external Auditors, 
independent consultants and other specialists may be invites to attend meeting 
at the request of the Chairman of the Audit Committee. 
Investors 
Bank 
(2013,p.51-
52) 
Seera 
investment 
bank 
(2015,p.17) 
38. The AGC must 
not have less 
than three 
members  
Investors 
Bank 
(2013,p52) 
39. The report of 
the AGC is 
submitted to the 
BOD, through the 
“Reporting to the Board of Directors on matters provided for this article” 
“ Draft criteria for financial disclosure submitted to the Board of Directors, 
shareholders, and other users” 
 
Masraf Al 
Rayan 
(2013,p27) 
The Arab IB 
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chairman of the 
board, and copies 
sent to the CEO  
(2013,p.47) 
 
40. SSB members 
will be just, 
faithful, 
intellectually  and 
free from 
disagreement of 
benefits 
“All the members are of the Syrian nationality and were selected after 
ascertaining that there are no substantial interests in the transactions of the 
members of the Authority or matters relating to them affecting the work of the 
bank” 
 
  “And there is no conflict of interest between any of the members of the Board 
and one of the employees or officials of the bank. 
 -  No member of the Shari'ah Supervisory Board has been granted in their 
personal capacity or the parties with whom they have any direct or indirect 
credit facilities 
-   No member of the Shari'a Supervisory Board has been granted any 
remuneration over the past year except for the compensation awarded to 
them” 
 
“Addition to the need for a good judgment and deep honest diligence to 
understand the Fiqh rules to get the Shariah opinion in financial” 
Cham 
Bank(2015,p.
128) 
 
 
Cham 
Bank(2015,p.
129) 
 
 
 
Islamic 
international 
Arab 
Abank(2015,
p.13) 
41. SSB members 
are not 
dependent their 
decision on Sharia 
supervision issues 
to others 
The members of the Shari'a Supervisory Board maintain intellectual and are 
professional independence, and no person or group is allowed to control the 
decisions taken by the Shari'a Supervisory Board. 
Cham 
Bank(2015,p.
129) 
 
42. SSBs avert 
possibility and 
active 
positions,  that 
reduce their 
capability to 
make a good 
professional 
decisions 
“The existence of the Sharia Supervisory Board contributions to further 
assurance to the shareholders and depositors, and without any doubt, 
confidence is one of the most important success factor for bank” 
“We have planned and implemented our monitoring in order to obtain the 
information and explanations that we considered necessary to provide us with 
sufficient evidence to give reasonable assurance that the Company did not 
violate the provisions and principles of Islamic Shari’a.” 
 
Alizz IB 
(2013,p.25) 
 
Arab IB 
(2014,P.65) 
43.SSB members 
are not 
employees of the 
same IFI 
“ An independent Sharia Supervisory Board approves all Alizz Islamic bank 
products and services” 
 
“Mechanism of selection of members 
After taking on the qualifications of the members and their long experience in 
the field of Islamic economy, the Board of Directors presented their candidacy 
to the Monetary and Credit Council for the approval of the Monetary and Credit 
Council on the nominated names. The recommendation was presented to the 
General Assembly at its ordinary meeting held on 26/6/2013 Which approved 
this nomination. The Board of Directors of the Monetary and Credit Council 
decided to appoint the members of the Board by resolution No. 999 of B / 4 
dated 2013/8/7” 
“The Sharia Supervisory apparatus at the Bank obtains full and continuing 
support from Management and the Board of Directors, and this ensures the 
independence of belief among Sharia internal observes during performance od 
Sharia Supervisory activities” 
 
Alizz IB 
(2013,p.27) 
 
Cham Bank 
(2015,p.127) 
 
 
 
 
Jordan Dubai 
IB 
(2013,P.61) 
44. SSB members 
are not 
contributory in 
any issue 
regarding 
executive 
decisions and 
operational 
 
“The Shari'a Supervisory Board and its members are not related to the 
administrative decisions and the responsibilities of conducting the banking 
business” 
“6. The Shari’a Supervisory Board shall be aware of all reports, including 
references to compliance with the provisions of Islamic law, its principles and 
management responses to such reports. 
7. The Shari'a Supervisory Board shall provide advice to the internal Shari'ah 
Cham Bank 
(2015,p.129) 
 
 
 
 
Cham Bank 
(2015,p.128) 
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accountability of 
the IFI 
Audit Department on the scope of the required Shari'ah audit. It shall seek to 
provide the internal audit reports and management responses thereon to 
ensure the adequacy and effectiveness of the Internal Audit Department. 
8. The Shari'a Supervisory Board shall, upon request, provide advice to parties 
that provide services to the Bank, such as auditors, law and consultants” 
 
 
45. Determined 
any cases  that 
might weaken 
independence 
and resolve them 
  
46.1  Interaction 
among the SSB or 
its members and 
administration 
should be clear 
“ Transparency and expression in a manner that enables parties concerned to 
evaluate the Bank’s position and financial performance” 
Jordan Dubai 
IB 
(2013,P.141) 
46.2  The 
accountability for 
the attitude of 
the all affairs of 
the IFI by Sharia 
rests with the 
board of directors 
“ A- The Board assumes all responsibilities relating to the Bank’s operations and 
its financial integrity and ensures that it meets requirements of the Central Bank 
of Jordan and Interests of the shareholders, depositors, borrowers, employees 
and other related parties; and ensuring that the Bank is managed wisely and 
within the framework of effective laws and regulations and the Bank’s internal 
policies” 
Jordan Dubai 
IB 
(2013,P.141) 
47.1   Equity 
holders should 
have entrance to 
vital corporate 
information 
around the 
attitude of the all 
affairs of the IFI 
to let them to 
make an 
informed 
decisions 
“ Fairness in treating all parties concerned such as :shareholders, depositors, 
borrowers, the Bank’s employees and regulatory authorities” 
 
“Commitment to the implementation of an integrated work system based on 
the principles and principles of governance and good management, which is a 
story of all the rights of shareholders provided for by the laws and regulations in 
force, particularly the Companies Law and the system of sound practices for the 
management of companies and amendments issued by the Securities and 
Securities Authority and including 
a.    The important and fundamental rights of the shareholders 
b.    The rights of shareholders to obtain information 
c.    The shareholders' rights related to the meeting of the General Authority and 
specifically the right of the president or one of the members of the Shari'a 
Supervisory Board to attend the annual meeting of the General Authority to 
read the annual report of the Shari'a Supervisory Board and to answer questions 
that may be raised about the legal matters pertaining to the bank and the right 
to appoint an independent legal authority” 
Jordan Dubai 
IB 
(2013,P.141) 
Syria 
international 
IB(2015,P.41) 
47.2  The BOD 
and management 
should be 
involved with the 
equity holders 
and responsible 
for managing 
successful and 
productive 
relationships with 
the equity 
holders 
 
“The Bank shall ensure equal treatment for all foreign shareholders and 
shareholders” 
 
Syria 
international 
IB(2015,P.41) 
47.3  Controlling 
equity holders 
should protection 
their benefits 
“Commitment the same level of Safeguard the interests to all stakeholders as 
the same level of shareholders” 
Syria 
international 
IB(2015,P.41) 
48.1  Safeguard 
against the risks 
“The Board of Directors of the Arab Islamic Bank ensures that each Bank 
shareholder enjoys all rights merited according to the valid laws, regulations, 
Arab IB 
(2013,P.26) 
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of unfair 
treatment of fund 
providers and 
other important 
stakeholders 
and instructions. These include the right to property records, the right to receive 
invitations to attend general assembly meetings, the right to fair treatment of 
all shareholders and their enjoyment of the same rights, whether in the 
distribution of cash of stock dividends, the right to transfer or mortgage shares, 
the right to vote and elect, and the priority right in new public offerings” 
48.2  Provide 
sufficient and 
timelyinformatio
n around main 
changes to its 
business that can 
have mater 
outcomes 
regarding their 
interests in the IFI 
“The Arab Islamic Bank is committed to the disclosure requirements stipulated 
by the current laws, regulations, and instructions, whether in daily disclosure 
related to essential matters or periodic disclosure related to financial data, as 
well as what must be contained in the annual report, to ensure that the 
necessary information reaches decision makers and external stakeholders such 
as shareholders, investors, and clients. Disclosure takes place through several 
media outlets, including the Bank’s website, local newspapers, the Palestine 
exchange website, and other means to ensure that the necessary information 
reaches stakeholders at the appropriate time” 
Arab IB 
(2014,P.28) 
49.  Chosen of 
members of BOD, 
SSB and 
management 
should be clear 
and according to 
a predefined set 
of standards 
“ Voting by a Group of Shareholders 
The shareholders voted in the last ordinary Central Assembly Meeting held on 
3rd May 2015 to approve the financial statements and discharge the members 
of the Board of Directors for the financial year ended 31 December 2014. The 
bonuses given to the chair and members of the board of directors for the results 
of the Bank’s work in 2014 were and members of the board of directors for the 
results of the Bank’s work in 2014 were approved as was the Bank’s future plan 
and the approval of distribution of cash dividends” 
“ Approving the strategic goals of the company and appointing Management, 
replacing it, setting its bonus, reviewing Management performance, ensuring 
succession planning for Management” 
Arab IB 
(2015,P.57) 
 
 
 
 
Masraf 
AlRayan 
(2013,p.17) 
50.1 The BOD 
should set a clear 
strategic plan 
that sets forth the 
IFI business 
strategy and 
management 
plans to 
implement it. 
“The Board of Directors (BOD) is responsible for approving the Bank’s overall 
business strategy, monitoring its operations, and taking critical business 
decision. The Board elected by the shareholders, is the ultimate decision making 
body of the Bank and has the following broad responsibilities, as enunciated in 
the corporate Governance Manual of the Bank: 
Providing effective governance over the bank’s affairs for benefit of its 
shareholders, employees, customers and other stakeholders” 
“The Board approves and oversees the implementation of the Bank’s strategic 
plan. As a part of its strategic review process, the Board reviews major plans, 
sets performance objectives; and oversees major investment divestitures and 
acquisitions. Every year at an annual Board strategy session, the Board formally 
reassesses the bank’s objective” 
Investors 
bank 
(2013,p.48) 
 
 
 
Bahrain 
IB( 2015,p.35
) 
50.2 The BOD 
should establish a 
well-aligned 
management 
structure that 
fosters the proper 
segregation of 
duties and 
enhances 
accountability 
and effectiveness 
of any 
management 
oversights 
“ Defining responsibility, regarding the clear separation between responsibilities 
and delegating authorities” 
Jordan Dubai 
IB 
(2013,p.141) 
50.3 Set effective 
financial and non-
financial 
execution 
measures for the 
periodic 
assessment of 
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effectiveness of 
governance 
51.1 The BOD 
should 
understand its 
role and that of 
management in 
the area of risk 
management 
Management is 
responsible for 
assessing and 
managing the IFI 
disclosure to 
various risks 
“The Arab Islamic Bank implements the latest best international banking criteria 
in managing all types of risks, whether financial risks, processes and operation, 
market and solvency, business, reputation, and work continuity, in order to 
achieve transparency and compliance with decisions of the monitoring bodies, 
the instructions of the Palestine Monetary Authority and the international 
criteria arising from the instructions of BASEL II.” 
Arab IB 
(2013,P.25) 
51.2 Approve the 
IFI risk strategy, 
and set tolerance 
levels for risks the 
IFI assumes, and 
establish the 
framework for 
management of 
the risks it takes 
on in its business 
 
 “The Bank’s Board of Directors has the overall responsibility for the 
establishment and oversight of the bank’s risk management framework. The 
board has established on executive committee ,aboard level subcommittee that 
is responsible for developing and monitoring the bank’s operations and policies 
across various functions including the risk management” 
Investors 
Bank( 2013,p
.60) 
51.3 Establish a 
programme for 
succession 
planning and 
leadership 
development 
“The Board has established an Executive Risk Committee, which is responsible 
for developing and implementation the bank’s risk management policies and 
procedures in all areas of the bank’s operations. The committee consists of 
heads of business units and other functional/ support units in the bank, meet on 
monthly basis and reports regularly to the board & risk management committee 
Khaleeji 
Commercial 
bank 
(2014,p.14) 
52.1 Determined 
overall situations 
of  possibility 
disagreement of 
interest and 
institute law and 
policies to ensure 
situations leading 
to such conflicts 
are avoided at all 
times 
“ 3.11 conflict of interest 
As per the Board charter: 
. Directors and employees of the Bank shall act ethically at all times and 
accordance with the Bank’s applicable Code of Conduct. If an actual or potential 
conflict of interest arises in respect of a director, the director shall promptly 
disclose such conflict to the Board” 
“ Directors shall disclose to the Board any potential conflict of interest in their 
activities with other organisations” 
Investors 
bank 
(2013,p.55) 
52.2 Those 
charged with 
governance 
should act in a 
manner that is 
free and objective 
in perspective 
 
“ Executive directors shall absent themselves from any discussions or decisions- 
making that involve a subject where they are incapable of providing objective 
advice, or which involves a subject or (proposed) transaction where a conflict of 
interest exists” 
Investors 
bank 
(2013,p.55) 
 
53. Appropriate 
compensation 
policy oversight 
 
“ Compensation 
Seera remunerates approves persons fairly and responsibly. Management 
compensation at Seera is through a pay and benefits system. A bouns system is 
in place and is based on both the business and individual performance. 
Sharia Board compensation is designed to reward the members for their 
valuable contribution to the business and involves an annual fixed component 
and variable one which is linked to the sharia Board meeting attended” 
Seera 
investment 
bank 
(2013,p.17) 
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54. Public 
Disclosure 
“ Public Disclosure Document 2013 
1 Executive Summary  
Basel 2 based guidelines of the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) outlining the 
capital adequacy framework for banks incorporated in the Kingdom of Bahrain 
become effective from 1 January 2008 in the Kingdom of Bahrain.  
This document encompasses the detailed qualitative and quantities public 
disclosure requirements (to enhance corporate governance and transparency). 
The document contains a description of following major aspects of investors 
Bank” 
Investors 
bank 
(2013,p.47) 
 
55. Code of 
conduct and 
ethics 
The BOD aspires to the highest standards of ethical conduct: doing what it says; 
reporting results with accuracy and transparency; and maintaining full 
compliance with the laws, rules and regulations that govern the Bank’s 
business. The Board attempts to monitors compliance of the ethical conduct 
through periodic reviews by compliance and the internal audit function” 
“ Write Code of Ethics and Business Conduct 
The bank has documented a code of Ethics and Business Conduct, including a 
code applicable to the Directors. The aforementioned documents are available 
with the management and can be provided to the shareholders on request” 
Investors 
bank 
(2013,p.49) 
 
 
International 
investment 
bank 
(2014,p.18) 
56. Appropriate 
enforcement of 
governance 
principles and 
standards 
Corporate Governance Guide for Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 
The Bank, represented by the Board of Directors, confirms its commitment to all 
the requirements of the Corporate Governance Guide and further confirms the 
ongoing follow up for all the items” 
Jordan Dubai 
IB 
(2013,P.140) 
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 Appendix B: A Summary of Literature Looking at How Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms Affect the Level of Disclosure 
 
Name of Variables Positive  Negative  Insignificant 
Independent Directors Chen and Jaggi, 2000; 
Almoataz and 
Hussainey, 2012; 
Forker, 1992; Gul and 
Leung, 2004; 
Hussainey and Al-
Najjar, 2012; 
Almanasir and 
Shivaraj, 2017; Arcay 
et al., 2005; Chen and 
Courtenay, 2006; 
Abdullah et al., 2015; 
El-Halaby and 
Hussainey, 2016; 
Gisbert and Navallas, 
2014; Scholtz and 
Smit, 2015; Nguyen, 
2014; Elfeky, 2017  
Hoitash and Bedard, 
2009; Eng and Mak, 
2003 
Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Ho and Wong, 
2001; Allegrini and 
Greco, 2013; Sultana 
et al., 2017 
Board Size Kent and Stewart, 
2008; Joshi et al., 
2017; Zaheer, 2013; 
Grassa et al., 2018; 
Nitm and Soobaroyen, 
2013 
 
Ostadhashemi and 
Aliei, 2017 
Carvalho et al., 2017; 
Zaluki and Hussin, 
2009; Hasan et al., 
2017; Arcay et al., 
2005 
Board Meeting Laksmana, 2008; 
Albawwat and Basah, 
2015; Anis et al., 2012 
Xiang et al., 2014 Fiori et al., 2016; 
Karamanou and 
Vafeas; 2005; Nelson 
et al., 2015 
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CEO Duality  Wang and Hussainey, 
2013; Arcay et al., 
2005; Ostadhashemi 
and Aliei, 2017; 
Andresson and Daoud, 
2005; Grassa et al., 
2018; Abdullah et al., 
2015; Abudallah, 2014  
Barako et al., 2006; 
Donnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008; 
Laksmana, 2008; El-
Halaby and Hussainey, 
2016; Lakhal, 2005; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Elfeky, 2017; 
Gisbert and Navallas, 
2013 
Haniffa and Cooke 
2002; Nasir and 
Abdullah, 2004; 
Nguyen, 2014; Hasan 
et al., 2017; Zaheer, 
2013; Ho and Wong, 
2001; Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006 
Audit Committee Size 
(ACS) 
Al-Moataz and 
Hussainey, 2012; 
Forker, 1992; Ho and 
Wong, 2001; Li, Pike 
and Haniffa, 2008; 
Percy and Stewart, 
2008; Hasan et al., 
2017; Almanasir and 
Shivaraj, 2017; Joshi 
et al., 2017; Arcay et 
al., 2005 
Barako, 2007 Mangena and Pike, 
2005; Madi et al., 
2014; Chay and Gray, 
2010 
Audit Committee 
Meeting 
(ACM) 
Othman et al., 2014; Li 
et al., 2012; Persons, 
2009; Akhtaruddin 
and Haron, 2010 
 Madi et al., 2014 
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